


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CHARACTERISTICS

O F

MEN, MANNERS, OPINIONS, TIMES,

WITH

A COLLECTION OF LETTERS.

BY THE RIGHT HONORABLE

ANTONY EARL OF SHAFTESBURY.

V O L. II.

B A S I L :

Printed for J. J. TOURNEISEN; and J. L. LEGRAND.

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C O N T E N T S.
OF THE
S E C O N D V O L U M E.

An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit. Page 1

The Moralists; a Philosophical Rhapsody. 147

CONTENTS

OF THE

SECOND VOLUME

An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit. Page 1

The Metaphysics; a Philosophical Rhapsody. 147

T R E A T I S E IV.

V I Z,

A N

I N Q U I R Y

C O N C E R N I N G

V I R T U E, O R M E R I T.

— *Amote quceramus seria ludo.*

Hor. sat. 1. lib. 1.

T R E A T I S E I V .

V I

A N

I N Q U I R Y

C O N C E R N I N G

V I R T U E , O R M E R I T .

— Quæstio præcedens finis habet.
Hoc lib. 1. lib. 1.

AN INQUIRY, &c.

BOOK I. PART I.

SECT. I.

Occasion of this Inquiry.

RELIGION and Virtue appear in many respects so nearly related, that they are generally presumed inseparable companions. And so willing we are to believe well of their union, that we hardly allow it just to speak, or even think of them apart. It may, however, be questioned, whether the practice of the world, in this respect, be answerable to our speculation. It is certain that we sometimes meet with instances which seem to make against this general supposition. We have known people, who having the appearance of great zeal in religion, have yet wanted even the common affections of humanity, and shown themselves extremely degenerate and corrupt. Others, again, who have paid little regard to religion, and been considered as mere Atheists, have yet been observed to practise the rules of morality, and act in many cases with such good meaning and affection towards mankind, as might seem to force an acknowledgment of their being virtuous. And, in general, we find mere moral principles of such weight, that, in

our dealings with men, we are seldom satisfied by the fullest assurance given us of their zeal in religion, till we hear something further of their character. If we are told, a man is religious, we still ask, "What are his morals?" But if we hear at first that he has honest, moral principles, and is a man of natural justice and good temper, we seldom think of the other question, "Whether he be religious and devout?"

This has given occasion to inquire, "What honesty or Virtue is, considered by itself; and in what manner it is influenced by religion: How far religion necessarily implies virtue; and whether it be a true saying, That it is impossible for an Atheist to be virtuous, or share any real degree of honesty or Merit."

And here it cannot justly be wondered at, if the method of explaining things should appear somewhat unusual; since the subject-matter has been so little examined, and is of so nice and dangerous speculation. For so much is the religious part of mankind alarmed by the freedom of some late pens, and so great a jealousy is raised every where on this account, that whatever an author may suggest in favor of religion, he will gain little credit in the cause, if he allows the least advantage to any other principle. On the other side, the men of wit and raillery, whose pleasantest entertainment is in the exposing the weak sides of religion, are so desperately afraid of being drawn into any serious thoughts of it, that they look upon a man as guilty of foul play,

who assumes the air of a free writer, and at the same time preserves any regard for the principles of natural religion. They are apt to give as little quarter as they receive; and are resolved to think as ill of the morals of their antagonists, as their antagonists can possibly think of theirs. Neither of them, it seems, will allow the least advantage to the other. It is as hard to persuade one sort, that there is any virtue in religion, as the other, that there is any virtue out of the verge of their particular community. So that, between both, an author must pass his time ill, who dares plead for religion and moral virtue, without lessening the force of either; but allowing to each its proper province, and due rank, would hinder their being made enemies by detraction.

However it be, if we would pretend to give the least new-light, or explain any thing effectually, within the intended compass of this inquiry, it is necessary to take things pretty deep; and endeavour, by some short scheme, to represent the original of each opinion, whether natural or unnatural, relating to the Deity. And if we can happily get clear of this thorny part of our philosophy, the rest, it is hoped, may prove more plain and easy.

S E C T. II.

State of opinions.

IN the whole of things, or in the universe, either all is according to a good order, and the most agreeable to a general interest; or there is that which is otherwise, and might possibly have been better constituted, more wisely contrived, and with more advantage to the general interest of beings, or of the whole.

If every thing which exists be according to a good order, and for the best; then of necessity there is no such thing as real Ill in the universe, nothing Ill with respect to the whole.

Whatsoever, then, is so as that it could not really have been better, or any way better ordered, is perfectly good. Whatsoever in the order of the world can be called Ill, must imply a possibility in the nature of the thing to have been better contrived or ordered: for if it could not, it is perfect, and as it should be.

Whatsoever is really Ill, therefore, must be caused or produced, either by design, that is to say, with knowledge and intelligence, or in defect of this, by hazard and mere chance.

If there be any thing Ill in the universe from design, then that which disposes all things, is no one good designing principle. For either the one

designing principle is itself corrupt, or there is some other in being which operates contrarily, and is Ill.

If there be any Ill in the universe from mere chance, then a designing principle or mind, whether good or bad, cannot be the cause of all things. And consequently, if there be supposed a designing principle, who is the cause only of good, but cannot prevent the ill which happens from chance, or from a contrary ill design; then there can be supposed in reality no such thing as a superior good design or mind, other than what is impotent and defective: for not to correct, or totally exclude that ill of chance, or of a contrary ill design, must proceed either from impotency or ill-will.

Whatsoever is superior in any degree over the world, or rules in nature with discernment and a mind, is what, by universal agreement, men call God. If there are several such superior minds, they are so many gods: but if that single, or those several superiors, are not in their nature necessarily good, they rather take the name of Dæmon.

To believe, therefore, that every thing is governed, ordered, or regulated for the best, by a designing principle or mind, necessarily good and permanent, is to be a perfect Theist.

To believe nothing of a designing principle or mind, nor any cause, measure, or rule of things, but chance, so that in nature neither the interest of the whole, nor of any particulars, can be said to

be in the last designed, pursued, or aimed at: is to be a perfect Atheist.

To believe no one supreme designing principle or mind, but rather two, three, or more, though in their nature good, is to be a Polytheist.

To believe the governing mind, or minds, not absolutely and necessarily good, nor confined to what is best, but capable of acting according to mere will or fancy, is to be a Dæmonist.

There are few who think always consistently, or according to one certain hypothesis, upon any subject so abstruse and intricate as the cause of all things, and the œconomy or government of the universe. For it is evident in the case of the most devout people, even by their own confession, that there are times when their faith hardly can support them in the belief of a supreme wisdom; and that they are often tempted to judge disadvantageously of a providence, and just administration in the whole.

That alone, therefore, is to be called a man's opinion, which is of any other the most habitual to him, and occurs upon most occasions. So that it is hard to pronounce certainly of any man, that he is an Atheist; because, unless his whole thoughts are, at all seasons, and on all occasions, steadily bent against all supposition or imagination of design in things, he is no perfect Atheist. In the same manner, if a man's thoughts are not at all times steady and resolute against all imagination of chance, fortune, or ill design in things, he is no perfect Theist. But if any one believes more of

chance and confusion than of design, he is to be esteemed more an Atheist than a Theist, from that which most predominates, or has the ascendant. And in case he believes more of the prevalency of an ill-designing principle, than of a good one, he is rather a Dæmonist; and may be justly so called, from the side to which the balance of his judgment most inclines.

All these sorts, both of Dæmonism, Polytheism, Atheism, and Theism, may be mixed¹. Religion

¹ As thus:

1. Theism with Dæmonism; 2. Dæmonism with Polytheism; 3. Theism with Atheism; 4. Dæmonism with Atheism; 5. Polytheism with Atheism; 6. Theism, as it stands in opposition to Dæmonism, and denotes goodness in the superior *Deity*, with Polytheism; 7. The same Theism or Polytheism with Dæmonism; 8. Or with Dæmonism and Atheism.

1. As when *the one* chief mind, or sovereign being, is, in the believer's sense, divided between a good and an ill nature, by being the cause of ill as well as good: or otherwise, when *two* distinct and contrary principles subsist; one, the author of all good, the other of all ill.

2. As when there is not *one*, but *several* corrupt minds who govern; which opinion may be called *Polydæmonism*.

3. As when chance is not excluded, but God and chance divide.

4. As when an evil dæmon and chance divide.

5. As when many minds and chance divide.

6. As when there are more principal minds than one, but agreeing in good, with one and the same will and reason.

7. As when the same system of Deity or corresponding Deity subsists, together with a contrary principle, or with several contrary principles or governing minds.

8. As when the last case is, together with chance.

excludes only perfect Atheism. Perfect Dæmonists undoubtedly there are in religion; because we know whole nations who worship a devil or fiend, to whom they sacrifice and offer prayers and supplications, in reality on no other account than because they fear him. And we know very well, that, in some religions, there are those who expressly give no other idea of God, than of a being arbitrary, violent, causing ill, and ordaining to misery; which in effect is the same as to substitute a Dæmon, or devil, in his room.

Now, since there are these several opinions concerning a superior power; and since there may be found perhaps some persons who have no formed opinion at all upon this subject, either through scepticism, negligence of thought, or confusion of judgment; the consideration is, how any of these opinions, on this want of any certain opinion, may possibly consist with Virtue and Merit, or be compatible with an honest or moral character.

P A R T II.

S E C T. I.

A constitution. Whole and parts. Interest or end in creatures. Interest of the species. Goodness. Private good. Private system. System of the species. Animal system. System of the earth. Planetary system. Universal system. Absolute ill. Relative ill. Good and ill man. Goodness through affection.

WHEN we reflect on any ordinary frame or constitution, either of art or nature; and consider how hard it is to give the least account of a particular part, without a competent knowledge of the whole; we need not wonder to find ourselves at a loss in many things relating to the constitution and frame of Nature herself. For to what end in nature many things, even whole species of creatures, refer, or to what purpose they serve, will be hard for any one justly to determine: but to what end the many proportions and various shapes of parts in many creatures actually serve, we are able, by the help of study and observation, to demonstrate with great exactness.

We know that every creature has a private good and interest of his own; which Nature has compelled him to seek, by all the advantages

afforded him, within the compass of his make. We know that there is in reality a right and a wrong state of every creature; and that his right one is by nature forwarded, and by himself affectionately fought. There being therefore in every creature a certain interest or good, there must be also a certain End, to which every thing in his constitution must naturally refer. To this End if any thing, either in his appetites, passions, or affections, be not conducing, but the contrary; we must of necessity own it ill to him. And in this manner he is ill with respect to himself; as he certainly is with respect to others of his kind, when any such appetites or passions make him any way injurious to them. Now, if, by the natural constitution of any rational creature, the same irregularities of appetite which make him ill to others, make him ill also to himself; and if the same regularity of affections which causes him to be good in one sense, causes him to be good also in the other; then is that goodness by which he is thus useful to others, a real good and advantage to himself. And thus virtue and interest may be found at last to agree.

Of this we shall consider particularly in the latter part of our inquiry. Our first design is, to see if we can clearly determine, what that quality is to which we give the name of goodness, or Virtue.

Should a historian or traveller describe to us a certain creature of a more solitary disposition than ever was yet heard of; one who had neither

mate nor fellow of any kind ; nothing of his own likeness , towards which he stood well affected or inclined ; nor any thing without , or beyond himself , for which he had the least passion or concern : we might be apt to say perhaps , without much hesitation , “ That this was doubtless a very
“ melancholy creature ; and that , in this unfociable
“ and sullen state , he was like to have a very
“ disconsolate kind of life . ” But if we were assured , that , notwithstanding all appearances , the creature enjoyed himself extremely , had a great relish of life , and was in nothing wanting to his own good ; we might acknowledge perhaps , “ That the creature was no monster , nor absurdly
“ constituted as to himself . ” But we should hardly , after all , be induced to say of him , “ That he
“ was a good creature . ” However , should it be urged against us , “ That such as he was , the
“ creature was still perfect in himself , and therefore
“ to be esteemed good ; for what had he to do
“ with others ? ” in this sense , indeed , we might be forced to acknowledge , “ That he was a good
“ creature , if he could be understood to be absolute
“ and complete in himself ; without any real relation
“ to any thing in the universe besides . ” For should there be any where in nature a system , of which this living creature was to be considered as a part , then could he no wise be allowed good , whilst he plainly appeared to be such a part , as made rather to the harm than good of that system or whole in which he was included .

If therefore , in the structure of this or any

other animal, there be any thing which points beyond himself, and by which he is plainly discovered to have relation to some other being or nature besides his own, then will this animal undoubtedly be esteemed a part of some other system. For instance, if an animal has the proportions of a male, it shows he has relation to a female. And the respective proportions both of the male and female will be allowed, doubtless, to have a joint relation to another existence and order of things beyond themselves. So that the creatures are both of them to be considered as parts of another system; which is that of a particular race or species of living creatures, who have some one common nature, or are provided for, by some one order or constitution of things subsisting together, and co-operating towards their conservation and support.

In the same manner, if a whole species of animals contribute to the existence or well-being of some other; then is that whole species in general a part only of some other system.

For instance: To the existence of the spider, that of the fly is absolutely necessary. The heedless flight, weak frame, and tender body of this latter insect, fits and determines him as much a prey, as the rough make, watchfulness, and cunning of the former, fits him for rapine, and the insnaring part. The web and wing are suited to each other. And in the structure of each of these animals, there is as apparent and perfect a relation to the other, as in our own

bodies there is a relation of limbs and organs, or; as in the branches or leaves of a tree, we see a relation of each to the other, and all in common to one root and trunk.

In the same manner are flies also necessary to the existence of other creatures, both fowls and fish. And thus are other species or kinds subservient to one another; as being parts of a certain system, and included in one and the same order of beings,

So that there is a system of all animals; an animal order or œconomy, according to which the animal affairs are regulated and disposed.

Now, if the whole system of animals, together with that of vegetables, and all other things in this inferior world, be properly comprehended in one system of a globe or earth; and if, again, this globe or earth itself appears to have a real dependence on something still beyond; as, for example, either on its sun, the galaxy, or its fellow-planets; then is it in reality a Part only of some other system. And if it be allowed, that there is in like manner a System of all things, and a universal nature; there can be no particular being or system, which is not either good or ill in that general one of the universe: for if it be insignificant, and of no use, it is a fault or imperfection, and consequently ill in the general system.

Therefore, if any being be wholly and really Ill; it must be ill with respect to the universal system; and then the system of the universe is ill,

or imperfect. But if the ill of one private system be the good of others ; if it makes still to the good of the general system , (as when one creature lives by the destruction of another , one thing is generated from the corruption of another , or one planetary system or vortex may swallow up another) , then is the ill of that private system no real ill in itself ; any more than the pain of breeding teeth is ill , in a system or body which is so constituted , that , without this occasion of pain , it would suffer worse , by being defective.

So that we cannot say of any being , that it is wholly and absolutely ill , unless we can positively show and ascertain , that what we call Ill is nowhere Good besides , in any other system , or with respect to any other order or œconomy whatsoever.

But were there in the world any entire species of animals destructive to every other , it might be justly called an ill species , as being ill in the animal system. And if in any species of animals , as in men , for example , one man is of a nature pernicious to the rest , he is in this respect justly styled an ill man.

We do not , however , say of any one , that he is an ill man , because he has the plague-spots upon him , or because he has convulsive fits which make him strike and wound such as approach him. Nor do we say , on the other side , that he is a good man , when having his hands tied up , he is hindered from doing the mischief he designs ;

or , which is in a manner the same , when he abstains from executing his ill purpose , through a fear of some impending punishment , or through the allurements of some exterior reward.

So that in a sensible creature , that which is not done through any affection at all , makes neither good nor ill in the nature of that creature ; who then only is supposed good , when the good or ill of the system to which he has relation , is the immediate object of some passion or affection moving him.

Since it is therefore by affection merely that a creature is esteemed good or ill , natural or unnatural ; our business will be , to examine which are the good and natural , and which the ill and unnatural affections.

S E C T. II.

Private or Self-affection. Temper.

IN the first place , then , it may be observed , that if there be an affection towards any subject considered as private good , which is not really such , but imaginary ; this affection , as being superfluous , and detracting from the force of other requisite and good affections , is in itself vicious and ill , even in respect of the private interest or happiness of the creature.

If there can possibly be supposed in a creature such an affection towards self-good , as is actually ,

in its natural degree, conducing to his private interest, and at the same time inconsistent with the public good; this may indeed be called still a vicious affection: and on this supposition, a creature¹ cannot really be good and natural in respect of his society or public, without being ill and unnatural towards himself. But if the affection be then only injurious to the society, when it is immoderate, and not so when it is moderate, duly tempered, and allayed; then is the immoderate degree of the affection truly vicious, but not the moderate. And thus, if there be found in any creature a more than ordinary self-concernment, or regard to private good, which is inconsistent with the interest of the species or public; this must in every respect be esteemed an ill and vicious affection. And this is what we commonly call Selfishness, and disapprove so much, in whatever creature we happen to discover it².

On the other side, if the affection towards private or self good, however selfish it may be esteemed, is in reality not only consistent with public good, but in some measure contributing to it; if it be such, perhaps, as, for the good of the species in general, every individual ought to share; it is so far from being ill, or blameable in any sense, that it must be acknowledged absolutely necessary to constitute a creature good.

¹ Infra, book 2. part 1. § 1. parag. 5. book 2. part 2. § 3. parag. 1. &c.

² Vol. 1. p. 102.

For if the want of such an affection as that towards self-preservation, be injurious to the species; a creature is ill and unnatural, as well through this defect, as through the want of any other natural affection. And this no one would doubt to pronounce; if he saw a man who minded not any precipices which lay in his way, nor made any distinction of food, diet, clothing, or whatever else related to his health and being. The same would be averred of one who had a disposition which rendered him averse to any commerce with womankind, and of consequence unfitted him, through illness of temper, and not merely through a defect of constitution, for the propagation of his species or kind.

Thus the affection towards self-good, may be a good affection, or an ill one. For if this private affection be too strong, (as when the excessive love of life unfits a creature for any generous act), then is it undoubtedly vicious; and if vicious, the creature who is moved by it, is viciously moved, and can never be otherwise than vicious in some degree, when moved by that affection. Therefore, if, through such an earnest and passionate love of life, a creature be accidentally induced to do good, (as he might be upon the same terms induced to do ill), he is no more a good creature for this good he executes, than a man is the more an honest or good man, either for pleading a just cause, or fighting in a good one, for the sake merely of his fee or stipend.

Whatsoever therefore is done which happens to be advantageous to the species, through an affection merely towards self-good, does not imply any more goodness in the creature than as the affection itself is good. Let him, in any particular, act ever so well, if, at the bottom, it be that selfish affection alone which moves him, he is in himself still vicious. Nor can any creature be considered otherwise, when the passion towards self-good, though ever so moderate, is his real motive, in the doing that to which a natural affection for his kind ought by right to have inclined him.

And indeed, whatever exterior helps or succours an ill-disposed creature may find, to push him on towards the performance of any one good action; there can no goodness arise in him till his temper be so far changed, that in the issue he comes in earnest to be led by some immediate affection, directly, and not accidentally, to good, and against ill.

For instance: If one of those creatures supposed to be by nature tame, gentle, and favorable to mankind, be, contrary to his natural constitution, fierce and savage; we instantly remark the breach of temper, and own the creature to be unnatural and corrupt. If, at any time afterwards, the same creature, by good fortune, or right management, comes to lose his fierceness, and is made tame, gentle, and treatable, like other creatures of his kind, it is acknowledged, that the creature thus restored

becomes good and natural. Suppose now, that the creature has indeed a tame and gentle carriage, but that it proceeds only from the fear of his keeper; which if set aside, his predominant passion instantly breaks out; then is his gentleness not his real temper; but his true and genuine nature, or natural temper, remaining just as it was, the creature is still as ill as ever.

Nothing therefore being properly either goodness or illness in a creature, except what is from natural temper; "A good creature is such a one
" as, by the natural temper or bent of his affec-
" tions, is carried primarily and immediately, and
" not secondarily and accidentally, to good,
" and against ill:" and an ill creature is just the contrary, viz. "One who is wanting in right
" affections, of force enough to carry him directly
" towards good, and bear him out against ill; or
" who is carried by other affections directly to
" ill, and against good."

When, in general, all the affections or passions are suited to the public good, or good of the species, as above mentioned; then is the natural temper entirely good. If, on the contrary, any requisite passion be wanting, or if there be any one supernumerary, or weak, or any wise disserviceable, or contrary to that main end; then is the natural temper, and consequently the creature himself, in some measure corrupt and ill.

There is no need of mentioning either envy, malice, forwardness, or other such hateful passions; to show in what manner they are ill, and constitute

an ill creature. But it may be necessary perhaps to remark, that even as to kindness and love of the most natural sort, such as that of any creature for its offspring, if it be immoderate and beyond a certain degree, it is undoubtedly vicious. For thus over-great tenderness destroys the effect of love, and excessive pity renders us incapable of giving succour. Hence the excess of motherly love is owned to be a vicious fondness; over-great pity, effeminacy and weakness; over-great concern for self-preservation, meanness and cowardice; too little, rashness; and none at all, or that which is contrary, viz. a passion leading to self-destruction, a mad and desperate depravity.

S E C T. III.

Reflex affection. Moral beauty and deformity. Public Good an object. Goodness and virtue. Unequal affection, or iniquity. Impaired sense. Corrupt opinion. Right and wrong. Vice in opinion. Vicious worship. Vicious custom.

BUT to proceed from what is esteemed mere goodness, and lies within the reach and capacity of all sensible creatures, to that which is called Virtue or Merit, and is allowed to man only:

In a creature capable of forming general notions of things, not only the outward beings

which offer themselves to the sense, are the objects of the affection; but the very actions themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, become objects. So that, by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of affection towards those very affections themselves, which have been already felt, and are now become the subject of a new liking or dislike.

The case is the same in the mental or moral subjects, as in the ordinary bodies, or common subjects of sense. The shapes, motions, colors, and proportions of these latter being presented to our eye, there necessarily results a beauty or deformity¹, according to the different measure, arrangement, and disposition of their several parts. So in behaviour and actions, when presented to our understanding, there must be found, of necessity, an apparent difference, according to the regularity or irregularity of the subjects.

The Mind, which is spectator or auditor of other minds, cannot be without its eye and ear, so as to discern proportion, distinguish sound, and scan each sentiment or thought which comes before it. It can let nothing escape its censure. It feels the soft and harsh, the agreeable and disagreeable, in the affections; and finds a foul and fair, a harmonious and a dissonant, as really and truly here,

¹ Rhapsody, part 3. § 2. parag. 42. in this volume.

as in any musical numbers, or in the outward forms or representations of sensible things. Nor can it² withhold its admiration and ecstasy, its aversion and scorn, any more in what relates to one than to the other of these subjects. So that to deny the common and natural sense of a sublime and beautiful in things, will appear in affectation merely³, to any one who considers duly of this affair.

Now, as in the sensible kind of objects, the species or images of bodies, colors, and sounds, are perpetually moving before our eyes, and acting on our senses, even when we sleep; so in the moral and intellectual kind, the forms and images of things are no less active and incumbent on the mind, at all seasons, and even when the real objects themselves are absent.

In these vagrant characters or pictures of manners, which the mind of necessity figures to itself, and carries still about with it, the heart cannot possibly remain neutral; but constantly takes part one way or other. However false or corrupt it be within itself, it finds the difference, as to beauty and comeliness, between one heart and another, one turn of affection, one behaviour, one sentiment and another, and accordingly, in all disinterested cases, must approve in some measure of what is natural and honest, and disapprove what is dishonest and corrupt.

² Rhapsody, part 3. § 2. parag. 43. &c.

³ Vol. 1. p. 76, 77. Misc. 2. ch. 1. parag. 6. &c. in vol. 3.

Thus the several motions, inclinations, passions, dispositions, and consequent carriage and behaviour of creatures in the various parts of life, being in several views or perspectives represented to the mind, which readily discerns the good and ill towards the species or public; there arises a new trial or exercise of the heart; which must either rightly and soundly affect what is just and right, and disaffect what is contrary; or corruptly affect what is ill, and disaffect what is worthy and good.

And in this case alone it is we call any creature worthy or virtuous, when it can have the notion of a public interest, and can attain the speculation or science of what is morally good or ill, admirable or blameable, right or wrong. For though we may vulgarly call an ill horse vicious, yet we never say of a good one, nor of any mere beast, idiot, or changeling, though ever so good-natured, that he is worthy or virtuous.

So that if a creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate; yet if he cannot reflect on what he himself does, or sees others do, so as to take notice of what is worthy or honest, and make that notice or conception of worth and honesty to be an object of his affection, he has not the character of being virtuous: for thus, and no otherwise, he is capable of having a sense of right or wrong; a sentiment or judgment of what is done, through just, equal, and good affection, or the contrary.

Whatsoever is done through any unequal affec-

tion, is iniquitous, wicked, and wrong. If the affection be equal, sound, and good, and the subject of the affection such as may with advantage to society be ever in the same manner prosecuted or affected; this must necessarily constitute what we call equity and right in any action. For Wrong is not such action as is barely the cause of harm, since at this rate a dutiful son aiming at an enemy, but by mistake or ill chance happening to kill his father, would do a wrong: but when any thing is done through insufficient or unequal affection, as when a son shows no concern for the safety of a father; or, where there is need of succour, prefers an indifferent person to him, this is of the nature of wrong.

Neither can any weakness or imperfection in the senses be the occasion of iniquity or wrong; if the object of the mind itself be not at any time absurdly framed, nor any way improper, but suitable, just, and worthy of the opinion and affection applied to it. For if we will suppose a man, who being sound and entire both in his reason and affection, has nevertheless so depraved a constitution or frame of body, that the natural objects are, through his organs of sense, as through ill glasses, falsely conveyed and misrepresented; it will be soon observed, in such a person's case, that since his failure is not in his principal or leading part, he cannot in himself be esteemed iniquitous or unjust.

It is otherwise in what relates to opinion, belief, or speculation. For as the extravagance of

judgment or belief is such, that in some countries even monkeys, cats, crocodiles, and other vile or destructive animals, have been esteemed holy, and worshipped even as deities; should it appear to any one of the religion or belief of those countries, that to save such a creature as a cat, preferably to a parent, was right; and that other men, who had not the same religious opinion, were to be treated as enemies, till converted; this would be certainly wrong, and wicked in the believer: and every action, grounded on this belief, would be an iniquitous, wicked, and vicious action.

And thus whatsoever causes a misconception or misapprehension of the worth or value of any object, so as to diminish a due, or raise any undue, irregular, or unsocial affection, must necessarily be the occasion of wrong. Thus he who affects or loves a man for the sake of something which is reputed honorable, but which is in reality vicious, is himself vicious and ill. The beginnings of this corruption may be noted in many occurrences: as when an ambitious man, by the fame of his high attempts, a conqueror or a pirate by his boasted enterprises, raises in another person an esteem and admiration of that immoral and inhuman character, which deserves abhorrence; it is then that the hearer becomes corrupt, when he secretly approves the ill he hears. But, on the other side, the man who loves and esteems another, as believing him to have that virtue which he has not, but only counterfeits, is not on this account either vicious or corrupt.

A mistake therefore in fact being no cause or sign of ill affection, can be no cause of vice. But a mistake of right being the cause of unequal affection, must of necessity be the cause of vicious action, in every intelligent or rational being.

But as there are many occasions where the matter of right may even to the most discerning part of mankind appear difficult, and of doubtful decision, it is not a slight mistake of this kind which can destroy the character of a virtuous or worthy man. But when, either through superstition or ill custom, there come to be very gross mistakes in the assignment or application of the affection; when the mistakes are either in their nature so gross, or so complicated and frequent, that a creature cannot well live in a natural state; nor with due affections, compatible with human society and civil life; then is the character of Virtue forfeited.

And thus we find how far Worth and Virtue depend on a knowledge of right and wrong, and on a use of reason, sufficient to secure a right application of the affections; that nothing horrid or unnatural, nothing unexemplary, nothing destructive of that natural affection by which the species or society is upheld, may, on any account, or through any principle or notion of honor or religion, be at any time affected or prosecuted as a good and proper object of esteem. For such a principle as this must be wholly vicious: and whatsoever is acted upon it, can be no other than vice and immorality. And thus, if there be any thing

which teaches men either treachery, ingratitude, or cruelty, by divine warrant, or under color and pretence of any present or future good to mankind; if there be any thing which teaches men to persecute their friends ⁴ through love, or to torment captives of war in sport, or to offer human sacrifice ⁵; or to torment, macerate, or mangle themselves, in a religious zeal, before their God; or to commit any sort of barbarity, or brutality, as amiable or becoming: be it custom which gives applause, or religion which gives a sanction; this is not, nor ever can be virtue, of any kind, or in any sense; but must remain still horrid depravity, notwithstanding any fashion, law, custom, or religion, which may be ill and vicious itself; but can never alter the eternal measures, and immutable, independent nature of worth and Virtue.

S E C T. IV.

Sensible and rational objects. Trial of virtue. Degrees of virtue.

UPON the whole: As to those creatures who are only capable of being moved by sensible objects, they are accordingly good or vicious, as the sensible affections stand with them. It is

⁴ Vol. 1. p. 14, 15.; Misc. 2. chap. 3. parag. 37. in vol. 3.

⁵ Misc. 2. chap. 3. parag. 52.

otherwise in creatures capable of framing rational objects of moral good. For in one of this kind, should the sensible affections stand ever so much amiss; yet if they prevail not, because of those other rational affections spoken of, it is evident, the temper still holds good in the main; and the person is with justice esteemed virtuous by all men.

More than this, if by temper any one is passionate, angry, fearful, amorous, yet resists these passions, and, notwithstanding the force of their impression, adheres to virtue; we say commonly in this case, that the virtue is the greater: and we say well: Though if that which restrains the person, and holds him to a virtuous-like behaviour, be no affection towards goodness or virtue itself, but towards private good merely, he is not in reality the more virtuous; as has been shown before. But this still is evident, that if voluntarily, and without foreign constraint, an angry temper bears, or an amorous one refrains, so that neither any cruel or immodest action can be forced from such a person, though ever so strongly tempted by his constitution; we applaud his virtue above what we should naturally do, if he were free of this temptation, and these propensities. At the same time, there is no body will say, that a propensity to vice can be an ingredient in virtue, or any way necessary to complete a virtuous character.

There seems therefore to be some kind of difficulty in the case: but it amounts only to this.

If there be any part of the temper in which ill passions or affections are seated, whilst in another part the affections towards moral good are such as absolutely to master those attempts of their antagonists; this is the greatest proof imaginable, that a strong principle of virtue lies at the bottom, and has possessed itself of the natural temper: whereas, if there be no ill passions stirring, a person may be indeed more cheaply virtuous; that is to say, he may conform himself to the known rules of virtue, without sharing so much of a virtuous principle as another. Yet if that other person, who has the principle of virtue so strongly implanted, comes at last to lose those contrary impediments supposed in him, he certainly loses nothing in virtue; but, on the contrary, losing only what is vicious in his temper, is left more entire to virtue, and possesses it in a higher degree.

Thus is virtue shared in different degrees by rational creatures, such at least as are called rational; but who come short of that sound and well-established reason which alone can constitute a just affection, a uniform and steady will and resolution. And thus vice and virtue are found variously mixed, and alternately prevalent in the several characters of mankind. For it seems evident from our inquiry, that how ill soever the temper or passions may stand with respect either to the sensible or the moral objects; however passionate, furious, lustful, or cruel, any creature may become; however vicious the mind be, or whatever ill

rules or principles it goes by; yet if there be any flexibleness or favorable inclination towards the least moral object, the least appearance of moral good, (as if there be any such thing as kindness, gratitude, bounty, or compassion), there is still something of virtue left; and the creature is not wholly vicious and unnatural.

Thus a ruffian, who, out of a sense of fidelity and honor of any kind, refuses to discover his associates; and rather than betray them, is content to endure torments and death; has certainly some principle of virtue, however he may misapply it. It was the same case with that malefactor, who, rather than do the office of executioner to his companions, chose to keep them company in their execution.

In short, as it seems hard to pronounce of any man, "That he is absolutely an Atheist;" so it appears altogether as hard to pronounce of any man, "That he is absolutely corrupt or vicious;" there being few, even of the horridest villains, who have not something of virtue in this imperfect sense. Nothing is more just than a known saying, That it is as hard to find a man wholly ill, as wholly good; because, wherever there is any good affection left, there is certainly some goodness or virtue still in being.

And having considered thus of Virtue, What it is in itself, we may now consider how it stands with respect to the opinions concerning a Deity, as above mentioned.

P A R T I I I.

S E C T. I.

Causes of vice. Of virtue. Loss of moral sense. Moral sense. How impaired: by opposite affection, or antipathy; not by opinion merely.

THE nature of Virtue consisting, as has been explained, in a certain just disposition, or proportionable affection of a rational creature towards the moral objects of right and wrong; nothing can possibly in such a creature exclude a principle of virtue, or render it ineffectual, except what,

1. Either takes away the natural and just sense of right and wrong;
2. Or creates a wrong sense of it;
3. Or causes the right sense to be opposed by contrary affections.

On the other side, nothing can assist or advance the principle of virtue, except what either in some manner nourishes and promotes a sense of right and wrong, or preserves it genuine and uncorrupt; or causes it, when such, to be obeyed, by subduing and subjecting the other affections to it.

We are to consider, therefore, how any of the above-mentioned opinions on the subject of a Deity may influence in these cases, or produce either of these three effects.

1. As to the first case, The taking away the natural sense of right and wrong:

It will not surely be understood, that by this is meant the taking away the notion of what is good or ill in the species or society. For of the reality of such a good and ill, no rational creature can possibly be insensible. Every one discerns and owns a public interest, and is conscious of what affects his fellowship or community. When we say therefore of a creature, "That he has wholly lost the sense of right and wrong;" we suppose, that being able to discern the good and ill of his species, he has at the same time no concern for either, nor any sense of excellency or baseness in any moral action, relating to one or the other. So that, except merely with respect to a private and narrowly-confined self-good, it is supposed there is in such a creature no liking or dislike of manners; no admiration or love of any thing as morally good; nor hatred of any thing as morally ill, be it ever so unnatural or deformed.

There is in reality no rational creature whatsoever, who knows not, that when he voluntarily offends, or does harm to any one, he cannot fail to create an apprehension and fear of like harm, and consequently a resentment and animosity in every creature who observes him. So that the offender must needs be conscious of being liable to such a treatment from every one, as if he had in some degree offended all.

Thus offence and injury are always known as punishable by every one; and equal behaviour, which

which is therefore called Merit, as rewardable and well-deserving from every one. Of this even the wickedest creature living must have a sense. So that if there be any further meaning in this sense of right and wrong; if in reality there be any sense of this kind which an absolute wicked creature has not; it must consist in a real antipathy or aversion to injustice or wrong, and in a real affection or love towards equity and right, for its own sake, and on the account of its own natural beauty and worth.

It is impossible to suppose a mere sensible creature originally so ill constituted and unnatural, as that, from the moment he comes to be tried by sensible objects, he should have no one good passion towards his kind, no foundation either of pity, love, kindness, or social affection. It is full as impossible to conceive, that a rational creature coming first to be tried by rational objects, and receiving into his mind the images or representations of justice, generosity, gratitude, or other virtue, should have no liking of these, or dislike of their contraries; but be found absolutely indifferent towards whatsoever is presented to him of this sort. A soul, indeed, may as well be without sense, as without admiration in the things of which it has any knowledge. Coming therefore to a capacity of seeing and admiring in this new way, it must needs find a beauty and a deformity, as well in actions, minds, and tempers, as in figures, sounds, or colors. If there be no real amiableness or deformity in moral acts, there is at least an

imaginary one of full force. Though perhaps the thing itself should not be allowed in nature, the imagination or fancy of it must be allowed to be from nature alone. Nor can any thing besides art and strong endeavour, with long practice and meditation, overcome such a natural prevention, or prepossession¹ of the mind, in favor of this moral distinction.

Sense of right and wrong, therefore, being as natural to us as natural affection itself, and being a first principle in our constitution and make; there is no speculative opinion, persuasion or belief, which is capable immediately or directly to exclude or destroy it. That which is of original and pure nature, nothing beside contrary habit and custom, a second nature, is able to displace. And this affection being an original one of earliest rise in the soul or affectionate part, nothing beside contrary affection, by frequent check and control, can operate upon it, so as either to diminish it in part, or destroy it in the whole.

It is evident, in what relates to the frame and order of our bodies, that no particular odd mien or gesture, which is either natural to us, and consequent to our make, or accidental and by habit acquired, can possibly be overcome by our immediate disapprobation, or the contrary bent of our will, ever so strongly set against it. Such a change cannot be effected without extraordinary means, and the intervention of art and method,

¹ Rhapf. part. 3. § 2. parag. 39. 51. in this volume.

a strict attention, and repeated check. And even thus, nature, we find, is hardly mastered; but lies fullen, and ready to revolt, on the first occasion. Much more is this the mind's case in respect of that natural affection and anticipating fancy which makes the sense of right and wrong. It is impossible that this can instantly, or without much force and violence, be effaced, or struck out of the natural temper, even by means of the most extravagant belief or opinion in the world.

Neither Theism, therefore, nor Atheism, nor Dæmonism, nor any religious or irreligious belief of any kind, being able to operate immediately or directly in this case, but indirectly, by the intervention of opposite or of favorable, affections, casually excited by any such belief; we may consider of this effect in our last case, where we come to examine the agreement or disagreement of other affections, with this natural and moral one which relates to right and wrong.

S E C T. II.

*Corruption of moral sense. Causes of this corruption.
Custom. Superstition. Influence of religion.*

II. **A**S to the second case, viz. The wrong sense or false imagination of right and wrong:

This can proceed only from the force of custom and education, in opposition to nature; as may

be noted in those countries, where, according to custom or politic institution, certain actions naturally foul and odious, are repeatedly viewed with applause, and honor ascribed to them. For thus it is possible, that a man forcing himself, may eat the flesh of his enemies, not only against his stomach, but against his nature, and think it nevertheless both right and honorable; as supposing it to be of considerable service to his community, and capable of advancing the name, and spreading the terror of his nation.

But to speak of the opinions relating to a Deity, and what effect they may have in this place: As to Atheism, it does not seem that it can directly have any effect at all towards the setting up a false species of right or wrong. For, notwithstanding a man may, through custom, or by licentiousness of practice, favored by Atheism, come in time to lose much of his natural moral sense; yet it does not seem, that Atheism should, of itself, be the cause of any estimation or valuing of any thing as fair, noble, and deserving, which was the contrary. It can never, for instance, make it be thought, that the being able to eat man's flesh, or commit bestiality, is good and excellent in itself. But this is certain, that by means of corrupt religion, or Superstition, many things the most horridly unnatural and inhuman, come to be received as excellent, good, and laudable in themselves.

Nor is this a wonder. For wherever any thing, in its nature odious and abominable, is by religion

advanced, as the supposed will or pleasure of a supreme Deity; if, in the eye of the believer, it appears not indeed in any respect the less ill or odious on this account; then must the Deity of necessity bear the blame, and be considered as a being naturally ill and odious, however courted and solicited, through mistrust and fear. But this is what religion, in the main, forbids us to imagine. It every where prescribes esteem and honor in company with worship and adoration. Whenever, therefore, it teaches the love and admiration of a Deity, who has any apparent character of ill; it teaches at the same time a love and admiration of that ill, and causes that to be taken for good and amiable, which is in itself horrid and detestable.

For instance: if Jupiter be he who is adored and revered; and if his history represents him amorously inclined, and permitting his desires of this kind to wander in the loosest manner; it is certain that his worshippers, believing this history to be literally and strictly true, must of course be taught a greater love of amorous and wanton acts. If there be a religion, which teaches the adoration and love of a God, whose character it is to be capacious, and of high resentment, subject to wrath and anger, furious, revengeful; and revenging himself, when offended, on others than those who gave the offence; and if there be added to the character of this God, a fraudulent disposition, encouraging deceit and treachery amongst men; favorable to a few, though

for flight causes, and cruel to the rest: it is evident, that such a religion as this being strongly enforced, must of necessity raise even an approbation and respect towards the vices of this kind, and breed a suitable disposition, a capricious, partial, revengeful, and deceitful temper. For even irregularities and enormities of a heinous kind, must in many cases appear illustrious, to one who considers them in a being admired and contemplated with the highest honor and veneration.

This indeed must be allowed, that, if in the cult or worship of such a Deity, there be nothing beyond common form, nothing beside what proceeds from mere example, custom, constraint, or fear; if there be at the bottom, no real heartiness, no esteem or love implied, the worshipper perhaps may not be much misled as to this notion of right and wrong. If, in following the precepts of his supposed God, or doing what he esteems necessary towards the satisfying of such his Deity, he is compelled only by fear; and contrary to his inclination, performs an act which he secretly detests as barbarous and unnatural; then has he an apprehension or sense still of right and wrong, and, according to what has been already observed, is sensible of ill in the character of his God, however cautious he may be of pronouncing any thing on this subject, or so thinking of it, as to frame any formal or direct opinion in the case. But if, by insensible degrees, as he proceeds in his religious faith and devout exercise, he comes to be more and more recon-

ciled to the malignity, arbitrariness, partiality, or revengefulness of his believed Deity, his reconciliation with these qualities themselves will soon grow in proportion; and the most cruel, unjust, and barbarous acts, will, by the power of this example, be often considered by him, not only as just and lawful, but as divine, and worthy of imitation.

For whoever thinks there is a God, and pretends formally to believe that he is just and good, must suppose, that there is independently such a thing as justice and injustice, truth and falsehood, right and wrong, according to which he pronounces that God is just, righteous, and true. If the mere will, decree, or law of God be said absolutely to constitute right and wrong, then are these latter words of no significancy at all. For thus, if each part of a contradiction were affirmed for truth by the supreme power, they would consequently become true. Thus, if one person were decreed to suffer for another's fault, the sentence would be just and equitable. And thus, in the same manner, if arbitrarily, and without reason, some beings were destined to endure perpetual ill, and others as constantly to enjoy good; this also would pass under the same denomination. But to say of any thing that it is just or unjust, on such a foundation as this, is to say nothing, or to speak without a meaning.

And thus it appears, that where a real devotion and hearty worship is paid to a supreme being, who in his history or character is represented

otherwise than as really and truly just and good, there must ensue a loss of rectitude, a disturbance of thought, and a corruption of temper and manners in the believer. His honesty will, of necessity, be supplanted by his zeal, whilst he is thus unnaturally influenced, and rendered thus immorally devout.

To this we need only add, that as the ill character of a God does injury to the affections of men, and disturbs and impairs the natural sense of right and wrong; so, on the other hand, nothing can more highly contribute to the fixing of right apprehensions, and a sound judgment or sense of right and wrong, than to believe a God who is ever, and on all accounts, represented such as to be actually a true model and example of the most exact justice, and highest goodness and worth. Such a view of divine providence and bounty, extended to all, and expressed in a constant good affection towards the whole, must of necessity engage us, within our compass and sphere, to act by a like principle and affection. And having once the good of our species or public in view, as our end or aim; it is impossible we should be misguided by any means to a false apprehension or sense of right or wrong.

As to this second case, therefore, Religion, according as the kind may prove, is capable of doing great good or harm; and Atheism nothing positive in either way. For however it may be indirectly an occasion of men's losing a good and sufficient sense of right and wrong; it will not, as

Atheism merely, be the occasion of setting up a false species of it; which only false religion, or phantastical opinion, derived commonly from superstition and credulity, is able to effect.

S E C T. III.

Opposition of the affections. Rise of moral sense. Deity. Hope and fear. Fear. Honor and love. Divine example. Divine presence. Fear and hope. Self-love, how advanced. Its effects in religion. False resignation. Belief of future life; how advantageous; supporting; saving; improving. Rewards and punishments, in the state; in the family; in religion. Security to virtue. Caution. Imprudent zeal. Atheism. Theism. Atheism and Theism. Effects of each. Of Atheism. Of Theism. Contemplation. Religious affection. Conclusion.

NOW, as to the last case, the opposition made by other affections to the natural sense of right and wrong:

It is evident, that a creature having this sort of Sense or good affection in any degree, must necessarily act according to it; if it happens not to be opposed, either by some settled sedate affection towards a conceived private good, or by some sudden, strong, and forcible passion, as of lust or anger; which may not only subdue the sense of right and wrong, but the very sense of private good itself; and over-rule even the most

familiar and received opinion of what is conducing to self-interest.

But it is not our business, in this place, to examine the several means or methods by which this corruption is introduced or increased. We are to consider only how the opinions concerning a Deity can influence one way or another.

That it is possible for a creature capable of using reflection, to have a liking or dislike of moral actions, and consequently a sense of right and wrong, before such time as he may have any settled notion of a God, is what will hardly be questioned; it being a thing not expected, or any way possible, that a creature such as man, arising from his childhood slowly and gradually, to several degrees of reason and reflection, should, at the very first, be taken up with those speculations, or more refined sort of reflections, about the subject of God's existence.

Let us suppose a creature, who wanting reason, and being unable to reflect, has notwithstanding many good qualities and affections; as love to his kind, courage, gratitude, or pity. It is certain, that if you give to this creature a reflecting faculty, it will at the same instant approve of gratitude, kindness, and pity; be taken with any show or representation of the social passion, and think nothing more amiable than this, or more odious than the contrary. And this is to be capable of Virtue, and to have a sense of right and wrong.

Before the time, therefore, that a creature can

have any plain or positive notion one way or other, concerning the subject of a God, he may be supposed to have an apprehension or sense of right and wrong, and be possessed of virtue and vice in different degrees; as we know by experience of those, who having lived in such places, and in such a manner as never to have entered into any serious thoughts of religion, are nevertheless very different among themselves, as to their characters of honesty and worth; some being naturally modest, kind, friendly, and consequently lovers of kind and friendly actions; others proud, harsh, cruel, and consequently inclined to admire rather the acts of violence and mere power.

Now, as to the belief of a Deity, and how men are influenced by it; we may consider, in the first place, on what account men yield obedience, and act in conformity to such a supreme being. It must be either in the way of his Power, as presupposing some disadvantage or benefit to accrue from him; or in the way of his Excellency and Worth, as thinking it the perfection of nature to imitate and resemble him.

If, as in the first case, there be a belief or conception of a Deity, who is considered only as powerful over his creature, and enforcing obedience to his absolute will, by particular rewards and punishments; and if, on this account, through hope merely of reward, or fear of punishment, the creature be incited to do the good he hates, or restrained from doing the ill to which he is not otherwise in the least degree averse; there is

in this case, as has been already shown, no virtue or goodness whatsoever. The creature, notwithstanding his good conduct, is intrinsically of as little worth, as if he acted in his natural way, when under no dread or terror of any sort. There is no more of rectitude, piety, or sanctity in a creature thus reformed, than there is meekness or gentleness in a tiger strongly chained, or innocence and sobriety in a monkey under the discipline of the whip. For however orderly and well those animals, or man himself upon like terms, may be induced to act, whilst the will is neither gained, nor the inclination wrought upon, but awe alone prevails, and forces obedience; the obedience is servile, and all which is done through it merely servile. The greater degree of such a submission or obedience, is only the greater servility, whatever may be the object. For whether such a creature has a good master, or an ill one, he is neither more or less servile in his own nature. Be the master, or superior, ever so perfect or excellent, yet the greater submission caused in this case, through this sole principle or motive, is only the lower and more abject servitude; and implies the greater wretchedness and meanness in the creature, who has those passions of self-love so predominant, and is in his temper so vicious and defective, as has been explained.

As to the second case; If there be a belief or conception of a Deity, who is considered as worthy and good, and admired and revered as

such; being understood to have, besides mere power and knowledge, the highest excellence of nature; such as renders him justly amiable to all; and if in the manner this sovereign and mighty being is represented, or as he is historically described, there appears in him a high and eminent regard to what is good and excellent, a concern for the good of all, and an affection of benevolence and love towards the whole; such an example must undoubtedly serve, as above explained, to raise and increase the affection towards virtue, and help to submit and subdue all other affections to that alone.

Nor is this good effected by example merely. For where the Theistical belief is entire and perfect, there must be a steady opinion of the superintendency of a supreme being, a witness and spectator of human life, and conscious of whatsoever is felt or acted in the universe: so that in the perfectest recess, or deepest solitude, there must be one still presumed remaining with us; whose presence singly must be of more moment than that of the most august assembly on earth. In such a presence, it is evident, that as the shame of guilty actions must be the greatest of any; so must the honor be, of well-doing, even under the unjust censure of a world. And in this case, it is very apparent how conducing a perfect Theism must be to virtue, and how great deficiency there is in Atheism.

What the fear of future punishment, and Hope of future reward, added to this belief, may fur-

ther contribute towards virtue, we come now to consider more particularly. So much in the meanwhile may be gathered from what has been said above, that neither this fear or hope can possibly be of the kind called good affections, such as are acknowledged the springs and sources of all actions truly good. Nor can this fear or hope, as above intimated, consist in reality with virtue, or goodness; if it either stands as essential to any moral performance, or as a considerable motive to any act, of which some better affection ought alone to have been a sufficient cause.

It may be considered withal, that, in this religious sort of discipline, the principle of self-love, which is naturally so prevailing in us, being no way moderated or restrained, but rather improved and made stronger every day, by the exercise of the passions in a subject of more extended self-interest; there may be reason to apprehend, lest the temper of this kind should extend itself in general through all the parts of life. For if the habit be such as to occasion, in every particular, a stricter attention to self-good, and private interest; it must insensibly diminish the affections towards public good, or the interest of society; and introduce a certain narrowness of spirit, which, as some pretend, is peculiarly observable in the devout persons and zealots of almost every religious persuasion.

This, too, must be confessed, that if it be true piety, to love God for his own sake, the over-sollicitous regard to private good expected

from him, must of necessity prove a diminution of piety. For whilst God is beloved only as the cause of private good, he is no otherwise beloved than as any other instrument or means of pleasure by any vicious creature. Now, the more there is of this violent affection towards private good, the less room is there for the other sort towards goodness itself, or any good and deserving object worthy of love and admiration for its own sake; such as God is universally acknowledged, or at least by the generality of civilized or refined worshippers.

It is in this respect that the strong desire and love of life may also prove an obstacle to piety, as well as to virtue and public love. For the stronger this affection is in any one, the less will he be able to have true resignation, or submission to the rule and order of the Deity. And if that which he calls resignation depends only on the expectation of infinite retribution or reward, he discovers no more worth or virtue here, than in any other bargain of interest; the meaning of his resignation being only this: "That he
" resigns his present life and pleasures, condi-
" tionally for that which he himself confesses to
" be beyond an equivalent; eternal living in a
" state of highest pleasure and enjoyment."

But notwithstanding the injury which the principle of virtue may possibly suffer, by the increase of the selfish passion, in the way we have been mentioning; it is certain, on the other side, that the principle of fear of future punishment,

and hope of future reward, how mercenary or servile soever it may be accounted, is yet, in many circumstances, a great advantage, security, and support to virtue.

It has been already considered, that notwithstanding there may be implanted in the heart a real sense of right and wrong, a real good affection towards the species or society; yet, by the violence of rage, lust, or any other counter-working passion, this good affection may frequently be controuled and overcome. Where therefore there is nothing in the mind capable to render such ill passions the objects of its aversion, and cause them earnestly to be opposed; it is apparent how much a good temper in time must suffer, and a character by degrees change for the worse. But if religion interposing, creates a belief that the ill passions of this kind, no less than their consequent actions, are the objects of a Deity's animadversion; it is certain, that such a belief must prove a seasonable remedy against vice, and be in a particular manner advantageous to virtue. For a belief of this kind must be supposed to tend considerably towards the calming of the mind, and disposing or fitting the person to a better recollection of himself, and to a stricter observance of that good and virtuous principle, which needs only his attention, to engage him wholly in its party and interest.

And as this belief of a future reward and punishment is capable of supporting those who, through ill practice, are like to apostatize from
virtue;

virtue; so when, by ill opinion and wrong thought, the mind itself is bent against the honest course, and debauched even to an esteem, and deliberate preference of a vicious one, the belief of the kind mentioned may prove on this occasion the only relief and safety.

A person, for instance, who has much of goodness and natural rectitude in his temper, but withal, so much softness, or effeminacy, as unfits him to bear poverty, crosses, or adversity; if by ill fortune he meets with many trials of this kind, it must certainly give a sourness and distaste to his temper, and make him exceedingly averse to that which he may falsely presume the occasion of such calamity or ill. Now, if his own thoughts, or the corrupt insinuations of other men, present it often to his mind, "That his
"Honesty is the occasion of this calamity, and
"that if he were delivered from this restraint
"of Virtue and Honesty, he might be much happier;" it is very obvious that his esteem of these good qualities must in proportion diminish every day, as the temper grows uneasy and quarrels with itself. But if he opposes to this thought the consideration, "That honesty carries with it,
"if not a present, at least a future advantage,
"such as to compensate that loss of private good
"which he regrets;" then may this injury to his temper and honest principle be prevented, and his love or affection towards honesty and virtue remain as it was before.

In the same manner, where instead of regard

or love, there is rather an aversion to what is good and virtuous, as, for instance, where lenity and forgiveness are despised, and revenge highly thought of, and beloved, if there be this consideration added, "That lenity is, by its rewards, made the cause of a greater self-good and enjoyment than what is found in revenge;" that very affection of lenity and mildness may come to be industriously nourished, and the contrary passion depressed. And thus temperance, modesty, candor, benignity, and other good affections, however despised at first, may come at last to be valued for their own sakes, the contrary species rejected, and the good and proper object beloved and prosecuted, when the reward or punishment is not so much as thought of.

Thus in a civil State or Public, we see that a virtuous administration, and an equal and just distribution of rewards and punishments, is of the highest service; not only by restraining the vicious, and forcing them to act usefully to society, but by making virtue to be apparently the interest of every one, so as to remove all prejudices against it, create a fair reception for it, and lead men into that path which afterwards they cannot easily quit. For thus a people raised from barbarity or despotic rule, civilized by laws, and made virtuous by the long course of a lawful and just administration; if they chance to fall suddenly under any misgovernment of unjust and arbitrary power, they will on this account be the rather animated to exert a stronger virtue, in opposition to such violence

and corruption. And even where, by long and continued arts of a prevailing tyranny, such a people are at last totally oppressed, the scattered seeds of virtue will for a long time remain alive, even to a second generation; ere the utmost force of misapplied rewards and punishments can bring them to the object and compliant state of long-accustomed slaves.

But though a right distribution of justice in a government be so essential a cause of virtue, we must observe in this case, that it is example which chiefly influences mankind and forms the character and disposition of a people. For a virtuous administration is in a manner necessarily accompanied with virtue in the magistrate: otherwise it could be of little effect, and of no long duration. But where it is sincere and well established, there virtue and the laws must necessarily be respected and beloved. So that as to punishments and rewards, their efficacy is not so much from the fear or expectation which they raise, as from a natural esteem of virtue, and detestation of villany, which is awakened and excited by these public expressions of the approbation and hatred of mankind in each case. For in the public executions of the greatest villains, we see generally that the infamy and odiousness of their crime, and the shame of it before mankind, contribute more to their misery than all besides; and that it is not the immediate pain, or death itself, which raises so much horror either in the sufferers or spectators, as the igno-

minious kind of death which is inflicted for public crimes, and violations of justice and humanity.

And as the case of reward and punishment stands thus in the public; so, in the same manner, as to private families. For slaves and mercenary servants, restrained and made orderly by punishment, and the severity of their master, are not on this account made good or honest. Yet the same master of the family using proper rewards and gentle punishments towards his children, teaches them goodness, and by this help instructs them in a virtue, which afterwards they practise upon other grounds, and without thinking of a penalty or bribe. And this is what we call a liberal education and a liberal service: the contrary service and obedience, whether towards God or man, being illiberal, and unworthy of any honor and commendation.

In the case of religion, however, it must be considered, that if by the hope of reward be understood the love and desire of virtuous enjoyment, or of the very practice and exercise of virtue in another life; the expectation or hope of this kind is so far from being derogatory to virtue, that it is an evidence of our loving it the more sincerely, and for its own sake. Nor can this principle be justly called selfish: for if the love of virtue be not mere self-interest, the love and desire of life for virtue's sake cannot be esteemed so. But if the desire of life be only through the violence of that natural aversion to death; if it be

through the love of something else than virtuous affection, or through the unwillingness of parting with something else than what is purely of this kind; then is it no longer any sign or token of real virtue.

Thus a person loving life for life's sake, and virtue not at all, may by the promise or hope of life, and fear of death, or other evil, be induced to practise virtue, and even endeavour to be truly virtuous, by a love of what he practises. Yet neither is this very endeavour to be esteemed a virtue. For though he may intend to be virtuous; he is not become so, for having only intended, or aimed at it, through love of the reward. But as soon as he is come to have any affection towards what is morally good, and can like or affect such good for its own sake, as good and amiable in itself; then is he in some degree good and virtuous, and not till then.

Such are the advantages or disadvantages which accrue to virtue from reflection upon private good or interest. For though the habit of selfishness, and the multiplicity of interested views are of little improvement to real merit or virtue; yet there is a necessity for the preservation of virtue, that it should be thought to have no quarrel with true interest and self-enjoyment.

Whoever, therefore, by any strong persuasion or settled judgment, thinks in the main, that virtue causes happiness, and vice misery, carries with him that security and assistance to virtue which is required. Or though he has no such thought, nor

can believe virtue his real interest, either with respect to his own nature and constitution, or the circumstances of human life; yet if he believes any supreme powers concerned in the present affairs of mankind, and immediately interposing in behalf of the honest and virtuous, against the impious and unjust; this will serve to preserve in him, however, that just esteem of virtue, which might otherwise considerably diminish. Or should he still believe little of the immediate interposition of Providence in the affairs of this present life; yet if he believes a God dispensing rewards and punishments to vice and virtue in a future, he carries with him still the same advantage and security; whilst his belief is steady, and no wise wavering or doubtful. For it must be observed, that an expectation and dependency, so miraculous and great as this, must naturally take off from other inferior dependencies and encouragements. Where infinite rewards are thus enforced, and the imagination strongly turned towards them, the other common and natural motives to goodness are apt to be neglected, and lose much by disuse. Other interests are hardly so much as computed, whilst the mind is thus transported in the pursuit of a high advantage and self-interest, so narrowly confined within ourselves. On this account, all other affections towards friends, relations, or mankind, are often slightly regarded, as being worldly, and of little moment, in respect of the interest of our soul. And so little thought is there of any immediate satisfaction arising from such

good offices of life, that it is customary with many devout people zealously to decry all temporal advantages of goodness; all natural benefits of virtue; and magnifying the contrary happiness of a vicious state, to declare, "That, except only
" for the sake of future reward, and fear of future
" punishment, they would divest themselves of
" all goodness at once, and freely allow them-
" selves to be most immoral and profligate." From whence it appears, that in some respects there can be nothing more fatal¹ to virtue than the weak and uncertain belief of a future reward and punishment. For the stress being laid wholly here, if this foundation come to fail, there is no further prop or security to men's morals. And thus virtue is supplanted and betrayed.

Now as to Atheism: Though it be plainly deficient, and without remedy, in the case of ill judgment on the happiness of virtue: yet it is not, indeed, of necessity the cause of any such ill judgment. For without an absolute assent to any hypothesis of Theism, the advantages of virtue may possibly be seen and owned, and a high opinion of it established in the mind. However, it must be confessed, that the natural tendency of Atheism is very different.

It is in a manner impossible to have any great opinion of the happiness of virtue, without conceiving high thoughts of the satisfaction resulting from the generous admiration and love of it: and

¹ Vol. I. p. 80. &c.

nothing beside the experience of such a love is likely to make this satisfaction credited. The chief ground and support, therefore, of this opinion of happiness in virtue, must arise from the powerful feeling of this generous moral affection, and the knowledge of its power and strength. But this is certain, that it can be no great strengthening to the moral affection, no great support to the pure love of goodness and virtue, to suppose there is neither goodness nor beauty in the whole itself, nor any example or precedent of good affection in any superior being. Such a belief must tend rather to the weaning the affections from any thing amiable or self-worthy, and to the suppressing the very habit and familiar custom of admiring natural beauties, or whatever in the order of things is according to just design, harmony, and proportion. For how little disposed must a person be, to love or admire any thing as orderly in the universe, who thinks the universe itself a pattern of disorder? How unapt to reverence or respect any particular subordinate beauty of a part, when even the whole itself is thought to want perfection, and to be only a vast and infinite deformity?

Nothing indeed can be more melancholy, than the thought of living in a distracted universe, from whence many ills may be suspected, and where there is nothing good or lovely which presents itself, nothing which can satisfy in contemplation, or raise any passion besides that of contempt, hatred, or dislike. Such an opinion as this may by degrees imbitter the temper, and not only

make the love of virtue to be less felt, but help to impair and ruin the very principle of virtue, viz. natural and kind affection.

Upon the whole: Whoever has a firm belief of a God, whom he does not merely call good, but of whom in reality he believes nothing beside real good, nothing beside what is truly suitable to the exactest character of benignity and goodness; such a person believing rewards or retributions in another life, must believe them annexed to real goodness and merit, real villany and baseness, and not to any accidental qualities or circumstances; in which respect they cannot properly be styled rewards or punishments, but capricious distributions of happiness or unhappiness to creatures. These are the only terms on which the belief of a world to come can happily influence the believer. And on these terms, and by virtue of this belief, man perhaps may retain his virtue and integrity, even under the hardest thoughts of human nature; when, either by any ill circumstance or untoward doctrine, he is brought to that unfortunate opinion of virtue's being naturally an enemy to happiness in life.

This, however, is an opinion which cannot be supposed consistent with sound Theism. For whatever be decided as to a future life, or the rewards and punishments of hereafter; he who, as a sound Theist, believes a reigning mind, sovereign in nature, and ruling all things with the highest perfection of goodness, as well as of wisdom and power, must necessarily believe virtue to be natur-

ally good and advantageous. For what could more strongly imply an unjust ordinance, a blot and imperfection in the general constitution of things, than to suppose virtue the natural ill, and vice the natural good of any creature?

And now, last of all, there remains for us to consider a yet further advantage to virtue, in the Theistical belief above the Atheistical. The proposition may at first sight appear over-refined, and of a sort which is esteemed too nicely philosophical. But, after what has been already examined, the subject perhaps may be more easily explained.

There is no creature, according to what has been already proved, who must not of necessity be ill in some degree, by having any affection or aversion in a stronger degree than is suitable to his own private good, or that of the system to which he is joined. For in either case the affection is ill and vicious. Now, if a rational creature has that degree of aversion which is requisite to arm him against any particular misfortune, and alarm him against the approach of any calamity; this is regular and well. But if, after the misfortune has happened, his aversion continues still, and his passion rather grows upon him, whilst he rages at the accident, and exclaims against his private fortune or lot; this will be acknowledged both vicious in present, and for the future; as it affects the temper, and disturbs that easy course of the affections on which virtue and goodness so much depend. On the other side, the patient enduring of the calamity, and the bearing up of the mind

under it, must be acknowledged immediately virtuous, and preservative of virtue. Now, according to the hypothesis of those who exclude a general mind, it must be confessed, there can nothing happen in the course of things to deserve either our admiration and love, or our anger and abhorrence. However, as there can be no satisfaction at the best in thinking upon what atoms and chance produce; so, upon disastrous occasions, and under the circumstances of a calamitous and hard fortune, it is scarce possible to prevent a natural kind of abhorrence and spleen, which will be entertained and kept alive by the imagination of so perverse an order of things.

But in another hypothesis, that of perfect Theism, it is understood, That whatever the order of the world produces, is in the main both just and good. Therefore, in the course of things in this world, whatever hardship of events may seem to force from any rational creature a hard censure of his private condition or lot, he may by reflection nevertheless come to have patience, and to acquiesce in it. Nor is this all. He may go further still in this reconciliation, and from the same principle may make the lot itself an object of his good affection; whilst he strives to maintain this generous fealty, and stands so well disposed towards the laws and government of his higher country.

Such an affection must needs create the highest constancy in any state of sufferance, and make us

in the best manner support whatever hardships are to be endured for virtue's sake. And as this affection must of necessity cause a greater acquiescence and complacency with respect to ill accidents, ill men, and injuries; so of course it cannot fail of producing still a greater equality, gentleness, and benignity, in the temper. Consequently the affection must be a truly good one, and a creature the more truly good and virtuous, by possessing it. For whatsoever is the occasion or means of more affectionately uniting a rational creature to his Part in society, and causes him to prosecute the public good or interest of his species with more zeal and affection than ordinary, is undoubtedly the cause of more than ordinary virtue in such a person.

This too is certain, that the admiration and love of order, harmony, and proportion, in whatever kind, is naturally improving to the temper, advantageous to social affection, and highly assistant to virtue; which is itself no other than the love of order and beauty in society. In the meanest subjects of the world, the appearance of order gains upon the mind, and draws the affection towards it. But if the order of the world itself appears just and beautiful, the admiration and esteem of order must run higher, and the elegant passion or love of beauty, which is so advantageous to virtue, must be the more improved by its exercise in so ample and magnificent a subject. For it is impossible that such a divine order should be contemplated with-

out ecstasy and rapture²; since in the common subjects of science, and the liberal arts, whatever is according to just harmony and proportion, is so transporting to those who have any knowledge or practice in the kind.

Now, if the subject and ground of this divine passion be not really just or adequate, the hypothesis of Theism being supposed false, the passion still in itself is so far natural and good, as it proves an advantage to virtue and goodness, according to what has been above demonstrated. But if, on the other side, the subject of this passion be really adequate and just, the hypothesis of Theism being real, and not imaginary, then is the passion also just, and becomes absolutely due and requisite in every rational creature.

Hence we may determine justly the relation which Virtue has to Piety, the first being not complete but in the latter; since where the latter is wanting, there can neither be the same benignity, firmness, or constancy; the same good composure of the affections, or uniformity of mind.

And thus the perfection and height of Virtue must be owing to the belief of a God.

² Rhaps. part 3. § 2. parag. 7. 20. in this vol.; Misc. 2. chap. 1. parag. 3. in vol. 3.

BOOK II. PART I.

SECT. I.

Obligation to virtue. Difficulty stated. Union with a kind or species. Opposition from self-interest. Reconciliation.

WE have considered what Virtue is, and to whom the character belongs. It remains to inquire, What obligation there is to Virtue, or what reason to embrace it?

We have found, that to deserve the name of good or virtuous, a creature must have all his inclinations and affections, his dispositions of mind and temper, suitable, and agreeing with the good of his kind, or of that system in which he is included, and of which he constitutes a part. To stand thus well affected, and to have one's affections right and entire, not only in respect of one's self, but of society and the public; this is rectitude, integrity, or Virtue. And to be wanting in any of these, or to have their contraries, is depravity, corruption, and Vice.

It has been already shown, that in the passions and affections of particular creatures, there is a constant relation to the interest [of a species, or common nature. This has been demonstrated in the case of natural affection, parental kindness,

zeal for posterity, concern for the propagation and nurture of the young, love of fellowship and company, compassion, mutual succour, and the rest of this kind. Nor will any one deny, that this affection of a creature towards the good of the species or common nature, is as proper and natural to him, as it is to any organ, part, or member of an animal body, or mere vegetable, to work in its known course, and regular way of growth. It is not more natural for the stomach to digest, the lungs to breathe, the glands to separate juices, or other entrails to perform their several offices, however they may by particular impediments be sometimes disordered or obstructed in their operations.

There being allowed therefore in a creature such affections as these towards the common nature, or system of the kind, together with those other which regard the private nature, or self-system; it will appear, that in following the first of these affections, the creature must on many occasions contradict and go against the latter. How else should the species be preserved? Or what would signify that implanted natural affection, by which a creature through so many difficulties and hazards preserves its offspring, and supports its kind?

It may therefore be imagined, perhaps, that there is a plain and absolute opposition between these two habits or affections. It may be presumed, that the pursuing the common interest or public good through the affections of one kind, must be a hindrance to the attainment of private good

through the affections of another. For it being taken for granted, that hazards and hardships, of whatever sort, are naturally the ill of the private state; and it being certainly the nature of those public affections to lead often to the greatest hardships and hazards of every kind; it is presently inferred, "That it is the creature's interest to be without
"any public affection whatsoever."

This we know for certain, that all social love, friendship, gratitude, or whatever else is of this generous kind, does by its nature take place of the self-interesting passions, draws us out of ourselves, and makes us disregarding of our own convenience and safety. So that, according to a known way of reasoning on self-interest¹, that which is of a social kind in us, should of right be abolished. Thus kindness of every sort, indulgence, tenderness, compassion, and, in short, all natural affection, should be industriously suppressed, and, as mere folly, and weakness of nature, be resisted and overcome; that by this means there might be nothing remaining in us which was contrary to a direct self-end; nothing which might stand in opposition to a steady and deliberate pursuit of the most narrowly confined self-interest.

According to this extraordinary hypothesis, it must be taken for granted, "That, in the
"system of a kind, or species, the interest of
"the private nature is directly opposite to that

¹ Vol. I. p. 76. 98. &c.

“ of the common one; -the interest of particulars
 “ directly opposite to that of the public in gene-
 “ ral. ” — A strange constitution! in which it
 must be confessed there is much disorder and
 untowardness; unlike to what we observe else-
 where in nature: as if, in any vegetable or ani-
 mal body, the part or member could be suppo-
 sed in a good and prosperous state as to itself,
 when under a contrary disposition, and in an un-
 natural growth or habit as to its whole.

Now, that this is in reality quite otherwise,
 we shall endeavour to demonstrate, so as to make
 appear, “ That what men represent as an ill
 “ order and constitution in the universe, by ma-
 “ king moral rectitude appear the ill, and depra-
 “ vity the good or advantage of a creature, is
 “ in nature just the contrary: That to be
 “ well affected towards the public interest and
 “ one’s own, is not only consistent, but insepa-
 “ rable: and that moral rectitude, or virtue, must
 “ accordingly be the advantage; and vice the in-
 “ jury and disadvantage of every creature. ”

S E C T. II.

*Contradictory notions. Dissolute or immoral state. In
 whole. In part. Inward proportion. Continuity.
 Fabric or system of the affections.*

THere are few, perhaps, who, when they
 consider a creature void of natural affection, and

wholly destitute of a communicative or social principle, will suppose him, at the same time, either tolerably happy in himself, or as he stands abroad, with respect to his fellow-creatures or kind. It is generally thought, that such a creature as this feels slender joy in life, and finds little satisfaction in the mere sensual pleasures which remain with him, after the loss of social enjoyment, and whatever can be called humanity or good-nature. We know, that to such a creature as this, it is not only incident, to be morose, rancorous, and malignant; but that, of necessity, a mind or temper thus destitute of mildness and benignity, must turn to that which is contrary, and be wrought by passions of a different kind. Such a heart as this must be a continual seat of perverse inclinations and bitter aversions, raised from a constant ill-humor, sourness, and disquiet. The consciousness of such a nature, so obnoxious to mankind, and to all beings which approach it, must overcloud the mind with dark suspicion and jealousy, alarm it with fears and horror, and raise in it a continual disturbance, even in the most seeming fair and secure state of fortune, and in the highest degree of outward prosperity.

This, as to the complete immoral state, is what, of their own accord, men readily remark. Where there is this absolute degeneracy, this total apostasy from all candor, equity, trust, sociableness, or friendship, there are few who do not see and acknowledge the misery which is consequent. Seldom is the case misconstrued, when

at worst. The misfortune is, we look not on this depravity, nor consider how it stands, in less degrees. The calamity, we think does not necessarily hold proportion with the injustice or iniquity: as if to be absolutely immoral and inhuman, were indeed the greatest misfortune and misery; but that to be so, in a little degree, should be no misery nor harm at all! Which to allow, is just as reasonable as to own, that it is the greatest ill of a body to be in the utmost manner distorted and maimed; but that to lose the use only of one limb, or to be impaired in some one single organ or member, is no inconvenience or ill worthy the least notice.

The parts and proportions of the mind, their mutual relation and dependency, the connexion and frame of those passions which constitute the soul or temper, may easily be understood by any one who thinks it worth his while to study this inward anatomy. It is certain, that the order or symmetry of this inward part is, in itself, no less real and exact than that of the body. However, it is apparent, that few of us endeavour to become anatomists of this sort. Nor is any one ashamed of the deepest ignorance in such a subject. For though the greatest misery and ill is generally owned to be from disposition and temper; though it is allowed, that temper may often change, and that it actually varies on many occasions, much to our disadvantage; yet how this matter is brought about, we inquire not. We never trouble ourselves to consider

thoroughly by what means or methods our inward constitution comes at any time to be impaired or injured. The *solutio continui*, which bodily surgeons talk of, is never applied in this case by surgeons of another sort. The notion of a whole and parts is not apprehended in this science. We know not what the effect is of straining any affection, indulging any wrong passion, or relaxing any proper and natural habit, or good inclination. Nor can we conceive how a particular action should have such a sudden influence on the whole mind, as to make the person an immediate sufferer. We suppose rather, that a man may violate his faith, commit any wickedness unfamiliar to him before, engage in any vice or villany, without the least prejudice to himself, or any misery naturally following from the ill action.

It is thus we hear it often said, "Such a person has done ill indeed: but what is he the worse for it?" Yet speaking of any nature thoroughly savage, cursed, and inveterate, we say truly, "Such a one is a plague and torment to himself:" and we allow, "That through certain humors or passions, and from temper merely, a man may be completely miserable, let his outward circumstances be ever so fortunate." These different judgments sufficiently demonstrate, that we are not accustomed to think with much coherency on these moral subjects; and that our notions, in this respect, are not a little confused and contradictory.

Now, if the fabric of the mind or temper appeared such to us as it really is; if we saw it impossible to remove hence any one good or orderly affection, or introduce any ill or disorderly one, without drawing on, in some degree, that dissolute state, which at its height is confessed to be so miserable; it would then undoubtedly be owned, that since no ill, immoral, or unjust action, could be committed, without either a new inroad and breach on the temper and passions, or a further advancing of that execution already begun; whoever did ill, or acted in prejudice of his integrity, good-nature, or worth, would of necessity act with greater cruelty towards himself, than he who scrupled not to swallow what was poisonous, or who with his own hands should voluntarily mangle or wound his outward form or constitution, natural limbs or body.

S E C T. III.

System explained. Spring of actions. Affections, three kinds. Degrees of affection. Oeconomy of the passions. Measure. Tone. Balance. Temper. Best or worst in man. State of the argument.

IT has been shown before, that no animal can be said properly to act, otherwise than through affections or passions, such as are proper to an animal. For in convulsive fits, where a creature

strikes either himself or others, it is a simple mechanism, an engine, or piece of clock-work, which acts, and not the animal.

Whatsoever, therefore, is done or acted by any animal as such, is done only through some affection or passion, as of fear, love, or hatred, moving him.

And as it is impossible that a weaker affection should overcome a stronger, so it is impossible but that where the affections or passions are strongest in the main, and form in general the most considerable party, either by their force or number; thither the animal must incline: and according to this balance, he must be governed, and led to action.

The affections or passions which must influence and govern the animal, are either:

1. The natural affections, which lead to the good of the Public.
2. Or the self-affections, which lead only to the good of the Private.
3. Or such as are neither of these, nor tending either to any good of the Public or Private, but contrariwise; and which may therefore be justly styled unnatural affections.

So that according as these affections stand, a creature must be virtuous or vicious, good or ill.

The latter sort of these affections, it is evident, are wholly vicious. The two former may be vicious or virtuous, according to their degree.

It may seem strange, perhaps, to speak of natural affections as too strong, or of self-affections

as too weak. But to clear this difficulty, we must call to mind what has been already explained. "That natural affection may, in particular cases, be excessive, and in an unnatural degree:" as when pity is so overcoming as to destroy its own end, and prevent the succour and relief required; or, as when love to the offspring proves such a fondness as destroys the parent, and consequently the offspring itself. And notwithstanding it may seem harsh to call that unnatural and vicious, which is only an extreme of some natural and kind affection; yet it is most certain, that wherever any single good affection of this sort is over-great, it must be injurious to the rest, and detract in some measure from their force and natural operation. For a creature possessed with such an immoderate degree of passion, must of necessity allow too much to that one, and too little to others of the same character, and equally natural and useful as to their end. And this must necessarily be the occasion of partiality and injustice, whilst only one duty or natural part is earnestly followed, and other parts or duties neglected, which should accompany it, and perhaps take place and be preferred.

This may well be allowed true in all other respects; since even Religion itself, considered as a passion, not of the selfish but nobler kind, may in some characters be strained beyond its natural proportion, and be said also to be in too high a degree. For as the end of religion is to render us more perfect, and accomplished in all moral duties and performances, if, by the height of

devout ecstasy and contemplation, we are rather disabled in this respect, and rendered more unapt to the real duties and offices of civil life; it may be said that Religion indeed is then too strong in us. For how possibly can we call this Superstition, whilst the object of the devotion is acknowledged just, and the faith orthodox? It is only the excess of zeal, which in this case is so transporting, as to render the devout person more remiss in secular affairs, and less concerned for the inferior and temporal interests of mankind.

Now, as in particular cases, public affection, on the one hand, may be too high, so private affection may, on the other hand, be too weak. For if a creature be self-neglectful, and insensible of danger; or if he want such a degree of passion in any kind, as is useful to preserve, sustain, or defend himself; this must certainly be esteemed vicious, in regard of the design and end of nature. She herself discovers this in her known method and stated rule of operation. It is certain, that her provisionary care and concern for the whole animal, must at least be equal to her concern for a single part or member. Now, to the several parts she has given, we see, proper affections, suitable to their interest and security; so that, even without our consciousness, they act in their own defence, and for their own benefit and preservation. Thus an eye, in its natural state, fails not to shut together, of its own accord, unknowingly to us, by a peculiar caution and timidity; which if it

wanted, however we might intend the preservation of our eye, we should not in effect be able to preserve it, by any observation or forecast of our own. To be wanting therefore in those principal affections, which respect the good of the whole constitution, must be a vice and imperfection, as great surely in the principal part, the soul or temper, as it is in any of those inferior and subordinate parts to want the self-preserving affections which are proper to them.

And thus the affections towards private good become necessary and essential to goodness. For though no creature can be called good or virtuous, merely for possessing these affections; yet since it is impossible, that the public good, or good of the system, can be preserved without them, it follows, that a creature really wanting in them, is in reality wanting in some degree to goodness and natural rectitude, and may thus be esteemed vicious and defective.

It is thus we say of a creature, in a kind way of reproof, that he is too good; when his affection towards others is so warm and zealous, as to carry him even beyond his part; or when he really acts beyond it, not through too warm a passion of that sort, but through an over-cool one of another, or through want of some self-passion to restrain him within due bounds.

It may be objected here, That the having the natural affections too strong, where the self-affections are overmuch so, or the having the self-affections defective or weak, where the natural

affections are also weak, may prove upon occasion the only cause of a creature's acting honestly, and in moral proportion. For thus, one who is to a fault regardless of his life, may, with the smallest degree of natural affection, do all which can be expected from the highest pitch of social love, or zealous friendship. And thus, on the other hand, a creature excessively timorous, may, by as exceeding a degree of natural affection, perform whatever the perfectest courage is able to inspire.

To this it is answered, That whenever we arraign any passion as too strong, or complain of any as too weak, we must speak with respect to a certain constitution or œconomy of a particular creature or species. For if a passion, leading to any right end, be only so much the more serviceable and effectual, for being strong, if we may be assured, that the strength of it will not be the occasion of any disturbance within, nor of any disproportion between itself and other affections; then consequently the passion, however strong, cannot be condemned as vicious. But if to have all the passions in equal proportion with it, be what the constitution of the creature cannot bear, so that only some passions are raised to this height, whilst others are not, nor can possibly be wrought up to the same proportion; then may those strong passions, though of the better kind, be called excessive. For, being in unequal proportion to the others, and causing an ill balance in the affection at large, they must of course be the occasion of

inequality in the conduct, and incline the party to a wrong moral practice.

But to show more particularly what is meant by the œconomy of the passions, from instances in the species or kinds below us¹: As for the creatures who have no manner of power or means given them by nature, for their defence against violence, nor any thing by which they can make themselves formidable to such as injure or offend them; it is necessary they should have an extraordinary degree of fear, but little or no animosity, such as might cause them to make resistance, or incline them to delay their flight. For in this their safety lies; and to this the passion of fear is serviceable, by keeping the senses on the watch, and holding the spirits in readiness to give the start.

And thus timorousness, and a habitual strong passion of fear, may be according to the œconomy of a particular creature, both with respect to himself, and to the rest of his species. On the other hand, courage may be contrary to his œconomy, and therefore vicious. Even in one and the same species, this is by nature differently ordered, with respect to different sexes, ages, and growths. The tamer creatures of the grazing kind, who live in herds, are different from the wilder, who herd not, but live in pairs only, apart from company, as is natural and suitable to their rapacious life.

¹ Infra, book 2. part 1. § 3. parag. 13, 14. Rhaps. part 2. § 4. parag. 37, 38, &c. in this volume; Misc. 4. chap. 2. parag. 6. &c. in vol. 3.

Yet is there found, even among the former inoffensive kind, a courage proportionable to their make and strength. At a time of danger, when the whole herd flies, the bull alone makes head against the lion, or whatever other invading beast of prey, and shows himself conscious of his make. Even the female of this kind is armed; we see, by nature, in some degree to resist violence, so as not to fly a common danger. As for a hind, or doe, or any other inoffensive and mere defenceless creature, it is no way unnatural or vicious in them, when the enemy approaches, to desert their offspring, and fly for safety. But for creatures who are able to make resistance, and are by nature armed offensively, be they of the poorest insect-kind, such as bees or wasps; it is natural to them to be roused with fury, and, at the hazard of their lives, oppose any enemy or invader of their species. For by this known passion in the creature, the species itself is secured; when, by experience, it is found, that the creature, though unable to repel the injury, yet voluntarily exposes his life for the punishment of the invader, and suffers not his kind to be injured with impunity. And, of all other creatures, man is in this sense the most formidable; since, if he thinks it just and exemplary, he may possibly, in his own or in his country's cause, revenge an injury on any one living; and, by throwing away his own life, if he be resolute to that degree, is almost certain master of another's, however strongly guarded. Examples of this nature have often

served to restrain those in power, from using it to the utmost extent, and urging their inferiors to extremity.

Upon the whole : It may be said properly to be the same with the affections or passions in an animal constitution, as with the cords or strings of a musical instrument. If these, though in ever so just proportion one to another, are strained beyond a certain degree, it is more than the instrument will bear. The lute or lyre is abused, and its effect lost. On the other hand, if, while some of the strings are duly strained, others are not wound up to their due proportion, then is the instrument still in disorder, and its part ill performed. The several species of creatures are like different sorts of instruments; and even in the same species of creatures, as in the same sort of instrument, one is not entirely like the other, nor will the same strings fit each. The same degree of strength which winds up one, and fits the several strings to a just harmony and consort, may in another burst both the strings and instrument itself. Thus men who have the liveliest sense, and are the easiest affected with pain or pleasure, have need of the strongest influence or force of other affections, such as tenderness, love sociableness, compassion, in order to preserve a right Balance within, and to maintain them in their duty, and in the just performance of their part; whilst others, who are of a cooler blood, or lower key, need not the same allay or counter-part; nor are made by nature to feel

those tender and endearing affections in so exquisite a degree.

It might be agreeable, one would think, to inquire thus into the different tunings of the passions, the various mixtures and allays by which men become so different from one another. For as the highest improvements of temper are made in human kind; so the greatest corruptions and degeneracies are discoverable in this race. In the other species of creatures around us, there is found generally an exact proportionableness, constancy and regularity in all their passions and affections; no failure in the care of the offspring, or of the society, to which they are united; no prostitution of themselves; no intemperance or excess in any kind. The smaller creatures, who live as it were in cities, as bees and ants, continue the same train and harmony of life: nor are they ever false to those affections which move them to operate towards their public good. Even those creatures of prey, who live the farthest out of society, maintain, we see, such a conduct towards one another, as is exactly suitable to the good of their own species. Whilst man, notwithstanding the assistance of religion, and the direction of laws, is often found to live in less conformity with nature; and, by means of religion itself, is often rendered the more barbarous and inhuman. Marks are set on men, distinctions formed, opinions decreed, under the severest penalties, antipathies instilled, and aversions raised in men against the generality of their own species.

So that it is hard to find in any region a human society which has human laws. No wonder, if in such societies it is so hard to find a man who lives Naturally, and as a man.

But having shown what is meant by a passion's being in too high or in too low a degree; and that, "To have any natural affection too high, " or any self-affection too low," though it be often approved as virtue, is yet, strictly speaking, a vice and imperfection: we come now to the plainer and more essential part of Vice, and which alone deserves to be considered as such; that is to say,

1. "When either the public affections are weak " or deficient."
2. "Or the private and self-affections too strong."
3. "Or that such affections arise as are neither " of these, nor in any degree tending to the sup-
" port either of the public or private system."

Otherwise than thus, it is impossible any creature can be such as we call ill or vicious. So that if once we prove, that it is really not the creature's interest to be thus viciously affected, but contrariwise; we shall then have proved, "That it is his interest to be wholly good and " virtuous:" since, in a wholesome and sound state of his affections, such as we have described, he cannot possibly be other than sound, good, and virtuous, in his action and behaviour.

Our business therefore will be, to prove,

- I. "That to have the natural, kindly, or

“ generous affections strong and powerful towards
“ the good of the public, is to have the chief
“ means and power of self-enjoyment;” and,
“ That to want them, is certain misery and ill.”

II. “ That to have the private or self-affections
“ too strong, or beyond their degree of subordi-
“ nacy to the kindly and natural, is also miser-
“ able.”

III. And, “ That to have the unnatural affec-
“ tions, viz. such as are neither founded on the
“ interest of the kind, or public, nor of the pri-
“ vate person or creature himself, is to be miser-
“ able in the highest degree.”

P A R T I I.

S E C T. I.

First proof, from the natural affections. Pleasures of the body and mind. The latter preferable. Inference. Mental enjoyments, whence. Energy of natural affections. Effects of natural affection. Partial affection examined. Partial affection. Entire affection. Mind and temper. Temper. Mind. Reflection. Conscience. Moral conscience. False conscience; causes reproach from true. Conscience from interest. Conclusion drawn from the mental pleasures. Pleasures of the sense, dependent also on natural affection. Vulgar epicurism. Imagination, fancy. A debauch. Women. Pleasures of the sense, convertible into disgust; variable; insupportable. Balance of the affections. Instance in the Animal kinds, Mankind. Oeconomy. Fabric. Monsters.

TO begin therefore with this proof, "That to
 " have the natural affections, such as are founded
 " in love, complacency, good-will, and in a sym-
 " pathy with the kind or species, is to have the
 " chief means and power of self-enjoyment; and
 " that to want them is certain misery and ill:"

We may inquire, first, what those are which we call pleasures or satisfactions; from whence happiness is generally computed. They are,

according to the common distinction, satisfactions and pleasures either of the body, or of the mind.

That the latter of these satisfactions are the greatest, is allowed by most people, and may be proved by this. That whenever the mind, having conceived a high opinion of the worth of any action or behaviour, has received the strongest impression of this sort, and is wrought up to the highest pitch or degree of passion towards the subject; at such time it sets itself above all bodily pain as well as pleasure, and can be no way diverted from its purpose by flattery or terror of any kind. Thus we see Indians, barbarians, malefactors, and even the most execrable villains, for the sake of a particular gang or society, or through some cherished notion or principle of honor or gallantry, revenge or gratitude, embrace any manner of hardship, and defy torments and death. Whereas, on the other hand, a person being placed in all the happy circumstances of outward enjoyment, surrounded with every thing which can allure or charm the sense, and being then actually in the very moment of such a pleasing indulgence; yet no sooner is there any thing amiss within, no sooner has he conceived any internal ail or disorder, any thing inwardly vexatious or distempered, than instantly his enjoyment ceases, the pleasure of sense is at an end; and every means of that sort becomes ineffectual, and is rejected as uneasy, and subject to give distaste.

The pleasures of the mind being allowed,

therefore, superior to those of the body, it follows,
“ That whatever can create in any intelligent
“ being a constant flowing series or train of men-
“ tal enjoyments, or pleasures of the mind, is
“ more considerable to his happiness, than that
“ which can create to him a like constant course
“ or train of sensual enjoyments, or pleasures of
“ the body.”

Now, the mental enjoyments are either actually the very natural affections themselves in their immediate operation; or they wholly, in a manner, proceed from them, and are no other than their effects.

If so, it follows, that the natural affections duly established in a rational creature, being the only means which can procure him a constant series or succession of the mental enjoyments, they are the only means which can procure him a certain and solid happiness.

Now, in the first place, to explain, “ How
“ much the natural affections are in themselves
“ the highest pleasures and enjoyments; ” there should, methinks, be little need of proving this to any one of human kind, who has ever known the condition of the mind under a lively affection of love, gratitude, bounty, generosity, pity, succour, or whatever else is of a social or friendly sort. He who has ever so little knowledge of human nature, is sensible what pleasure the mind perceives when it is touched in this generous way. The difference we find between solitude and company, between a common company and

that of friends; the reference of almost all our pleasures to mutual converse, and the dependence they have on society, either present or imagined; all these are sufficient proofs in our behalf.

How much the social pleasures are superior to any other, may be known by visible tokens and effects. The very outward features, the marks and signs which attend this sort of joy, are expressive of a more intense, clear, and undisturbed pleasure, than those which attend the satisfaction of thirst, hunger, and other ardent appetites. But more particularly still may this superiority be known, from the actual prevalence and ascendancy of this sort of affection over all besides. Wherever it presents itself with any advantage, it silences and appeases every other motion of pleasure. No joy, merely of sense, can be a match for it. Whoever is judge of both the pleasures, will ever give the preference to the former. But to be able to judge of both, it is necessary to have a sense of each. The honest man indeed can judge of sensual pleasure, and knows its utmost force. For neither is his taste or sense the duller; but, on the contrary, the more intense and clear, on the account of his temperance, and a moderate use of appetite. But the immoral and profligate man can by no means be allowed a good judge of social pleasure, to which he is so mere a stranger by his nature.

Nor is it any objection here, that in many natures the good affection, though really present, is found to be of insufficient force. For where

it is not in its natural degree, it is the same indeed as if it were not, or had never been. The less there is of this good affection in any unward creature, the greater the wonder is, that it should at any time prevail; as in the very worst of creatures it sometimes will. And if it prevails but for once, in any single instance, it shows evidently, that if the affection were thoroughly experienced or known, it would prevail in all.

Thus the charm of kind affection is superior to all other pleasure; since it has the power of drawing from every other appetite or inclination. And thus in the case of love to the offspring, and a thousand other instances, the charm is found to operate so strongly on the temper, as, in the midst of other temptations, to render it susceptible of this passion alone, which remains as the master-pleasure and conqueror of the rest.

There is no one who, by the least progress in science or learning, has come to know barely the principles of mathematics, but has found, that, in the exercise of his mind on the discoveries he there makes, though merely of speculative truths, he receives a pleasure and delight superior to that of sense. When we have thoroughly searched into the nature of this contemplative delight, we shall find it of a kind which relates not in the least to any private interest of the creature, nor has for its object any self-good or advantage of the private system. The admiration, joy, or love, turns wholly upon what is

exterior, and foreign to ourselves. And though the reflected joy or pleasure which arises from the notice of this pleasure once perceived, may be interpreted a self-passion, or interested regard; yet the original satisfaction can be no other than what results from the love of truth, proportion, order, and symmetry, in the things without. If this be the case, the passion ought in reality to be ranked with natural affection. For having no object within the compass of the private system, it must either be esteemed superfluous and unnatural, as having no tendency towards the advantage or good of any thing in nature, or it must be judged to be, what it truly is, "A natural joy" in the contemplation of those "numbers, that harmony, proportion, and concord, which supports the universal nature, and is essential in the constitution and form of every particular species, or order of beings."

But this speculative pleasure, however considerable and valuable it may be, or however superior to any motion of mere sense, must yet be far surpassed by virtuous motion, and the exercise of benignity and goodness; where, together with the most delightful affection of the soul, there is joined a pleasing assent and approbation of the mind to what is acted in this good disposition and honest bent. For where is there on earth a fairer matter of speculation, a goodlier, view or contemplation, than that of a beautiful,

¹ Mife. 2. chap. 1. parag. 3. in vol. 3.

proportioned, and becoming action? Or what is there relating to us, of which the consciousness and memory is more solidly and lastingly entertaining?

We may observe, that in the passion of love between the sexes, where, together with the affection of a vulgar sort, there is a mixture of the kind and friendly, the sense or feeling of this latter is in reality superior to the former; since often through this affection, and for the sake of the person beloved, the greatest hardships in the world have been submitted to, and even death itself voluntarily embraced, without any expected compensation. For where should the ground of such an expectation lie? Not here, in this world surely; for death puts an end to all. Nor yet hereafter, in any other: for who has ever thought of providing a heaven or future recompence for the suffering virtue of lovers?

We may observe, withal, in favor of the natural affections, that it is not only when joy and sprightliness are mixed with them, that they carry a real enjoyment above that of the sensual kind. The very disturbances which belong to natural affection, though they may be thought wholly contrary to pleasure, yield still a contentment and satisfaction greater than the pleasures of indulged sense. And where a series or continued succession of the tender and kind affections can be carried on, even through fears, horrors, sorrows, griefs; the emotion of the soul is still agreeable. We continue pleased even with

this melancholy aspect or sense of virtue. Her beauty supports itself under a cloud, and in the midst of surrounding calamities. For thus, when by mere illusion, as in a tragedy, the passions of this kind are skilfully excited in us, we prefer the entertainment to any other of equal duration. We find by ourselves, that the moving our passions in this mournful way, the engaging them in behalf of merit and worth, and the exerting whatever we have of social affection, and human sympathy, is of the highest delight; and affords a greater enjoyment in the way of thought and sentiment, than any thing besides can do in a way of sense and common appetite. And after this manner it appears, "How much the mental enjoyments are actually the very natural affections themselves."

Now, in the next place, to explain, "How they proceed from them, as their natural effects;" we may consider, first, that the effects of love or kind affection, in a way of mental pleasure, are, "An enjoyment of good by communication; a receiving it, as it were, by reflection, or by way of participation in the good of others;" and, "A pleasing consciousness of the actual love, merited esteem, or approbation of others."

How considerable a part of happiness arises from the former of these effects, will be easily apprehended by one who is not exceedingly ill-natured. It will be considered how many the pleasures are, of sharing contentment and delight with

others; of receiving it in fellowship and company; and gathering it, in a manner, from the pleased and happy states of those around us, from accounts and relations of such happinesses, from the very countenances, gestures, voices, and sounds, even of creatures foreign to our kind, whose signs of joy and contentment we can any way discern. So insinuating are these pleasures of sympathy, and so widely diffused through our whole lives, that there is hardly such a thing as satisfaction or contentment, of which they make not an essential part.

As for that other effect of social love, viz. the consciousness of merited kindness or esteem, it is not difficult to perceive how much this avails in mental pleasure, and constitutes the chief enjoyment and happiness of those who are, in the narrowest sense, voluptuous. How natural is it for the most selfish among us, to be continually drawing some sort of satisfaction from a character, and pleasing ourselves in the fancy of deserved admiration and esteem? For though it be mere fancy, we endeavour still to believe it truth, and flatter ourselves all we can with the thought of merit of some kind, and the persuasion of our deserving well from some few at least, with whom we happen to have a more intimate and familiar commerce.

What tyrant is there, what robber, or open violator of the laws of society, who has not a companion, or some particular set, either of his own kindred, or such as he calls friends, with

whom he gladly shares his good, in whose welfare he delights, and whose joy and satisfaction he makes his own? What person in the world is there, who receives not some impressions from the flattery or kindness of such as are familiar with him? It is to this soothing hope and expectation of friendship, that almost all our actions have some reference. It is this which goes through our whole lives, and mixes itself even with most of our vices. Of this, vanity, ambition, and luxury, have a share; and many other disorders of our life partake. Even the unchaste love borrows largely from this source. So that, were pleasure to be computed in the same way as other things commonly are, it might properly be said, that out of these two branches, viz community or participation in the pleasures of others, and belief of meriting well from others, would arise more than nine tenths of whatever is enjoyed in life. And thus, in the main sum of happiness, there is scarce a single article but what derives itself from social love, and depends immediately on the natural and kind affections.

Now, such as Causes are, such must be their Effects. And therefore as natural affection or social love is perfect or imperfect, so must be the content and happiness depending on it.

But lest any should imagine with themselves, that an inferior degree of natural affection, or an imperfect partial regard of this sort, can supply the place of an entire, sincere, and truly moral one; lest a small tincture of social inclination

should be thought sufficient to answer the end of pleasure in society, and give us that enjoyment of participation and community which is so essential to our happiness; we may consider, first, that partial Affection, or social love in part, without regard to a complete society or whole, is in itself an inconsistency, and implies an absolute contradiction. Whatever affection we have towards any thing besides ourselves, if it be not of the natural sort towards the system, or kind, it must be of all other affections the most dissociable, and destructive of the enjoyments of society: if it be really of the natural sort, and applied only to some one part of society, or of a species, but not to the species or society itself; there can be no more account given of it, than of the most odd, capricious, or humorfome passion which may arise. The person, therefore, who is conscious of this affection, can be conscious of no merit or worth on the account of it. Nor can the persons on whom this capricious affection has chanced to fall, be in any manner secure of its continuance or force. As it has no foundation or establishment in reason, so it must be easily removable, and subject to alteration, without reason. Now, the variableness of such sort of passion, which depends solely on capriciousness and humor, and undergoes the frequent successions of alternate hatred and love, aversion and inclination must of necessity create continual disturbance and disgust, give an allay to what is immediately enjoyed in the way of friendship and

society, and in the end extinguish, in a manner, the very inclination towards friendship and human commerce. Whereas, on the other hand, entire Affection, from whence integrity has its name, as it is answerable to itself, proportionable, and rational; so it is irrefragable, solid and durable. And as in the case of partiality, or vicious friendship, which has no rule or order, every reflection of the mind necessarily makes to its disadvantage, and lessens the enjoyment; so in the case of integrity, the consciousness of just behaviour towards mankind in general, casts a good reflection on each friendly affection in particular, and raises the enjoyment of friendship still the higher, in the way of community or participation above mentioned.

And, in the next place, as partial Affection is fitted only to a short and slender enjoyment of those pleasures of sympathy or participation with others; so neither is it able to derive any considerable enjoyment from that other principal branch of human happiness, viz. consciousness of the actual or merited esteem of others. From whence should this esteem arise? The merit, surely, must in itself be mean, whilst the affection is so precarious and uncertain. What trust can there be to a mere casual inclination or capricious liking? Who can depend on such a friendship as is founded on no moral rule, but fantastically assigned to some single person or small part of mankind, exclusive of society, and the whole?

It may be considered, withal, as a thing impos-

sible, that they who esteem or love by any other rule than that of virtue, should place their affection on such subjects as they can long esteem or love. It will be hard for them, in the number of their so beloved friends, to find any in whom they can heartily rejoice, or whose reciprocal love or esteem they can sincerely prize and enjoy. Nor can those pleasures be found or lasting, which are gathered from a self-flattery, and false persuasion of the esteem and love of others, who are incapable of any sound esteem or love. It appears therefore how much the men of narrow or partial affection must be losers in this sense, and of necessity fall short in this second principal part of mental enjoyment.

Mean while entire affection has all the opposite advantages. It is equal, constant, accountable to itself, ever satisfactory, and pleasing. It gains applause and love from the best; and in all disinterested cases, from the very worst of men. We may say of it, with justice, that it carries with it a consciousness of merited love and approbation from all society, from all intelligent creatures, and from whatever is original to all other intelligence. And if there be in nature any such original, we may add, that the satisfaction which attends entire affection, is full and noble, in proportion to its final object, which contains all perfection; according to the sense of Theism above noted. For this, as has been shown, is the result of virtue. And to have this entire Affection or Integrity of mind, is to live according

to nature, and the dictates and rules of supreme wisdom. This is morality, justice, piety, and natural religion.

But lest this argument should appear perhaps too scholastically stated, and in terms and phrases which are not of familiar use, we may try whether possibly we can set it yet in a plainer light.

Let any one, then, consider well those pleasures which he receives either in private retirement, contemplation, study, and converse with himself; or in mirth, jollity, and entertainment, with others; and he will find, that they are wholly founded in an easy temper, free of harshness, bitterness, or distaste; and in a mind or reason well composed, quiet, easy within itself, and such as can freely bear its own inspection and review. Now, such a mind, and such a Temper, which fit and qualify for the enjoyment of the pleasures mentioned, must of necessity be owing to the natural and good affections.

As to what relates to Temper, it may be considered thus. There is no state of outward prosperity, or flowing fortune, where inclination and desire are always satisfied, fancy and humor pleased. There are almost hourly some impediments or crosses to the appetite; some accidents or other from without, or something from within, to check the licentious course of the indulged affections. They are not always to be satisfied by mere indulgence. And when a life is guided by fancy only, there is sufficient ground of contrariety and disturbance. The very ordinary las-

situdes, uneasinesses, and defects of disposition in the soundest body; the interrupted course of the humors, or spirits in the healthiest people; and the accidental disorders, common to every constitution, are sufficient, we know, on many occasions, to breed uneasiness and distaste. And this, in time, must grow into a habit, where there is nothing to oppose its progress, and hinder its prevailing on the temper. Now, the only sound opposite to ill Humor, is natural and kind affection. For we may observe, that when the mind, upon reflection, resolves at any time to suppress this disturbance already risen in the temper, and sets about this reforming work with heartiness, and in good earnest, it can no otherwise accomplish the undertaking, than by introducing into the affectionate part some gentle feeling of the social and friendly kind; some enlivening motion of kindness, fellowship, complacency, or love, to allay and convert that contrary motion of impatience and discontent.

If it be said, perhaps, that, in the case before us, religious affection or devotion is a sufficient and proper remedy; we answer, that it is according as the kind may happily prove. For if it be of the pleasant and chearful sort, it is of the very kind of natural affection itself: if it be of the dismal or fearful sort²; if it brings along with it any affection opposite to manhood, generosity,

² Vol. 1. p. 26. &c; Misc. 2. chap. 3. parag. 38, 39. 51. &c. in vol. 3.


courage, or free thought; there will be nothing gained by this application; and the remedy will, in the issue, be undoubtedly found worse than the disease. The severest reflections on our duty, and the consideration merely of what is by authority and under penalties enjoined, will not by any means serve to calm us on this occasion. The more dismal our thoughts are on such a subject, the worse our temper will be, and the readier to discover itself in harshness and austerity. If, perhaps, by compulsion, or through any necessity or fear incumbent, a different carriage be at any time affected, or different maxims owned, the practice at the bottom will be still the same. If the countenance be composed, the heart, however, will not be changed. The ill passion may for the time be withheld from breaking into action, but will not be subdued, or in the least debilitated against the next occasion. So that in such a breast as this, whatever devotion there may be, it is likely there will in time be little of an easy spirit, or good temper remaining; and consequently few and slender enjoyments of a mental kind.

If it be objected, on the other hand. That though in melancholy circumstances ill humor may prevail, yet in a course of outward prosperity, and in the height of fortune, there can nothing probably occur which should thus sour the temper, and give it such disrelish as is suggested; we may consider, that the most humored and indulged state is apt to receive the most disturbance from every disappointment or smallest ail.

And

And if provocations are easiest raised, and the passions of anger, offence, and enmity, are found the highest in the most indulged state of will and humor; there is still the greater need of a supply from social affection, to preserve the temper from running into savageness and inhumanity. And this, the case of tyrants, and most unlimited potentates, may sufficiently verify and demonstrate.

Now, as to the other part of our consideration, which relates to a Mind or reason well composed and easy within itself; upon what account this happiness may be thought owing to natural affection, we may possibly resolve ourselves after this manner. It will be acknowledged, that a creature, such as man, who from several degrees of reflection has risen to that capacity which we call reason and understanding, must, in the very use of this his reasoning faculty, be forced to receive reflections back into his mind of what passes in itself, as well as in the affections, or will; in short, of whatsoever relates to his character, conduct, or behaviour amidst his fellow-creatures, and in society. Or should he be of himself unapt, there are others ready to remind him, and refresh his memory, in this way of criticism. We have all of us remembrancers enow to help us in this work. Nor are the greatest favorites of fortune exempted from this task of self-inspection. Even flattery itself, by making the view agreeable, renders us more attentive this way, and insnares us in the habit. The vainer any person is, the more he has his eye inwardly fixed upon himself, and is,



after a certain manner, employed in this home-survey. And when a true regard to ourselves cannot oblige us to this inspection, a false regard to others, and a fondness for reputation, raises a watchful jealousy, and furnishes us sufficiently with acts of reflection on our own character and conduct.

In whatever manner we consider of this, we shall find still, that every reasoning or reflecting creature is, by his nature, forced to endure the review of his own mind and actions; and to have representations of himself, and his inward affairs, constantly passing before him, obvious to him, and revolving in his mind. Now, as nothing can be more grievous than this is, to one who has thrown off natural affection; so nothing can be more delightful to one who has preserved it with sincerity.

There are two things which to a rational creature must be horridly offensive and grievous, viz. "To have the reflection in his mind of any
" unjust action or behaviour, which he knows
" to be naturally odious and ill-deserving; or of
" any foolish action or behaviour, which he knows
" to be prejudicial to his own interest or happiness.

The former of these is alone properly called Conscience, whether in a moral or religious sense. For to have awe and terror of the Deity, does not, of itself, imply conscience. No one is esteemed the more conscientious for the fear of evil spirits, conjurations, enchantments, or whatever may proceed from any unjust, capricious, or

devilish nature. Now, to fear God any otherwise than as in consequence of some justly blamable and imputable act, is to fear a devilish nature, not a divine one. Nor does the fear of hell, or a thousand terrors of the Deity, imply conscience, unless where there is an apprehension of what is wrong, odious, morally deformed, and ill-deserving. And where this is the case, there conscience must have effect, and punishment of necessity be apprehended, even though it be not expressly threatened.

And thus religious conscience supposes moral or natural conscience. And though the former be understood to carry with it the fear of divine punishment; it has its force, however, from the apprehended moral deformity and odiousness of any act, with respect purely to the divine presence, and the natural veneration due to such a supposed being. For in such a presence, the shame of villany or vice must have its force, independently on that further apprehension of the magisterial capacity of such a being, and his dispensation of particular rewards or punishments in a future state.

It has been already said that no creature can maliciously and intentionally do ill, without being sensible at the same time, that he deserves ill. And in this respect, every sensible creature may be said to have conscience. For with all mankind, and all intelligent creatures, this must ever hold, "That what they know they deserve from
" every one, that they necessarily must fear and

“ expect from all.” And thus suspicions and ill apprehensions must arise, with terror both of men and of the Deity. But besides this, there must in every rational creature be yet farther conscience; viz. from sense of deformity in what is thus ill-deserving and unnatural; and from a consequent shame or regret of incurring what is odious, and moves aversion.

There scarcely is, or can be any creature, whom consciousness of villany, as such merely, does not at all offend; nor any thing opprobrious or heinously imputable move or affect. If there be such a one, it is evident he must be absolutely indifferent towards moral good or ill. If this indeed be his case, it will be allowed he can be no way capable of natural affection: if not of that, then neither of any social pleasure, or mental enjoyment, as shown above; but, on the contrary, he must be subject to all manner of horrid, unnatural, and ill affection. So that to want Conscience, or natural sense of the odiousness of crime and injustice, is to be most of all miserable in life: but where conscience, or sense of this sort, remains; there, consequently, whatever is committed against it, must of necessity, by means of reflection, as we have shown, be continually shameful, grievous, and offensive.

A man who in a passion happens to kill his companion, relents immediately on the sight of what he has done. His revenge is changed into pity, and his hatred turned against himself; and this merely by the power of the object. On this

account he suffers agonies; the subject of this continually occurs to him; and of this he has a constant ill remembrance, and displeasing consciousness. If, on the other side, we suppose him not to relent, or suffer any real concern or shame, then either he has no sense of the deformity of the crime and injustice, no natural affection, and consequently no happiness or peace within; or if he has any sense of moral worth or goodness, it must be of a perplexed and contradictory kind. He must pursue an inconsistent notion, idolize some false species or virtue, and affect as noble, gallant, or worthy, that which is irrational and absurd. And how tormenting this must be to him, is easy to conceive. For never can such a phantom as this be reduced to any certain form. Never can this Proteus of honor be held steady to one shape. The pursuit of it can only be vexatious and distracting. There is nothing besides real virtue, as has been shown, which can possibly hold any proportion to esteem, approbation, or good conscience. And he, who being led by false religion, or prevailing custom, has learned to esteem or admire any thing as virtue which is not really such, must, either through the inconsistency of such an esteem, and the perpetual immoralities occasioned by it, come at last to lose all conscience, and so be miserable in the worst way; or, if he retains any conscience at all, it must be of a kind never satisfactory, or able to bestow content. For it is impossible that a cruel enthusiast, or bigot, a persecutor, a murderer,

a bravo, a pirate, or any villain of less degree, who is false to the society of mankind in general, and contradicts natural affection, should have any fixed principle at all, any real standard or measure by which he can regulate his esteem, or any solid reason by which to form his approbation of any one moral act. And thus, the more he sets up honor, or advances zeal, the worse he renders his nature, and the more detestable his character. The more he engages in the love or admiration of any action or practice, as great and glorious, which is in itself morally ill and vicious, the more contradiction and self-disapprobation he must incur. For there being nothing more certain than this, "That no natural affection can be contradicted, "nor any unnatural one advanced, without a "prejudice, in some degree, to all natural affection in general;" it must follow, "That inward deformity growing greater, by the encouragement of unnatural affection, there must "be so much the more subject for dissatisfactory reflection, the more any false principle "of honor, any false religion or superstition, prevails."

So that whatever notions of this kind are cherished, or whatever character affected, which is contrary to moral equity, and leads to inhumanity, through a false conscience, or wrong sense of honor, serves only to bring a man the more under the lash of real and just conscience, shame, and self-reproach. Nor can any one, who, by any pretended authority, commits one single im-

morality, be able to satisfy himself with any reason, why he should not at another time be carried further, into all manner of villany, such perhaps as he even abhors to think of. And this is a reproach which a mind must of necessity make to itself, upon the least violation of natural conscience; in doing what is morally deformed, and ill-deserving, though warranted by any example or precedent amongst men, or by any supposed injunction or command of higher powers.

Now, as for that other part of conscience, viz. the remembrance of what was at any time unreasonably and foolishly done, in prejudice of one's real interest or happiness: This dissatisfactory reflection must follow still and have effect, wheresoever there is a sense of moral deformity, contracted by crime and injustice. For even where there is no sense of moral deformity, as such merely; there must be still a sense of the ill merit of it with respect to God and man. Or, though there were a possibility of excluding for ever all thoughts or suspicions of any superior powers, yet considering that this insensibility towards moral good or ill, implies a total defect in natural affection, and that this defect can by no dissimulation be concealed; it is evident, that a man of this unhappy character must suffer a very sensible loss in the friendship, trust, and confidence of other men; and consequently must suffer in his interest and outward happiness. Nor can the sense of this disadvantage fail to occur to him, when he sees,

with regret and envy, the better and more grateful terms of friendship and esteem, on which better people live with the rest of mankind. Even, therefore, where natural affection is wanting, it is certain still, that by immorality, necessarily happening through want of such affection, there must be disturbance from conscience of this sort, viz. from sense of what is committed imprudently, and contrary to real interest and advantage.

From all this we may easily conclude, how much our happiness depends on natural and good affection. For if the chief happiness be from the Mental pleasures; and the chief mental pleasures are such as we have described, and are founded in natural affection: it follows, "That to have the
" natural affections, is to have the chief means and
" power of self-enjoyment, the highest possession
" and happiness of life."

Now, as to the pleasures of the Body, and the satisfactions belonging to mere Sense, it is evident they cannot possibly have their effect, or afford any valuable enjoyment, otherwise than by the means of social and natural affection.

To live well, has no other meaning with some people, than to eat and drink well. And methinks it is an unwary concession we make in favor of these pretended good livers, when we join with them, in honoring their way of life with the title of living fast; as if they lived the fastest who took the greatest pains to enjoy least of life: for if our account of happiness be right, the greatest enjoyments in life are such as these

men pass over in their haste, and have scarce ever allowed themselves the liberty of tasting.

But as considerable a part of voluptuousness as is founded in the palate; and as notable as the science is, which depends on it; one may justly presume that the ostentation of elegance, and a certain emulation and study how to excel in this sumptuous art of living, goes very far in the raising such a high idea of it, as is observed among the men of pleasure. For were the circumstances of a table and company, equipages, services and the rest of the management withdrawn, there would be hardly left any pleasure worth acceptance, even in the opinion of the most debauched themselves.

The very notion of a debauch, which is a fallacy into whatever can be imagined of pleasure and voluptuousness, carries with it a plain reference to society or fellowship. It may be called a surfeit, or excess of eating and drinking, but hardly a debauch of that kind, when the excess is committed separately, out of all society or fellowship. And one who abuses himself in this way, is often called a sot, but never a debauchee. The courtesans, and even the commonest of women, who live by prostitution, know very well how necessary it is, that every one whom they entertain with their beauty, should believe there are satisfactions reciprocal, and that pleasures are no less given than received. And were this imagination to be wholly taken away, there would be hardly any of the grosser sort of mankind, who would not per-

ceive their remaining pleasure to be of slender estimation.

Who is there can well or long enjoy any thing, when alone, and abstracted perfectly, even in his very mind and thought, from every thing belonging to society? Who would not, on such terms as these, be presently cloyed by any sensual indulgence? Who would not soon grow uneasy with his pleasure, however exquisite, till he had found means to impart it, and make it truly pleasant to him, by communicating, and sharing it at least with some one single person? Let men imagine what they please, let them suppose themselves ever so selfish, or desire ever so much to follow the dictates of that narrow principle, by which they would bring nature under restraint, nature will break out; and in agonies, disquiets, and a distempered state, demonstrate evidently the ill consequence of such violence, the absurdity of such a device, and the punishment which belongs to such a monstrous and horrid endeavour.

Thus, therefore, not only the pleasures of the mind, but even those of the body, depend on natural affection; insomuch, that where this is wanting, they not only lose their force, but are in a manner converted into uneasiness and disgust. The sensations which should naturally afford contentment and delight, produce rather discontent and sourness, and breed a wearisomeness and restlessness in the disposition. This we may perceive by the perpetual inconstancy, and love of change,

so remarkable in those who have nothing communicative or friendly in their pleasures. Good fellowship, in its abused sense, seems indeed to have something more constant and determining. The company supports the humor. It is the same in love. A certain tenderness and generosity of affections supports the passion, which otherwise would instantly be changed. Perfectest beauty cannot of itself retain or fix it. And that love which has no other foundation, but relies on this exterior kind, is soon turned into aversion. Satiety, perpetual disgust, and feverishness of desire, attend those who passionately study pleasure. They best enjoy it, who study to regulate their passions. And by this they will come to know how absolute an incapacity there is in any thing sensual to please, or give contentment, where it depends not on something friendly or social, something conjoined, and in affinity with kind or natural affection.

But ere we conclude this article of social or natural affection, we may take a general view of it, and bring it, once for all, into the scale, to prove what kind of Balance³ it helps to make within; and what the consequence may be of its deficiency or light weight.

There is no one, of ever so little understanding in what belongs to a human constitution, who knows not, that without action, motion, and employment, the body languishes, and is oppressed; its nourishment turns to disease; the

³ Supra, p. 74, 75.

spirits, unemployed abroad, help to consume the parts within; and nature, as it were, preys upon herself. In the same manner, the sensible and living part, the soul or mind, wanting its proper and natural exercise, is burdened and diseased. Its thoughts and passions being unnaturally withheld from their due objects, turn against itself, and create the highest impatience and ill humor.

In brutes^{*}, and other creatures, who have not the use of reason or reflection, at least not after the manner of mankind, it is so ordered in nature, that, by their daily search after food, and their application either towards the business of their livelihood, or the affairs of their species or kind, almost their whole time is taken up, and they fail not to find full employment for their passion, according to that degree of agitation to which they are fitted, and which their constitution requires. If any one of these creatures be taken out of his natural laborious state, and placed amidst such a plenty as can profusely administer to all his appetites and wants; it may be observed, that as his circumstances grow thus luxuriant, his temper and passions have the same growth. When he comes, at any time, to have the accommodations of life at a cheaper and easier rate than was at first intended him by nature, he is made to pay dear for them in another way; by losing his natural good disposition, and the orderliness of his kind or species.

^{*} Supra, p. 74, 75.; Rhaps. part 2. § 4. parag. 42, &c. in this volume; Misc. 4. chap. 2. parag. 9, &c. in vol. 3.

This needs not to be demonstrated by particular instances. Whoever has the least knowledge of natural history, or has been an observer of the several breeds of creatures, and their ways of life and propagation, will easily understand this difference of orderliness between the wild and the tame of the same species. The latter acquire new habits, and deviate from their original nature. They lose even the common instinct and ordinary ingenuity of their kind; nor can they ever regain it, whilst they continue in this pampered state; but being turned to shift abroad, they resume the natural affection and sagacity of their species. They learn to unite in stricter fellowship, and grow more concerned for their offspring. They provide against the seasons, and make the most of every advantage given by nature for the support and maintenance of their particular species, against such as are foreign and hostile. And thus, as they grow busy and employed, they grow regular and good. Their petulancy and vice forsakes them with their idleness and ease.

It happens with mankind, that whilst some are by necessity confined to labor, others are provided with abundance of all things, by the pains and labor of inferiors. Now, if among the superior and easy sort, there be not something of fit and proper employment raised in the room of what is wanting in common labor and toil; if, instead of an application to any sort of work, such as has a good and honest end in society, as lettres, sciences, arts, husbandry, public

affairs, œconomy, or the like, there be a thorough neglect of all duty or employment; a settled idleness, supineness, and inactivity; this of necessity must occasion a most relaxed and dissolute state: it must produce a total disorder of the passions, and break out in the strangest irregularities imaginable.

We see the enormous growth of luxury in capital cities, such as have been long the seat of empire. We see what improvements are made in vice of every kind, where numbers of men are maintained in lazy opulence and wanton plenty. It is otherwise with those who are taken up in honest and due employment, and have been well inured to it from their youth. This we may observe in the hardy remote provincials, the inhabitants of smaller towns, and the industrious sort of common people; where it is rare to meet with any instances of those irregularities which are known in courts and palaces, and in the rich foundations of easy and pampered priests.

Now, if what we have advanced concerning an inward constitution be real and just; if it be true, that Nature works by a just order and regulation, as well in the passions and affections, as in the limbs and organs which she forms; if it appears withal, that she has so constituted this inward part, that nothing is so essential to it as exercise; and no exercise so essential as that of social or natural affection: it follows, that where this is removed or weakened, the inward part

must necessarily suffer and be impaired. Let indolence, indifference, or insensibility, be studied as an art, or cultivated with the utmost care; the passions thus restrained will force their prison, and in one way or another procure their liberty, and find full employment. They will be sure to create to themselves unusual and unnatural exercise, where they are cut off from such as is natural and good. And thus in the room of orderly and natural affection, new and unnatural must be raised, and all inward order and œconomy destroyed.

One must have a very imperfect idea of the order of nature in the formation and structure of animals, to imagine that so great a principle, so fundamental a part as that of natural affection, should possibly be lost or impaired, without any inward ruin or subversion of the temper and frame of mind.

Whoever is the least versed in this moral kind of architecture, will find the inward fabric so adjusted, and the whole so nicely built, that the barely extending of a single passion a little too far, or the continuance of it too long, is able to bring irrecoverable ruin and misery. He will find this experienced in the ordinary case of phrenzy and distraction; when the mind, dwelling too long upon one subject, whether prosperous or calamitous, sinks under the weight of it, and proves what the necessity is of a due balance, and counterpoise in the affections. He will find, that in every different creature, and distinct sex, there is a

different and distinct order, set, or suit of passions, proportionable to the different order of life, the different functions and capacities assigned to each. As the operations and effects are different, so are the springs and causes in each system. The inside-work is fitted to the outward action and performance. So that where habits or affections are dislodged, misplaced, or changed; where those belonging to one species are intermixed with those belonging to another, there must of necessity be confusion and disturbance within.

All this we may observe easily, by comparing the more perfect with the imperfect natures, such as are imperfect from their birth, by having suffered violence within, in their earliest form, and inmost matrix. We know how it is with monsters, such as are compounded of different kinds, or different sexes. Nor are they less monsters, who are misshapen or distorted in an inward part. The ordinary animals appear unnatural and monstrous, when they lose their proper instincts, forsake their kind, neglect their offspring, and pervert those functions or capacities bestowed by nature. How wretched must it be, therefore, for Man, of all other creatures, to lose that sense and feeling which is proper to him as a Man, and suitable to his character and genius? How unfortunate must it be for a creature, whose dependence on society is greater than any others, to lose that natural affection by which he is prompted to the good and interest of his species and community? Such indeed is man's natural share of this affection,
that

that he, of all other creatures, is plainly the least able to bear solitude. Nor is any thing more apparent, than that there is naturally in every man such a degree of social affection, as inclines him to seek the familiarity and friendship of his fellows. It is here that he lets loose a passion, and gives reins to a desire which can hardly by any struggle or inward violence be with-held; or if it be, is sure to create a sadness, dejection, and melancholy in the mind. For whoever is unsociable, and voluntarily shuns society or commerce with the world, must of necessity be morose and ill-natured. He, on the other side, who is with-held by force or accident, finds in his temper the ill effects of this restraint. The inclination, when suppressed, breeds discontent; and on the contrary affords a healing and enlivening joy, when acting at its liberty, and with full scope; as we may see particularly, when, after a time of solitude and long absence, the heart is opened, the mind disburdened, and the secrets of the breast unfolded to a bosom-friend.

This we see yet more remarkably instanced in persons of the most elevated stations; even in princes, monarchs, and those who seem by their condition to be above ordinary human commerce, and who affect a sort of distant strangeness from the rest of mankind. But their carriage is not the same towards all men. The wiser and better sort, it is true, are often held at a distance, as unfit for their intimacy, or secret trust. But to compensate this, there are others substituted in

their room, who, though they have the least merit, and are perhaps the most vile and contemptible of men, are sufficient, however, to serve the purpose of an imaginary friendship, and can become favorites in form. These are the subjects of humanity in the great. For these we see them often in concern and pain: in these they easily confide: to these they can with pleasure communicate their power and greatness, be open, free, generous, confiding, bountiful, as rejoicing in the action itself; having no intention or aim beyond it; and their interest, in respect of policy, often standing a quite contrary way. But where neither the love of mankind, nor the passion for favorites, prevails, the tyrannical temper fails not to show itself in its proper colors, and to the life, with all the bitterness, cruelty, and mistrust, which belong to that solitary and gloomy state of uncommunicative and unfriendly greatness. Nor needs there any particular proof from history, or present time, to second this remark.

Thus it may appear, how much natural affection is predominant, how it is inwardly joined to us, and implanted in our natures; how interwoven with our other passions; and how essential to that regular motion and course of our affections, on which our happiness and self-enjoyment so immediately depend.

And thus we have demonstrated, that as, on one side, to have the natural and good affections, is to have the chief means and power of self-enjoy-

ment; so, on the other side, to want them, is certain misery, and ill.

S E C T. II.

Second proof; from the self-passions. Love of life. Resentment. Pleasure. Luxury. Amours. Interest. Emulation. Indolence. Self-passions in general.

WE are now to prove, That by having the self-passions too intense or strong, a creature becomes miserable.

In order to this, we must, according to method, enumerate those home-affections which relate to the private interest or separate œconomy of the creature; such as, love of life; — resentment of injury; — pleasure, or appetite towards nourishment and the means of generation; — interest, or desire of those conveniencies, by which we are well provided for, and maintained; — emulation, or love of praise and honor; — indolence, or love of ease and rest. — These are the affections which relate to the private system, and constitute whatever we call interestedness or self-love.

Now, these affections, if they are moderate, and within certain bounds, are neither injurious to social life, nor a hindrance to virtue: but being in an extreme degree, they become cowardice, — revengefulness, — luxury, — avarice, — vanity

and ambition, — sloth; — and, as such, are owned vicious and ill with respect to human society. How they are ill also with respect to the private person, and are to his own disadvantage, as well as that of the public, we may consider, as we severally examine them.

If there were any of these self-passions, which, for the good and happiness of the creature, might be opposed to natural affection, and allowed to overbalance it; The desire and love of life would have the best pretence. But it will be found perhaps, that there is no passion which, by having much allowed to it, is the occasion of more disorder and misery.

There is nothing more certain, or more universally agreed, than this, “That life may sometimes be even a misfortune and misery.” To enforce the continuance of it in creatures reduced to such extremity, is esteemed the greatest cruelty. And though religion forbids that any one should be his own reliever; yet if, by some fortunate accident, death offers of itself, it is embraced as highly welcome. And on this account the nearest friends and relations often rejoice at the release of one entirely beloved; even though he himself may have been so weak as earnestly to decline death, and endeavour the utmost prolongment of his own uneligible state.

Since life, therefore, may frequently prove a misfortune and misery; and since it naturally becomes so, by being only prolonged to the infirmities of old age; since there is nothing, withal, more

common than to see life over-valued, and purchased at such a cost as it can never justly be thought worth : it follows evidently , that the passion itself, viz. the love of life, and abhorrence or dread of death, if beyond a certain degree, and overbalancing in the temper of any creature, must lead him directly against his own interest; make him, upon occasion, become the greatest enemy to himself, and necessitate him to act as such.

But though it were allowed the interest and good of a creature, by all courses and means whatsoever, in any circumstances, or at any rate, to preserve life; yet would it be against his interest still to have this passion in a high degree. For it would by this means prove ineffectual, and no way conducing to its end. Various instances need not be given. For what is there better known, than that at all times an excessive fear betrays to danger, instead of saving from it? It is impossible for any one to act sensibly, and with presence of mind, even in his own preservation and defence, when he is strongly pressed by such a passion. On all extraordinary emergencies, it is courage and resolution saves; whilst cowardice robs us of the means of safety, and not only deprives us of our defensive faculties, but even runs us to the brink of ruin, and makes us meet that evil which of itself would never have invaded us.

But were the consequences of this passion less injurious than we have represented, it must be allowed still, that in itself it can be no other than

miserable; if it be misery to feel cowardice, and be haunted by those spectres and horrors which are proper to the character of one who has a thorough dread of death. For it is not only when dangers happen, and hazards are incurred, that this sort of fear oppresses and distracts. If it in the least prevails, it gives no quarter, so much as at the safest, stillest hour of retreat and quiet. Every object suggests thought enough to employ it. It operates when it is least observed by others; and enters at all times into the pleasantest parts of life, so as to corrupt and poison all enjoyment and content. One may safely aver, that, by reason of this passion alone, many a life, if inwardly and closely viewed, would be found to be thoroughly miserable, though attended with all other circumstances which in appearance render it happy. But when we add to this the meannesses, and base condescensions, occasioned by such a passionate concern for living; when we consider how, by means of it, we are driven to actions we can never view without dislike, and forced by degrees from our natural conduct into still greater crookednesses and perplexity; there is no one, surely, so disingenuous, as not to allow, that life, in this case, becomes a sorry purchase, and is passed with little freedom or satisfaction. For how can this be otherwise, whilst every thing which is generous and worthy, even the chief relish, happiness, and good of life, is for life's sake abandoned and renounced?

And thus it seems evident, "That to have this

“ affection of desire and love of life too intense,
“ or beyond a moderate degree, is against the
“ interest of a creature, and contrary to his happiness and good.”

There is another passion very different from that of fear, and which in a certain degree is equally preservative to us, and conducing to our safety. As that is serviceable, in prompting us to shun danger; so is this, in fortifying us against it, and enabling us to repel injury, and resist violence, when offered. It is true, that according to strict virtue, and a just regulation of the affections in a wise and virtuous man, such efforts towards action amount not to what is justly styled passion or commotion. A man of courage may be cautious without real fear; and a man of temper may resist or punish without anger. But in ordinary characters, there must necessarily be some mixture of the real passions themselves; which, however, in the main, are able to allay and temper one another. And thus Anger in a manner becomes necessary. It is by this passion that one creature offering violence to another, is deterred from the execution; whilst he observes how the attempt affects his fellow; and knows, by the very signs which accompany this rising motion, that if the injury be carried further, it will not pass easily, or with impunity. It is this passion withal, which, after violence and hostility executed, rouses a creature in opposition, and assists him in returning like hostility and harm on the invader. For thus, as rage and despair increase, a creature grows still

more terrible; and being urged to the greatest extremity, finds a degree of strength and boldness unexperienced till then, and which had never risen except through the height of provocation. As to this affection therefore, notwithstanding its immediate aim be indeed the ill or punishment of another, yet it is plainly of the sort of those which tend to the advantage and interest of the self-system, the animal himself; and is withal, in other respects, contributing to the good and interest of the species. But there is hardly need we should explain how mischievous and self-destructive Anger is, if it be what we commonly understand by that word; if it be such a passion as is rash and violent in the instant of provocation, or such as imprints itself deeply, and causes a settled revenge, and an eager vindictive pursuit. No wonder indeed, that so much is done in mere revenge, and under the weight of a deep resentment, when the relief and satisfaction found in that indulgence is no other than the assuaging of the most torturous pain, and the alleviating the most weighty and pressing sensation of misery. The pain of this sort being for a while removed or alleviated by the accomplishment of the desire, in the ill of another, leaves indeed behind it the perception of a delicious ease, and an overflowing of soft and pleasing sensation. Yet is this, in truth, no better than the rack itself. For whoever has experienced racking pains, can tell in what manner a sudden cessation or respite is used to affect him. From hence are those untoward delights of perverseness, frowardness, and an inve-

nomed, malignant disposition, acting at its liberty. For this is only a perpetual assuaging of Anger perpetually renewed. In other characters, the passion arises not so suddenly, or on slight causes; but being once moved, is not so easily quieted. The dormant fury, Revenge, being raised once, and wrought up to her highest pitch, rests not till she attains her end; and, that attained, is easy and reposes; making our succeeding relief and ease so much the more enjoyed, as our preceding anguish and incumbent pain was of long duration, and bitter sense. Certainly, if among lovers, and in the language of gallantry, the success of ardent love is called the assuaging of a pain, this other success may be far more justly termed so. However soft or flattering the former pain may be esteemed, this latter surely can be no pleasing one: nor can it be possibly esteemed other than sound and thorough wretchedness, a grating and disgustful feeling, without the least mixture of any thing soft, gentle, or agreeable.

It is not very necessary to mention the ill effects of this passion, in respect of our minds, or bodies, our private condition, or circumstances of life. By these particulars we may grow too tedious. These are of the moral sort of subjects, joined commonly with religion, and treated so rhetorically, and with such enforced repetition in public, as to be apt to raise the satiety of mankind. What has been said, may be enough perhaps to make this evident, “That to be subject to such a passion as we
“ have been mentioning, is, in reality, to be

“ very unhappy ;” and, “ That the habit itself is
“ a disease of the worst sort, from which misery
“ is inseparable.”

Now, as to luxury, and what the world calls Pleasure: Were it true, as has been proved the contrary, that the most considerable enjoyments were those merely of the sense; and were it true, withal, that those enjoyments of the sense lay in certain outward things capable of yielding always a due and certain portion of pleasure, according to their degree and quality; it would then follow, that the certain way to obtain happiness, would be to procure largely of these subjects, to which happiness and pleasure were thus infallibly annexed. But however fashionably we may apply the notion of good living, it will hardly be found that our inward faculties are able to keep pace with these outward supplies of a luxuriant fortune. And if the natural disposition and aptness from within be not concurring, it will be in vain that these subjects are thus multiplied from abroad, and acquired with ever so great facility.

It may be observed in those who by excess have gained a constant nauseating and distaste, that they have nevertheless as constant a craving or eagerness of stomach. But the appetite of this kind is false and unnatural; as is that of thirst arising from a fever, or contracted by habitual debauch. Now, the satisfactions of the natural appetite in a plain way, are infinitely beyond those indulgences of the most refined and elegant luxury. This is often perceived by the luxurious them-

selves. It has been experienced, in people bred after the sumptuous way, and used never to wait, but to prevent appetite, that when, by any new turn of life, they came to fall into a more natural course, or for a while, as on a journey, or a day of sport, came accidentally to experience the sweet of a plain diet, recommended by due abstinence and exercise, they have with freedom owned, that it was then they received the highest satisfaction and delight which a table could possibly afford.

On the other side, it has been as often remarked in persons accustomed to an active life, and healthful exercise, that having once thoroughly experienced this plainer and more natural diet, they have, upon a following change of life, regretted their loss, and undervalued the pleasures received from all the delicacies of luxury, in comparison with those remembered satisfactions of a preceding state. It is plain, that by urging nature, forcing the appetite, and inciting sense, the keenness of the natural sensations is lost. And though, through vice or ill habit, the same subjects of appetite may every day be sought with greater ardor, they are enjoyed with less satisfaction. Though the impatience of abstaining be greater, the pleasure of indulgence is really less. The palls or nauseatings which continually intervene, are of the worst and most hateful kind of sensation. Hardly is there any thing tasted which is wholly free from this ill relish of a surfeited sense and ruined appetite. So that, instead of a

constant and flowing delight afforded in such a state of life, the very state itself is in reality a sickness and infirmity, a corruption of pleasure, and destructive of every natural and agreeable sensation. So far is it from being true, "That in this licentious course we enjoy Life best, or are likely to make the most of it."

As to the consequences of such an indulgence, how fatal to the body, by diseases of many kinds, and to the mind, by sottishness and stupidity, this needs not any explanation.

The consequences as to interest are plain enough. Such a state of impotent and unrestrained desire, as it increases our wants, so it must subject us to a greater dependence on others. Our private circumstances, however plentiful or easy they may be, can less easily content us. Ways and means must be invented to procure what may administer to such an imperious luxury, as forces us to sacrifice honor to fortune, and runs us out into all irregularity and extravagance of conduct. The injuries we do ourselves by excess and forbearance, are then surely apparent, when, through an impotence of this sort, and an impossibility of restraint, we do what we ourselves declare to be destructive to us. But these are matters obvious of themselves. And from less than what has been said, it is easy to conclude, "That luxury, riot, and debauch, are contrary to real interest, and to the true enjoyment of life."

There is another luxury superior to the kind we have been mentioning, and which, in strict-

ness, can scarce be called a self-passion, since the sole end of it is the advantage and promotion of the species. But whereas all other social affections are joined only with a mental pleasure, and founded in mere kindness and love; this has more added to it, and is joined with a pleasure of sense. Such concern and care has nature shown for the support and maintenance of the several species, that, by a certain indigence and kind of necessity of their natures, they are made to regard the propagation of their kind. Now, whether it be the interest or good of the animal to feel this indigence beyond a natural and ordinary degree, is what we may consider.

Having already said so much concerning natural and unnatural appetite, there needs less to be said on this occasion. If it be allowed, that to all other pleasures there is a measure of appetite belonging, which cannot possibly be exceeded without prejudice to the creature, even in his very capacity of enjoying pleasure; it will hardly be thought that there is no certain limit or just boundary of this other appetite of the amorous kind. There are other sorts of ardent sensations accidentally experienced, which we find pleasant and acceptable, whilst they are held within a certain degree; but which, as they increase, grow oppressive and intolerable. Laughter provoked by titillation, grows an excessive pain; though it retains still the same features of delight and pleasure. And though in the case of that particular kind of itch which belongs to a distemper named from that

effect, there are some, who, far from disliking the sensation, find it highly acceptable and delightful; yet it will hardly be reputed such among the more refined sort, even of those who make pleasure their chief study and highest good.

Now, if there be in every sensation of mere pleasure, a certain pitch or degree of ardor, which, by being further advanced, comes the nearer to mere rage and fury; if there be indeed a necessity of stopping somewhere, and determining on some boundary for the passion; where can we fix our standard, or how regulate ourselves but with regard to nature, beyond which there is no measure or rule of things? Now, nature may be known from what we see of the natural state of creatures, and of man himself, when unprejudiced by vicious education.

Where happily any one is bred to a natural life, inured to honest industry and sobriety, and unaccustomed to any thing immoderate or intemperate; he is found to have his appetites and inclinations of this sort at command. Nor are they on this account less able to afford him the pleasure or enjoyment of each kind. On the contrary, as they are more sound, healthy, and uninjured by excess and abuse, they must afford him proportionate satisfaction. So that were both these sensations to be experimentally compared; that of a virtuous course, which belonged to one who lived a natural and regular life, and that of a vicious course, which belonged to one who was relaxed and dissolute; there is no ques-

tion but judgment would be given in favor of the former, without regard to consequences, and only with respect to the very pleasure of sense itself.

As to the consequences of this vice with respect to the health and vigor of the body, there is no need to mention any thing. The injury it does the mind, though less noticed, is yet greater. The hindrance of all improvement, the wretched waste of time, the effeminacy, sloth, supineness, the disorder and looseness of a thousand passions, through such a relaxation and enervating of the mind, are all of them effects sufficiently apparent, when reflected on.

What the disadvantages are of this intemperance in respect of interest, society, and the world; and what the advantages are of a contrary sobriety, and self-command, would be to little purpose to mention. It is well known there can be no slavery greater than what is consequent to the dominion and rule of such a passion. Of all other, it is the least manageable by favor or concession, and assumes the most from privilege and indulgence. What it costs us in the modesty and ingenuity of our natures, and in the faith and honesty of our characters, is as easily apprehended by any one who will reflect. And it will from hence appear, "That there is no passion which in its extravagance and excess more necessarily occasions disorder and unhappiness."

Now, as to that passion which is esteemed peculiarly interesting, as having for its aim the pos-

session of wealth, and what we call a settlement or fortune in the world: If the regard towards this kind be moderate, and in a reasonable degree; if it occasions no passionate pursuit, nor raises any ardent desire or appetite, there is nothing in this case which is not compatible with virtue, and even suitable and beneficial to society. The public as well as private system is advanced by the industry which this affection excites. But if it grows at length into a real passion, the injury and mischief it does the public, is not greater than that which it creates to the person himself. Such a one is in reality a self-oppressor, and lies heavier on himself than he can ever do on mankind.

How far a coveting or avaricious Temper is miserable, needs not, surely, be explained. Who knows not how small a portion of worldly matters is sufficient for a man's single use and convenience, and how much his occasions and wants might be contracted and reduced, if a just frugality were studied, and temperance and a natural life came once to be pursued with half that application, industry, and art, which is bestowed on sumptuousness and luxury? Now, if temperance be in reality so advantageous, and the practice as well as the consequences of it so pleasing and happy, as has been before expressed; there is little need, on the other side, to mention any thing of the miseries attending those covetous and eager desires after things which have no bounds or rule, as being out of nature, beyond which there can be no limits

limits to desire. For where shall we once stop, when we are beyond this boundary? How shall we fix or ascertain a thing wholly unnatural and unreasonable? or what method, what regulation shall we set to mere imagination, or the exorbitancy of fancy, in adding expense to expense, or possession to possession?

Hence that known restlessness of covetous and eager minds, in whatever state or degree of fortune they are placed, there being no thorough or real satisfaction, but a kind of insatiableness belonging to this condition. For it is impossible there should be any real enjoyment, except in consequence of natural and just appetite. Nor do we readily call that an enjoyment of wealth or of honor, when, through covetousness or ambition, the desire is still forward, and can never rest satisfied with its gains. But against this vice of Covetousness there is enough said continually in the world, and in our common way of speaking, "A covetous and a miserable temper has, in reality, one and the same signification."

Nor is there less said, abroad, as to the ills of that other aspiring temper, which exceeds an honest emulation, or love of praise, and passes the bounds even of vanity and conceit. Such is that passion which breaks into an enormous Pride and Ambition. Now, if we consider once the ease, happiness, and security which attend a modest disposition and quiet mind, such as is of easy self-command, fitted to every station in society, and able to suit itself with any reasonable circum-

stances whatever; it will, on the first view, present us with the most agreeable and winning character. Nor will it be found necessary after this to call to mind the excellence and good of moderation, or the mischief and self-injury of immoderate desires, and conceited, fond imaginations of personal advantage, in such things as titles, honors, precedencies, fame, glory, or vulgar astonishment, admiration, and applause.

This too is obvious, that as the desires of this kind are raised, and become impetuous, and out of our command; so the averfions and fears of the contrary part grow proportionably strong and violent, and the temper accordingly suspicious, jealous, captious, subject to apprehensions from all events, and incapable of bearing the least repulse or ordinary disappointment. And hence it may be concluded, “That all rest and security as to
“ what is future, and all peace, contentedness,
“ and ease as to what is present, is forfeited by
“ the aspiring passions of this emulous kind, and
“ by having the appetites towards glory and outward appearance thus transporting and beyond
“ command.”

There is a certain temper placed often in opposition to those eager and aspiring aims of which we have been speaking. Not that it really excludes either the passion of covetousness or ambition; but because it hinders their effects, and keeps them from breaking into open action. It is this passion, which by soothing the mind, and softening it into an excessive Love of Rest and

Indolence, renders high attempts impracticable, and represents as insuperable the difficulties of a painful and laborious course towards wealth and honors. Now, though an inclination to ease, and a love of moderate recess and rest from action, be as natural and useful to us as the inclination we have towards sleep; yet an excessive love of rest, and a contracted aversion to action and employment, must be a disease in the mind equal to that of a lethargy in the body.

How necessary action and exercise are to the body, may be judged by the difference we find between those constitutions which are accustomed, and those which are wholly strangers to it; and by the different health and complexion which labor and due exercise create, in comparison with that habit of body we see consequent to an indulged state of indolence and rest. Nor is the lazy habit ruinous to the body only. The languishing disease corrupts all the enjoyments of a vigorous and healthy sense, and carries its infection into the mind, where it spreads a worse contagion. For however the body may for a while hold out, it is impossible that the mind, in which the distemper is seated, can escape without an immediate affliction and disorder. The habit begets a tediousness and anxiety, which influences the whole temper, and converts the unnatural rest into an unhappy sort of activity, ill-humor, and spleen; of which there has been enough said above, where we considered the want of a due balance in the affections.

It is certain, that, as in the body, when no

labor or natural exercise is used, the spirits which want their due employment, turn against the constitution, and find work for themselves in a destructive way; so in a soul, or mind, unexercised, and which languishes for want of proper action and employment, the thoughts and affections being obstructed in their due course, and deprived of their natural energy, raise disquiet, and foment a rancorous eagerness and tormenting irritation. The temper from hence becomes more impotent in passion, more incapable of real moderation, and, like prepared fuel, readily takes fire by the least spark.

As to interest, how far it is here concerned; how wretched that state is, in which by this habit a man is placed, towards all the circumstances and affairs of life, when at any time he is called to action; how subjected he must be to all inconveniencies, wanting to himself, and deprived of the assistance of others; whilst being unfit for all offices and duties of society, he yet of any other person most needs the help of it, as being least able to assist or support himself; all this is obvious. And thus it is evident, "That
"to have this over-biasing inclination towards
"rest, this slothful, soft, or effeminate temper,
"averse to labor and employment, is to have an
"unavoidable mischief, and attendant plague."

Thus have we considered the self-passions; and what the consequence is of their rising beyond a moderate degree. These affections, as self-interesting as they are, can often, we see, become

contrary to our real interests They betray us into most misfortunes, and into the greatest of unhappineſſes, that of a profligate and abject character. As they grow imperious and high, they are the occaſion that a creature in proportion becomes mean and low. They are original to that which we call ſelfiſhneſs, and give riſe to that fordid diſpoſition of which we have already ſpoken. It appears there can be nothing ſo miſerable in itſelf, or ſo wretched in its conſequence, as to be thus impotent in temper, thus maſtered by paſſion, and, by means of it, brought under the moſt ſervile ſubjection to the world.

It is evident withal, that as this ſelfiſhneſs increaſes in us, ſo muſt a certain ſubtilty, and feignedneſs of carriage, which naturally accompanies it. And thus the candor and ingenuity of our natures, the eaſe and freedom of our minds, muſt be forfeited; all truſt and confidence in a manner loſt; and ſuſpicions, jealousies, and envies multiplied. A ſeparate end and intereſt muſt be every day more ſtrongly formed in us; generous views and motives laid aſide; and the more we are thus ſenſibly diſjoined every day from ſociety and our fellows, the worſe opinion we ſhall have of thoſe uniting paſſions which bind us in ſtrict alliance and amity with others. Upon theſe terms we muſt of courſe endeavour to ſilence, and ſuppreſs our natural and good affections; ſince they are ſuch as would carry us to the good of ſociety, againſt what we fondly conceive to be our private good and intereſt; as has been ſhown.

Now, if these selfish passions, besides what other ill they are the occasion of, are withal the certain means of losing us our natural affections; then, by what has been proved before, it is evident, “ That they must be the certain means of losing
 “ us the chief enjoyment of life, and raising in us
 “ those horrid and unnatural passions, and that
 “ savageness of temper, which makes the greatest
 “ of miseries, and the most wretched state of life;”
 as remains for us to explain.

S E C T. III.

Third proof; from the unnatural affections. Inhumanity. Petulancy. Malignity. Envy. Moroseness. Misanthropy. Inhospitallity. Barbarity. Superstition. Unnatural lusts. Tyranny. Treachery. Ingratitude. Unnatural pleasure in general. Unnatural state.

THE passions, therefore, which, in the last place, we are to examine, are those which lead neither to a public nor a private good; and are neither of any advantage to the species in general, or the creature in particular. These, in opposition to the social and natural, we call the unnatural affections.

Of this kind is that unnatural and inhuman delight in beholding torments, and in viewing

distress, calamity, blood, massacre, and destruction, with a peculiar joy and pleasure. This has been the reigning passion of many tyrants and barbarous nations; and belongs, in some degree, to such tempers as have thrown off that courteousness of behaviour which retains in us a just reverence of mankind, and prevents the growth of harshness and brutality. This passion enters not where civility or affable manners have the least place. Such is the nature of what we call good-breeding, that, in the midst of many other corruptions, it admits not of inhumanity, or savage pleasure. To see the sufferance of an enemy with cruel delight, may proceed from the height of anger, revenge, fear, and other extended self-passions: but to delight in the torture and pain of other creatures indifferently, natives or foreigners, of our own or of another species, kindred, or no kindred, known or unknown; to feed, as it were, on death, and be entertained with dying agonies; this has nothing in it accountable in the way of self-interest or private good above-mentioned, but is wholly and absolutely unnatural, as it is horrid and miserable.

There is another affection nearly related to this, which is a gay and frolicsome delight in what is injurious to others; a sort of wanton mischievousness, and pleasure in what is destruction; a passion which, instead of being restrained, is usually encouraged in children: so that it is indeed no wonder if the effects of it are very unfortunately felt in the world. For it will be hard,

perhaps, for any one to give a reason why that temper which was used to delight in disorder and ravage, when in a nursery, should not afterwards find delight in other disturbances, and be the occasion of equal mischief in families, amongst friends, and in the public itself. But of this passion there is not any foundation in nature; as has been explained.

Malice, malignity, or ill-will, such as is grounded on no self-consideration, and where there is no subject of anger or jealousy, nor any thing to provoke or cause such a desire of doing ill to another; this also is of that kind of passion.

Envy too, when it is such as arises from the prosperity or happiness of another creature no wise interfering with ours, is of the same kind of passion.

There is also among these a sort of hatred of mankind and society; a passion which has been known perfectly reigning in some men, and has had a peculiar name given to it. A large share of this belongs to those who have long indulged themselves in a habitual moroseness, or who, by force of ill-nature and ill-breeding, have contracted such a reverse of affability and civil manners, that to see or meet a stranger is offensive. The very aspect of mankind is a disturbance to them, and they are sure always to hate at first sight. The distemper of this kind is sometimes found to be in a manner national; but peculiar to the more savage nations, and a plain characteristic of uncivilized manners and barbarity. This

is the immediate opposite to that noble affection, which, in ancient language, was termed hospitality¹, viz. extensive love of mankind, and relief of strangers.

We may add likewise to the number of the unnatural passions, all those which are raised from superstition, as before mentioned, and from the customs of barbarous countries: all which are too horrid and odious in themselves, to need any proof of their being miserable.

There might be other passions named, such as unnatural lusts, in foreign kinds or species, with other perversions of the amorous desire within our own. But as to these depravities of appetite, we need add nothing here, after what has been already said on the subject of the more natural passion.

Such as these are the only affections or passions we can strictly call unnatural, ill, and of no tendency so much as to any separate or private good. Others indeed there are which have this tendency; but are so exorbitant and out of measure, so beyond the common bent of any ordinary self-passion, and so utterly contrary and abhorrent to all social and natural affection, that they are generally called, and may be justly esteemed unnatural and monstrous.

Among these may be reckoned such an enormous pride or ambition, such an arrogance and tyranny, as would willingly leave nothing emi-

¹ Misc. 3. chap. 1. parag. 23. in the notes, in vol. 3.

ment, nothing free, nothing prosperous in the world: such an anger as would sacrifice every thing to itself: such a revenge as is never to be extinguished, nor ever satisfied without the greatest cruelties: such an inveteracy and rancor as seeks, as it were, occasion to exert itself; and lays hold of the least subject, so as often to make the weight of its malevolence fall even upon such as are mere objects of pity and compassion.

Treachery and ingratitude are in strictness mere negative vices, and, in themselves, no real passions; having neither aversion or inclination belonging to them; but are derived from the defect, unsoundness, or corruption of the affections in general. But when these vices become remarkable in a character, and arise in a manner from inclination and choice; when they are so forward and active, as to appear of their own accord, without any pressing occasion; it is apparent they borrow something of the mere unnatural passions, and are derived from malice, envy, and inveteracy; as explained above.

It may be objected here, That these passions, unnatural as they are, carry still a sort of pleasure with them; and that however barbarous a pleasure it be, yet still it is a pleasure and satisfaction which is found in pride, or tyranny, revenge, malice, or cruelty exerted. Now, if it be possible in nature, that any one can feel a barbarous or malicious joy, otherwise than in consequence of mere anguish and torment, then may we perhaps allow this kind of satisfaction

to be called pleasure or delight. But the case is evidently contrary. To love, and to be kind; to have social or natural affection, complacency, and good-will, is to feel immediate satisfaction and genuine content. It is in itself original joy, depending on no preceding pain or uneasiness, and producing nothing beside satisfaction merely. On the other side, animosity, hatred, and bitterness, is original misery and torment, producing no other pleasure or satisfaction, than as the unnatural desire is for the instant satisfied by something which appeases it. How strong soever this pleasure, therefore, may appear, it only the more implies the misery of that state which produces it. For as the cruellest bodily pains do by intervals of assuagement produce, as has been shown, the highest bodily pleasure; so the fiercest and most raging torments of the mind do, by certain moments of relief, afford the greatest of mental enjoyments to those who know little of the truer kind.

The men of gentlest dispositions, and best of tempers, have at some time or other been sufficiently acquainted with those disturbances, which, at ill hours, even small occasions are apt to raise. From these slender experiences of harshness and ill-humor, they fully know and will confess the ill moments which are past, when the temper is ever so little galled or fretted. How must it fare, therefore, with those who hardly know any better hours in life, and who, for the greatest part of it, are agitated by a thorough active spleen,

a close and settled malignity and rancor? How lively must be the sense of every thwarting and controuling accident? How great must be the shocks of disappointment, the stings of affront, and the agonies of a working antipathy, against the multiplied objects of offence? Nor can it be wondered at, if to persons thus agitated and oppressed, it seems a high delight to appease and allay for the while those furious and rough motions, by an indulgence of their passion in mischief and revenge.

Now, as to the consequences of this unnatural state, in respect of interest, and the common circumstances of life; upon what terms a person who has in this manner lost all which we call nature, can be supposed to stand, in respect of the society of mankind; how he feels himself in it; what sense he has of his own disposition towards others, and of the mutual disposition of others towards himself; this is easily conceived.

What enjoyment or rest is there for one who is not conscious of the merited affection or love, but, on the contrary, of the ill-will and hatred of every human soul? What ground must this afford for horror and despair? What foundation of fear, and continual apprehension from mankind, and from superior powers? How thorough and deep must be that melancholy, which being once moved, has nothing soft or pleasing from the side of friendship, to allay or divert it? Wherever such a creature turns himself; whichever way he casts his eye, every thing around

must appear ghastly and horrid ; every thing hostile , and , as it were , bent against a private and single being , who is thus divided from every thing , and at defiance and war with the rest of nature.

It is thus , at last , that a Mind becomes a wilderness ; where all is laid waste , every thing fair and goodly removed , and nothing extant beside what is savage and deformed. Now , if banishment from one's country ; removal to a foreign place , or any thing which looks like solitude or desertion , be so heavy to endure ; what must it be to feel this inward banishment , this real estrangement from human commerce ; and to be after this manner in a desert , and in the horridest of solitudes , even when in the midst of society ? What must it be to live in this disagreement with every thing , this irreconcilableness and opposition to the order and government of the universe ?

Hence it appears , that the greatest of miseries accompanies that state which is consequent to the loss of natural affection ; and that to have those horrid , monstrous , and unnatural affections , is to be miserable in the highest degree.

C O N C L U S I O N.

THUS have we endeavoured to prove what was proposed in the beginning. And since , in the

common and known sense of vice and illness, no one can be vicious or ill, except either,

1. By the deficiency or weakness of natural affections;

Or, 2. By the violence of the selfish;

Or, 3. By such as are plainly unnatural:

It must follow, that if each of these are pernicious and destructive to the creature, inasmuch that his completest state of misery is made from hence; To be wicked or vicious, is to be miserable and unhappy.

And since every vicious action must in proportion, more or less, help towards this mischief, and self-ill; it must follow, that every vicious action must be self-injurious and ill.

On the other side, the happiness and good of Virtue has been proved from the contrary effect of other affections, such as are according to nature, and the œconomy of the species or kind. We have cast up all those particulars, from whence, as by way of addition and subtraction, the main sum or general account of happiness is either augmented or diminished. And if there be no article exceptionable in this scheme of moral arithmetic, the subject treated may be said to have an evidence as great as that which is found in numbers or mathematics. For let us carry scepticism ever so far; let us doubt, if we can, of every thing about us; we cannot doubt of what passes within ourselves. Our passions and affections are known to us. They are certain, whatever the objects may be on which they are em-

ployed. Nor is it of any concern to our argument, how these exterior objects stand; whether they are realities or mere illusions; whether we wake or dream. For ill dreams will be equally disturbing; and a good dream, if life be nothing else, will be easily and happily passed. In this dream of life, therefore, our demonstrations have the same force; our balance and œconomy hold good, and our obligation to Virtue is in every respect the same.

Upon the whole: There is not, I presume, the least degree of certainty wanting, in what has been said concerning the preferableness of the mental pleasures to the sensual; and even of the sensual, accompanied with good affection, and under a temperate and right use, to those which are no wise restrained, nor supported by any thing social or affectionate.

Nor is there less evidence in what has been said of the united structure and fabric of the mind, and of those passions which constitute the temper or soul, and on which its happiness or misery so immediately depend. It has been shown, that in this constitution, the impairing of any one part must instantly tend to the disorder and ruin of other parts, and of the whole itself; through the necessary connexion and balance of the affections: that those very passions through which men are vicious, are of themselves a torment and disease; and that whatsoever is done which is knowingly ill, must be of ill consciousness; and in proportion as the act is ill, must im-

pair and corrupt social enjoyment, and destroy both the capacity of kind affection, and the consciousness of meriting any such. So that neither can we participate thus in joy or happiness with others, or receive satisfaction from the mutual kindness or imagined love of others: on which, however, the greatest of all our pleasures are founded.

If this be the case of moral delinquency, and if the state which is consequent to this defection from nature, be of all other the most horrid, oppressive, and miserable; it will appear, “That to yield or
“ consent to any thing ill or immoral, is a breach
“ of interest, and leads to the greatest ills:” and,
“ That, on the other side, every thing which is an
“ improvement of virtue, or an establishment of
“ right affection and integrity, is an advancement
“ of interest, and leads to the greatest and most
“ solid happiness and enjoyment.”

Thus the wisdom of what rules, and is first and chief in nature, has made it to be according to the private interest and good of every one, to work towards the general good; which if a creature ceases to promote, he is actually so far wanting to himself, and ceases to promote his own happiness and welfare. He is, on this account, directly his own enemy: nor can he any otherwise be good or useful to himself, than as he continues good to society, and to that whole of which he is himself a part. So that Virtue, which of all excellencies and beauties is the chief and most amiable; that which is the prop and ornament of human affairs;
which

which upholds communities, maintains union, friendship, and correspondence amongst men; that by which countries as well as private families, flourish and are happy; and for want of which every thing comely, conspicuous, great, and worthy, must perish, and go to ruin; that single quality, thus beneficial to all society, and to mankind in general, is found equally a happiness and good to each creature in particular; and is that by which alone man can be happy, and without which he must be miserable.

And thus Virtue is the good, and Vice the ill of every one.

And thus Virtue is the good, and Vice the ill
of cycly one

THE
M O R A L I S T S:
A
PHILOSOPHICAL RHAPSODY.

BEING
A RECITAL OF CERTAIN CONVERSATIONS
ON NATURAL AND MORAL SUBJECTS.

— *Inter silvas academi quærere verum.*

Horat. ep. 2. lib. 2.

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PHILOCLES to PALEMON.

WHAT mortal, if he had never chanced to hear your character, Palemon, could imagine that a genius fitted for the greatest affairs, and formed amidst courts and camps, should have so violent a turn towards philosophy and the schools? Who is there could possibly believe that one of your rank and credit in the fashionable world, should be so thoroughly conversant in the learned one, and deeply interested in the affairs of a people so disagreeable to the generality of mankind and humor of the age?

I believe truly, you are the only well-bred man who would have taken the fancy to talk philosophy in such a circle of good company as we had round us yesterday, when we were in your coach together, in the park. How you could reconcile

the objects there to such subjects as these, was unaccountable. I could only conclude, that either you had an extravagant passion for philosophy, to quit so many charms for it; or that some of those tender charms had an extravagant effect, which sent you to philosophy for relief.

In either case I pitied you, thinking it a milder fate to be, as I truly was, for my own part, a more indifferent lover. It was better, I told you, to admire beauty and wisdom a little more moderately. It was better, I maintained, to engage so cautiously as to be sure of coming off with a whole heart, and a fancy as strong as ever towards all the pretty entertainments and diversions of the world. For these, methought, were things one would not willingly part with, for a fine romantic passion of one of those gentlemen whom they called virtuosos.

The name I took to belong in common to your lover and philosopher. No matter what the object was; whether poetry, music, philosophy, or the fair. All who were enamoured any way, were in the same condition. You might perceive it, I told you, by their looks, their admiration, their profound thoughtfulness, their waking ever and anon as out of a dream, their talking still of one thing, and scarce minding what they said on any other subject. — Sad indications!

But all this warning served not to deter you. For you, Palemon, are one of the adventurous, whom danger rather animates than discourages. And now nothing less will satisfy you than to

have our philosophical adventures recorded. All must be laid before you, and summed in one complete account; to remain, it seems, as a monument of that unseasonable conversation, so opposite to the reigning genius of gallantry and pleasure.

I must own, indeed, it is become fashionable in our nation to talk politics in every company, and mix the discourses of state - affairs with those of pleasure and entertainment. However, it is certain we approve of no such freedom in Philosophy. Nor do we look upon politics to be of her province, or in the least related to her. So much have we moderns degraded her, and stripped her of her chief rights.

You must allow me, Palemon, thus to bemoan philosophy; since you have forced me to engage with her at a time when her credit runs so low. She is no longer active in the world; nor can hardly, with any advantage, be brought upon the public stage. We have immured her, poor lady! in colleges and cells, and have set her servilely to such works as those in the mines. Empirics, and pedantic sophists, are her chief pupils. The school-syllogism, and the elixir, are the choicest of her products. So far is she from producing statesmen, as of old, that hardly any man of note in the public cares to own the least obligation to her. If some few maintain their acquaintance, and come now and then to her recesses, it is as the disciple of quality came to his Lord and Master, "secretly, and by night."

But as low as Philosophy is reduced, if morals be allowed belonging to her, politics must undeniably be hers. For to understand the manners and constitutions of men in common, it is necessary to study Man in particular, and know the creature as he is in himself, before we consider him in company, as he is interested in the state, or joined to any city or community. Nothing is more familiar than to reason concerning man in his confederate state and national relation, as he stands engaged to this or that society, by birth or naturalization: yet to consider him as a citizen or commoner of the world, to trace his pedigree a step higher, and view his end and constitution in nature itself, must pass, it seems, for some intricate or over-refined speculation.

It may be properly alledged perhaps, as a reason for this general shyness in moral inquiries, that the people to whom it has principally belonged to handle these subjects, have done it in such a manner as to put the better sort out of countenance with the undertaking. The appropriating this concern to mere scholastics, has brought their fashion and air into the very subject. There are formal set places, where we reckon there is enough said and taught on the head of these graver subjects. We can give no quarter to any thing like it in good company. The least mention of such matters gives us a disgust, and puts us out of humor. If learning comes across us, we count it pedantry; if morality, it is preaching.

One must own this, however, as a real disadvan-

tage of our modern conversations, that, by such a scrupulous nicety, they lose those masculine helps of learning and sound reason. Even the fair sex, in whose favor we pretend to make this condescension, may with reason despise us for it, and laugh at us for aiming at their peculiar softness. It is no compliment to them, to affect their manners, and be effeminate. Our sense, language, and style, as well as our voice and person, should have something of that male feature, and natural roughness, by which our sex is distinguished. And whatever politeness we may pretend to, it is more disfigurement than any real refinement of discourse, to render it thus delicate.

No work of wit can be esteemed perfect without that strength and boldness of hand, which gives it body and proportions. A good piece, the painters say, must have good muscling as well as coloring and drapery. And surely no writing or discourse of any great moment, can seem other than enervated, when neither strong reason, nor antiquity, nor the records of things, nor the natural history of man, nor any thing which can be called knowledge, dares accompany it, except perhaps in some ridiculous habit, which may give it an air of play and dalliance.

This brings to my mind a reason I have often sought for, why we moderns, who abound so much in treatises and essays, are so sparing in the way of Dialogue¹, which heretofore was found

¹ Vol. 1. p. 166, — 169. ; Misc. 5. chap. 2. parag. 10. from the end, in vol. 3.

the politest and best way of managing even the graver subjects. The truth is, it would be an abominable falshood, and belying of the age, to put so much good sense together in any one conversation, as might make it hold out steadily, and with plain coherence, for an hour's time, till any one subject had been rationally examined.

To lay colors, to draw, or describe, against the appearance of nature and truth, is a liberty neither permitted the painter nor the poet. Much less can the philosopher have such a privilege; especially in his own case. If he represents his philosophy as making any figure in conversation; if he triumphs in the debate, and gives his own wisdom the advantage over that of the world, he may be liable to sound raillery, and possibly be made a fable of.

It is said of the lion, that being in civil conference with the man, he wisely refused to yield the superiority of strength to him; when, instead of fact, the man produced only certain figures and representations of human victories over the lion-kind. These master-pieces of art the beast discovered to be wholly of human forgery; and from these he had good right to appeal. Indeed, had he ever in his life been witness to any such combats, as the man represented to him in the way of art, possibly the example might have moved him. But old statues of a Hercules, a Theseus, or other beast-subduers, could have little power over him, whilst he neither saw nor felt any such living antagonist capable to dispute the field with him.

We need not wonder, therefore, that the sort of moral painting, by way of dialogue, is so much out of fashion, and that we see no more of these philosophical portraitures now a days. For where are the originals? Or what though you, Palemon, or I, by chance, have lighted on such a one, and pleased ourselves with the life, can you imagine it should make a good picture?

You know too, that in this academic philosophy I am to present you with, there is a certain way of questioning and doubting, which no way suits the genius of our age. Men love to take party instantly. They cannot bear being kept in suspense; the examination torments them. They want to be rid of it upon the easiest terms. It is as if men fancied themselves drowning, whenever they dare trust to the current of reason. They seem hurrying away, they know not whither, and are ready to catch at the first twig. There they chuse afterwards to hang, though ever so insecurely, rather than trust their strength to bear them above water. He who has got hold of a hypothesis, how slight soever, is satisfied. He can presently answer every objection; and, with a few terms of art, give an account of every thing without trouble.

It is no wonder, if in this age the philosophy of the alchymists prevails so much; since it promises such wonders, and requires more the labor of hands than brains. We have a strange fancy to be creators, a violent desire at least to know the knack or secret by which nature does all. The rest of our philosophers only aim at that in spe-

culatation, which our alchymists aspire to in practice. For with some of these, it has been actually under deliberation how to make man, by other mediums than nature has hitherto provided. Every sect has a recipe. When you know it, you are master of nature; you solve all her phænomena²; you see all her designs, and can account for all her operations. If need were, you might perchance too be of her laboratory, and work for her: at least one would imagine, the partisans of each modern sect had this conceit. They are all Archimedes in their way, and can make a world upon easier terms than he offered to move one.

In short, there are good reasons for our being thus superficial, and consequently thus dogmatical in philosophy. We are too lazy and effeminate, and withal a little too cowardly, to dare doubt. The decisive way best becomes our manners. It suits as well with our vices as with our superstition. Whichever we are fond of, is secured by it. If in favor of religion, we have espoused a hypothesis on which our faith, we think, depends, we are superstitiously careful not to be loosened in it. If, by means of our ill morals, we are broken with religion, it is the same case still. We are as much afraid of doubting. We must be sure to say, "It cannot be;" and, It is demonstrable: For otherwise who knows? "and not to know, is to yield!"

² See vol. 3. Mife. 3. chap. 3. parag. 5. from the end.

Thus we will needs know every thing, and be at the pains of examining nothing. Of all philosophy, therefore, how absolutely the most disagreeable must that appear, which goes upon no established hypothesis, nor presents us with any flattering scheme, talks only of probabilities, suspense of judgment, inquiry, search, and caution not to be imposed on, or deceived? This is that academic discipline in which formerly the youth were trained³; when not only horsemanship and military arts had their public places of exercise, but philosophy too had its wrestlers in repute. Reason and wit had their academy, and underwent this trial; not in a formal way, apart from the world, but openly, among the better sort, and as an exercise of the genteeler kind. This the greatest man were not ashamed to practise, in the intervals of public affairs, in the highest stations and employments, and at the latest hour of their lives. Hence that way of Dialogue, and patience of debate and reasoning, of which we have scarce a resemblance left in any of our conversations, at this season of the world.

Consider then, Palemon, what our picture is like to prove, and how it will appear, especially in the light you have unluckily chosen to set it. For who would thus have confronted philosophy with the gaiety, wit, and humor of the age? — If this, however, can be for your cre-

³ Vol. I. p. 287. &c. and notes.

dit, I am content. The project is your own. It is you who have matched philosophy thus unequally. Therefore leaving you to answer for the success, I begin this inauspicious work, which my ill stars and you have assigned me; and in which I hardly dare ask succour of the muses, as poetical as I am obliged to show myself in this enterprize.

S E C T. II.

Gallantry. Misanthropy. Cause of ill. Scepticism.
Deism.

“ O Wretched state of mankind! — Hapless
 “ nature, thus to have erred in thy chief work-
 “ manship! — Whence sprang this fatal weakness?
 “ What chance or destiny shall we accuse? Or
 “ shall we mind the poets, when they sing thy
 “ tragedy, Prometheus, who with thy stolen celest-
 “ tial fire, mixed with vile clay, didst mock
 “ heaven’s countenance, and, in abusive likeness
 “ of the immortals, madest the compound Man;
 “ that wretched mortal, ill to himself, and cause
 “ of ill to all.” —

What say you, Palemon, to this rant, now upon second thoughts? or have you forgot it was just in such a romantic strain that you broke out against human kind, upon a day when every thing looked pleasing, and the kind itself, I thought, never appeared fairer, or made a better show?

But it was not the whole creation you thus quarrelled with, nor were you so out of conceit with all beauty. The verdure of the field, the distant prospects, the gilded horizon, and purple sky, formed by a setting sun, had charms in abundance, and were able to make impression on you. Here, Palemon, you allowed me to admire as much as I pleased; when, at the same instant, you would not bear my talking to you of those nearer beauties of our own kind, which I thought more natural for men at our age to admire. Your severity, however, could not silence me upon this subject. I continued to plead the cause of the fair, and advance their charms above all those other beauties of nature. And when you took advantage from this opposition, to show how little there was of nature, and how much of art in what I admired, I made the best apology I could; and fighting for beauty, kept the field as long as there was one fair-one present.

Considering how your genius stood inclined to poetry, I wondered most to find you on a sudden grown so out of conceit with our modern poets, and gallant writers; whom I quoted to you as better authorities than any ancient in behalf of the fair sex, and their prerogative. But this you treated slightly. You acknowledged it to be true indeed, what had been observed by some late wits, "That Gallantry was of a modern growth." And well it might be so, you thought, without dishonor to the ancients;

who understood truth and nature too well, to admit so ridiculous an invention.

It was in vain, therefore, that I held up this shield in my defence. I did my cause no service, when, in behalf of the fair, I pleaded all the fine things which are usually said, in this romantic way, to their advantage. You attacked the very fortrefs of gallantry, ridiculed, the point of honor, with all those nice sentiments and ceremonials belonging to it. You damned even our favorite novels; those dear sweet natural pieces, writ most of them by the fair sex themselves. In short, this whole order and scheme of wit you condemned absolutely, as false, monstrous, and Gothic; quite out of the way of nature, and sprung from the mere dregs of chivalry or knight-errantry; a thing which in itself you preferred, as of a better taste than that which reigns at present in its stead. For at a time when this mystery of gallantry carried along with it the notion of doughty knighthood, when the fair were made witnesses, and, in a manner, parties to feats of arms, entered into all the points of war and combat, and were won by dint of lance and manly prowess; it was not altogether absurd, you thought, on such a foundation as this, to pay them homage and adoration, make them the standard of wit and manners, and bring mankind under their laws. But in a country, where no she-saints were worshipped by any authority from religion, it was as impertinent and senseless as it was profane, to deify the sex, raise them to a capacity above what Nature had allowed, and
treat

treat them with a respect, which, in the natural way of love, they themselves were the aptest to complain of.

Indeed, as for the moral part, it was wonderful, you said, to observe the licentiousness which this foppish courtly humor had established in the world. What such a flattering way of address to all the sex in common could mean, you knew not; unless it were to render them wholly common indeed, and make each fair-one apprehend, that the public had a right to her; and that beauty was too communicative and divine a thing, to be made a property, and confined to one at once.

Mean while our company began to leave us: The beau-monde, whom you had been thus severely censuring, drew off apace: for it grew late. I took notice, that the approaching objects of the night were the more agreeable to you, for the solitude they introduced; and that the moon and planets which began now to appear, were in reality the only proper company for a man in your humor. For now you began to talk with much satisfaction of natural things, and of all orders of beauties, Man only excepted. Never did I hear a finer description than you made of the order of the heavenly luminaries, the circles of the planets, and their attendant fatellites. And you who would allow nothing to those fair earthly luminaries in the circles which just now we moved in; you, Palemon, who seemed to overlook the pride of that theatre, began now to look out with ravishment on this other, and triumph in the new philoso-

phical scene of worlds unknown. Here, when you had pretty well spent the first fire of your imagination, I would have got you to reason more calmly with me upon that other part of the creation, your own kind; to which, I told you, you discovered so much aversion, as would make one believe you a complete Timon, or man-hater.

“ Can you then, O Philocles, ” said you in a high strain, and with a moving air of passion, “ can you believe me of that character? Or can “ you think it of me in earnest, that being Man, “ and conscious of my nature, I should have “ yet so little of humanity, as not to feel the “ affections of a man? or feeling what is natural “ towards my kind, that I should hold their “ interest light, and be indifferently affected with “ what affects or seriously concerns them? Am I “ so ill a lover of my country? or is it that you “ find me indeed so ill a friend? For what are “ all relations else? What are the ties of private “ friendship, if that to mankind be not obliging? “ Can there be yet a bond in nature, if that be “ none? O Philocles! believe me when I say I “ feel it one, and fully prove its power within “ me. Think not that I would willingly break “ my chain: nor count me so degenerate or “ unnatural, as whilst I hold this form, and wear “ a human heart, that I should throw off love, “ compassion, kindness, and not befriend man- “ kind. — But O what treacheries! what disorders! And how corrupt is all! — Did you

“ not observe even now , when all this space was
“ filled with goodly rows of company , how
“ peaceful all appeared ? ——— What charms there
“ are in public companies ! What harmony in
“ courts and courtly places ! How pleased is every
“ face ! How courteous and humane the general
“ carriage and behaviour ! ——— What creature
“ capable of reflection , if he thus saw us mankind ,
“ and saw no more , would not believe our earth
“ a very heaven ? What foreigner , the inhabitant ,
“ suppose , of some near planet , when he had
“ travelled hither , and surveyed this outward
“ face of things , would think of what lay hid
“ beneath the mask ? ——— But let him stay a
“ while. Allow him leisure ; till he has gained
“ a nearer view , and following our dissolved
“ assemblies to their particular recesses , he has the
“ power of seeing them in this new aspect. ———
“ Here he may behold those great men of the
“ ministry , who not an hour ago in public ap-
“ peared such friends , now plotting craftily each
“ other’s ruin , with the ruin of the state itself , a
“ sacrifice to their ambition. Here he may see
“ too those of a softer kind , who knowing not
“ ambition , follow only love. Yet , Philocles ,
“ who would think it ? ——— ”

At these words , you may remember , I discovered the lightness of my temper , and laughed aloud ; which I could hardly hope you would have pardoned , had I not freely told you the true reason. It was not for want of being affected with what you spoke. I only imagined a

more particular cause had provoked you, when, having passed over the ambitious, you were coming full-charged against the people of a softer passion. At first, I looked on you as deeply in the spleen: but now I concluded you in love, and so unhappily engaged as to have reason to complain of infidelity. "This," thought I, "has moved Palemon thus. Hence the sad world! Here was that corruption, and those disorders he lamented!"

After I had begged pardon for my rude mirth, which had the good fortune, however, to make some change in your humor, we fell naturally into cool reasoning about the nature and cause of Ill in general: "Through what contingency, what chance; by what fatal necessity, what will, or what permission, it came upon the world; or being come once, should still subsist." This inquiry, which with slight reasoners is easily got over, stuck hard, I found, with one of your close judgment and penetration. And this insensibly led us into a nice criticism of Nature; whom you sharply arraigned for many absurdities you thought her guilty of; in relation to mankind, and his peculiar state.

Fain would I have persuaded you to think with more equality of Nature, and to proportion her defects a little better. My notion was, that the grievance lay not altogether in one part, as you placed it; but that every thing had its share

¹ Treatise IV. See the beginning. In this volume.

of inconvenience. Pleasure and pain , beauty and deformity , good and ill , seemed to me every where interwoven ; and one with another made , I thought , a pretty mixture , agreeable enough , in the main. It was the same , I fancied , as in some of those rich stuffs , where the flowers and ground were oddly put together , with such irregular work , and contrary colors , as looked ill in the pattern , but mighty natural and well in the piece.

But you were still upon extremes. Nothing would serve to excuse the faults or blemishes of this part of the creation , Mankind ; even though all besides were fair , without a blemish. The very storms and tempests had their beauty in your account , those alone excepted which arose in human breasts. It was only for this turbulent race of mortals you offered to accuse Nature. And I now found why you had been so transported with the story of Prometheus. You wanted such an operator as this for mankind : and you were tempted to wish the story could have been confirmed in modern divinity ; that , clearing the supreme powers of any concern or hand in the ill workmanship , you might have the liberty of inveighing against it , without profaneness.

This , however , I told you , was but a slight evasion of the religious poets among the ancients. It was easy to answer every objection by a Prometheus : as , “ Why had mankind originally
“ so much folly and perverseness ? why so much

“ pride, such ambition, and strange appetites ?
 “ why so many plagues and curses entailed on
 “ him and his posterity ? ” — — Prometheus was
 the cause. The plastic artist, with his unlucky
 hand, solved all. “ It was his contrivance, they
 “ said, and he was to answer for it. ” They
 reckoned it a fair game, if they could gain a
 single remove, and put the evil cause further off.
 If the people asked a question, they told them a
 tale, and sent them away satisfied. None besides
 a few philosophers would be such busy-bodies,
 they thought, as to look beyond, or ask a second
 question.

And in reality, continued I, it is not to be
 imagined how serviceable a tale is, to amuse
 others besides mere children; and how much
 easier the generality of men are paid in this paper-
 coin, than in Sterling reason. We ought not to
 laugh so readily at the Indian philosophers, who,
 to satisfy their people how this huge frame of the
 world is supported, tell them it is by an elephant. —
 And the elephant how ? — — A shrewd question !
 but which by no means should be answered. It is
 here only that our Indian philosophers are to
 blame. They should be contented with the
 elephant, and go no further. But they have a
 tortoise in reserve, whose back, they think, is
 broad enough. So the tortoise must bear the
 new load : and thus the matter stands worse than
 before.

The Heathen story of Prometheus was, I told
 you, much the same with this Indian one : only

the Heathen mythologists were so wise as not to go beyond the first remove. A single Prometheus was enough to take the weight from Jove. They fairly made Jove a stander-by. He resolved, it seems, to be neuter; and see what would come of this notable experiment; how the dangerous man-moulder would proceed; and what would be the event of his tampering. — Excellent account, to satisfy the Heathen vulgar! But how, think you, would a philosopher digest this? “For
“ the gods, he would say presently, either could
“ have hindered Prometheus’s creation, or they
“ could not. If they could, they were answerable
“ for the consequences; if they could not, they
“ were no longer gods, being thus limited and
“ controuled. And whether Prometheus were a
“ name for chance, destiny, a plastic nature, or
“ an evil dæmon; whatever was designed by
“ it, it was still the same breach of Omnipotence.”

That such a hazardous affair as this of creation should have been undertaken by those who had not perfect foresight as well as command, you owned was neither wise nor just. But you stood to foresight. You allowed the consequences to have been understood by the creating powers, when they undertook their work: and you denied that it would have been better for them to have omitted it, though they knew what would be the event. “It was better still that the project should
“ be executed, whatever might become of
“ mankind, or how hard soever such a creation

“ was like to fall on the generality of this miserable
 “ race. For it was impossible , you thought , that
 “ Heaven should have acted otherwise than for the
 “ best. So that even from this misery and ill of
 “ man , there was undoubtedly some good arising ;
 “ something which overbalanced all , and made
 “ full amends. ”

This was a confession I wondered indeed how I came to draw from you : and soon afterwards I found you somewhat uneasy under it. For here I took up your own part against you ; and setting all those villanies and corruptions of human kind in the same light you had done just before , I put it upon you to tell , where possibly could be the advantage or good arising hence ; or what excellence or beauty could redound from those tragical pictures you yourself had drawn so well after the life. Whether it must not be a very strong philosophical faith , which should persuade one , that those dismal parts you set to view were only the necessary shades of a fine piece , to be reckoned among the beauties of the creation ; or whether possibly you might look upon that maxim as very fit for heaven , which I was sure you did not approve at all in mankind , “ To do ill , that good might follow. ”

This , I said , made me think of the manner of our modern Prometheus , the mountebanks , who performed such wonders of many kinds here on our earthly stages. They could create diseases , and make mischief , in order to heal , and to restore. But should we assign such a

practice as this to heaven ? Should we dare to make such empirics of the gods , and such a patient of poor Nature ? “ Was this a reason for “ Nature’s sickliness ? Or how else came she, “ poor innocent ! to fall sick , or run astray ? “ Had she been originally healthy , or created “ sound at first , she had still continued so. It “ was no credit to the gods to leave her desti- “ tute , or with a flaw which would cost dear the “ mending , and make them sufferers for their “ own work. ” —

I was going to bring Homer to witness for the many troubles of Jove , the death of Sarpedon , and the frequent crosses heaven met with from the fatal sisters. But this discourse, I saw, displeased you. I had by this time plainly discovered my inclination to Scepticism. And here not only religion was objected to me , but I was reproached too on the account of that gallantry which I had some time before defended. Both were joined together in the charge you made against me , when you saw I adhered to nothing ; but was now as ready to declaim against the fair, as I had been before to plead their cause, and defend the moral of lovers. This , you said , was my constant way in all debates : I was as well pleased with the reason on one side , as on the other : I never troubled myself about the success of the argument , but laughed still, whatever way it went ; and even when I convinced others , never seemed as if I was convinced myself.

I owned to you, Palemon, there was truth enough in your charge. For above all things I loved ease; and of all philosophers, those who reasoned most at their ease, and were never angry or disturbed; as those called Sceptics, you owned, never were. I looked upon this kind of philosophy as the prettiest, agreeablest, roving exercise of the mind, possible to be imagined. The other kind, I thought, was painful and laborious: "To keep always in the limits of
 " one path; to drive always at a point; and
 " hold precisely to what men, at a venture,
 " called the Truth: A point, in all appear-
 " ance, very unfixed, and hard to ascertain." Besides, my way hurt no body. I was always the first to comply on any occasion; and for matters of religion, was further from profaneness and erroneous doctrine than any one. I could never have the sufficiency to shock my spiritual and learned superiors. I was the furthest from leaning to my own understanding: nor was I one who exalted reason above faith, or insisted much upon what the dogmatical men call demonstration, and dare oppose to the sacred mysteries of religion. And to show you, continued I, how impossible it is for the men of our sort ever to err from the catholic and established faith, pray consider, that whereas others pretend to see with their own eyes, what is properest and best for them in religion; we, for our parts, pretend not to see with any other than those of our spiritual guides. Neither do

we presume to judge those guides ourselves; but submit to them, as they are appointed us by our just superiors. In short, you who are rationalists, and walk by reason in every thing, pretend to know all things, whilst you believe little or nothing, we, for our parts, know nothing, and believe all.

Here I ended; and, in return, you only asked me coldly, "Whether, with that fine Scepticism of mine, I made no more distinction between sincerity and insincerity in actions, than I did between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, in arguments?"

I durst not ask what your question drove at. I was afraid I saw it too plainly; and that by this loose way of talking, which I had learned in some fashionable conversations of the world, I had given you occasion to suspect me of the worst sort of scepticism, such as spared nothing; but overthrew all principles, moral and divine.

Forgive me, said I, good Palemon: you are offended, I see, and not without cause. But what if I should endeavour to compensate my sceptical misbehaviour, by using a known sceptic privilege, and asserting strenuously the cause I have hitherto opposed? Do not imagine that I dare aspire so high as to defend revealed religion, or the holy mysteries of the Christian faith. I am unworthy of such a task, and should profane the subject. It is of mere philosophy I speak: and my fancy is only to try what I can muster up thence, to make head against the chief arguments of Atheism, and

re-establish what I have offered to loosen in the system of Theism.

Your project, said you, bids fair to reconcile me to your character, which I was beginning to mistrust. For as averse as I am to the cause of Theism, or name of Deist, when taken in a sense exclusive of revelation, I consider still that, in strictness, the root of all is Theism; and that to be a settled Christian, it is necessary to be first of all a good Theist. For Theism can only be opposed to Polytheism², or Atheism. Nor have I patience to hear the name of Deist, the highest of all names, decried and set in opposition to Christianity: “As if our religion was a kind of magic, which depended not on the belief of a single supreme being, or as if the firm and rational belief of such a being, on philosophical grounds, was an improper qualification for believing any thing further.” Excellent presumption, for those who naturally incline to the disbelief of revelation, or who through vanity affect a freedom of this kind! —

But let me hear, continued you, whether in good earnest, and thorough sincerity, you intend to advance any thing in favor of that opinion which is fundamental to all religion; or whether you design only to divert yourself with the subject, as you have done hitherto? “Whatever your thoughts are, Philocles, I am resolved to force them from you. You can no longer plead the unsuitableness of the time or place to

² “To Polytheism (*Dæmonism*) or Atheism;” as above, p. 6.

“such grave subjects. The gaudy scene is over
“with the day. Our company have long since
“quitted the field. And the solemn majesty of
“such a night as this, may justly suit with the
“profoundest meditation, or most serious dis-
“course.”

Thus, Palemon, you continued to urge me,
till by necessity I was drawn into the following
vein of philosophical enthusiasm.

S E C T. III.

*Love. Beauty. Society. Virtue. Universe. God. Ill,
natural and moral. Good. Enthusiast.*

YOU shall find then, said I, taking a grave air,
that it is possible for me to be serious; and that
it is probable I am growing so, for good and all.
Your over-seriousness a while since, at such an
unseasonable time, may have driven me perhaps
into a contrary extreme, by opposition to your
melancholy humor. But I have now a better
idea of that melancholy you discovered; and
notwithstanding the humorous turn you were pleas-
ed to give it, I am persuaded it has a different
foundation from any of those fantastical causes I
then assigned to it. “Love, doubtless, is at the
“bottom; but a nobler love than such as com-
“mon beauties inspire.” —

Here, in my turn, I began to raise my voice, and imitate the solemn way you had been teaching me. "Knowing as you are," continued I, "well knowing and experienced in all the degrees "and orders of beauty, in all the mysterious "charms of the particular forms; you rise to what "is more general; and with a larger heart, and "mind more comprehensive, you generously seek "that which is highest in the kind. Not capti- "vated by the lineaments of a fair face, or the "well-drawn proportions of a human body, you "view the life itself, and embrace rather the "mind which adds the lustre, and renders chiefly "amiable.

"Nor is the enjoyment of such a single beauty "sufficient to satisfy such an aspiring soul. It "seeks how to combine more beauties, and by "what coalition of these, to form a beautiful "society. It views communities, friendships, re- "lations, duties; and considers by what harmony "of particular minds the general harmony is com- "posed, and common-weal established.

"Nor satisfied even with public good in one "community of men, it frames itself a nobler "object, and with enlarged affection seeks the "good of mankind. It dwells with pleasure amidst "that reason, and those orders on which this fair "correspondence and goodly interest is established. "Laws, constitutions, civil and religious rites; "whatever civilizes or polishes rude mankind; "the sciences and arts, philosophy, morals, virtue, "the flourishing state of human affairs, and the

“ perfection of human nature; these are its de-
“ lightful prospects, and this the charm of beauty
“ which attracts it.

“ Still ardent in this pursuit, such is its love
“ of order and perfection, it rests not here; nor
“ satisfies itself with the beauty of a part; but ex-
“ tending further its communicative bounty, seeks
“ the good of all, and affects the interest and
“ prosperity of the whole. True to its native
“ world and higher country, it is here it seeks
“ order and perfection; wishing the best, and
“ hoping still to find a just and wise adminis-
“ tration.

“ And since all hope of this were vain and idle,
“ if no universal mind presided; since without
“ such a supreme intelligence and providential
“ care, the distracted universe must be condemned
“ to suffer infinite calamities; it is here the gene-
“ rous mind labors to discover that healing cause
“ by which the interest of the whole is securely
“ established, the beauty of things, and the uni-
“ versal order happily sustained.

“ This, Palemon, is the labor of your soul:
“ and this its melancholy; when unsuccessfully
“ pursuing the supreme beauty, it meets with
“ darkening clouds which intercept its sight. Mon-
“ sters arise not those from Lybian deserts, but
“ from the heart of man more fertile; and with
“ their horrid aspect cast an unseemly reflection
“ upon Nature. She, helpless, as she is thought,
“ and working thus absurdly, is contemned, the
“ government of the world arraigned, and Deity
“ made void.

“ Much is alledged in answer, to show why
 “ Nature errs, and how she came thus impotent
 “ and erring from an unerring hand. But I deny
 “ she errs; and when she seems most ignorant or
 “ perverse in her productions, I assert her even
 “ then as wise and provident, as in her goodliest
 “ works. For it is not then that men complain
 “ of the world’s order, or abhor the face of things
 “ when they see various interests mixed and
 “ interfering; natures subordinate, of different
 “ kinds, opposed one to another, and in their
 “ different operations submitted, the higher to
 “ the lower. It is, on the contrary, from this
 “ order of inferior and superior things, that we
 “ admire the world’s beauty¹, founded thus on
 “ contrarieties: whilst, from such various and
 “ disagreeing principles, a universal concord is
 “ established.

“ Thus, in the several orders of terrestrial
 “ forms, a resignation is required, a sacrifice and
 “ mutual yielding of natures one to another. The
 “ vegetables by their death sustain the animals:
 “ and animal bodies dissolved, enrich the earth,
 “ and raise again the vegetable world. The nu-
 “ merous insects are reduced by the superior kinds
 “ of birds and beasts: and these again are checked
 “ by man; who in his turn submits to other
 “ natures, and resigns his form a sacrifice in com-
 “ mon to the rest of things. And if in natures

¹ See Misc. 5. chap. 1. parag. 6. from the end, what is cited
 in the notes from the ancient author on the world.

“ so little exalted or pre-eminent above each other;
 “ the sacrifice of interests can appear so just; how
 “ much more reasonably may all inferior natures
 “ be subjected to the superior nature of the world!
 “ That world, Palemon, which even now transf-
 “ ported you, when the sun’s fainting light gave
 “ way to these bright constellations, and left you
 “ this wide system to contemplate.

“ Here are those laws which ought not, nor
 “ can submit to any thing below. The central
 “ powers, which hold the lasting orbs in their
 “ just poize and movement, must not be con-
 “ trouled to save a fleeting form, and rescue from
 “ the precipice a puny animal, whose brittle
 “ frame, however protected, must of itself so
 “ soon dissolve. The ambient air, the inward
 “ vapors, the impending meteors, or whatever
 “ else is nutrimental or preservative of this earth,
 “ must operate in a natural course: and other
 “ constitutions must submit to the good habit and
 “ constitution of the all-sustaining globe.

“ Let us not therefore wonder, if by earth-
 “ quakes, storms, pestilential blasts, nether or
 “ upper fires, or floods, the animal kinds are oft
 “ afflicted, and whole species perhaps involved at
 “ once in common ruin: but much less let us
 “ account it strange, if either by outward shock,
 “ or some interior wound from hostile matter,
 “ particular animals are deformed even in their
 “ first conception, when the disease invades the
 “ seats of generation, and seminal parts are in-
 “ jured and obstructed in their accurate labors.

“ It is then alone that monstrous shapes are seen :
 “ nature still working as before , and not perverse-
 “ ly or erroneously ; not faintly , or with feeble
 “ endeavours ; but overpowered by a superior
 “ rival , and by another nature’s justly conquer-
 “ ing force.

“ Nor need we wonder , if the interior form ,
 “ the soul and temper , partakes of this occasional
 “ deformity , and sympathizes often with its close
 “ partner. Who is there can wonder either at
 “ the sicknesses of sense , or the depravity of minds
 “ inclosed in such frail bodies , and dependent
 “ on such pervertible organs ?

“ Here then is that solution you require : and
 “ hence those seeming blemishes cast upon nature.
 “ Nor is there ought in this beside what is na-
 “ tural and good. It is good which is predomi-
 “ nant ; and every corruptible and mortal nature ,
 “ by its mortality and corruption , yields only to
 “ some better , and all in common to that best
 “ and highest nature , which is incorruptible and
 “ immortal.”

I scarce had ended these words , ere you broke out in admiration ; asking what had befallen me , that of a sudden I had thus changed my character , and entered into thoughts , which must certainly , you supposed , have some foundation in me , since I could express them with such seeming affection as I had done.

O , said I , Palemon ! that it had been my fortune to have met you the other day , just at my return out of the country , from a friend whose

conversation had in one day or two made such an impression on me, that I should have suited you to a miracle. You would have thought indeed that I had been cured of my scepticism and levity, so as never to have rallied more, at that wild rate, on any subject, much less on these which are so serious.

Truly, said you, I could wish I had met you rather at that time, or that those good and serious impressions of your friend had without interruption lasted with you till this moment.

Whatever they were, I told you, Palemon, I had not so lost them neither, as not easily, you saw, to revive them on occasion; were I not afraid.

Afraid! said you. For whose sake, good Philocles, I entreat you? For mine or your own?

For both, replied I. For though I was like to be perfectly cured of my scepticism, it was by what I thought worse, downright enthusiasm. You never knew a more agreeable Enthusiast!

Were he my friend, said you, I should hardly treat him in so free a manner. Nor should I, perhaps, judge that to be enthusiasm which you so freely term so. I have a strong suspicion that you injure him. Nor can I be satisfied till I hear further of that serious conversation for which you tax him as enthusiastic.

I must confess, said I, he had nothing of that savage air of the vulgar enthusiastic kind. All was serene, soft, and harmonious. The manner of it was more after the pleasing transports of

those ancient poets you are often charmed with, than after the fierce, unfociable way of modern zealots; those starched gruff gentlemen, who guard religion as bullies do a mistress, and give us the while a very indifferent opinion of their lady's merit, and their own wit, by adoring what they neither allow to be inspected by others, nor care themselves to examine in a fair light. But here I will answer for it, there was nothing of disguise or paint. All was fair, open, and genuine, as nature herself. It was nature he was in love with; it was nature he sung. And if any one might be said to have a natural mistress, my friend certainly might, whose heart was thus engaged. But Love, I found, was every where the same. And though the object here was very fine, and the passion it created very noble, yet liberty, I thought, was finer than all: and I who never cared to engage in other loves of the least continuance, was the more afraid, I told you, of this which had such a power with my poor friend, as to make him appear the perfectest Enthusiast in the world, ill-humor only excepted. For this was singular in him, "That though he had all of the enthusiast, he had nothing of the bigot. He heard every thing with mildness and delight, and bore with me when I treated all his thoughts as visionary, and when, sceptic-like, I unravelled all his systems".

Here was that character and description which so highly pleased you, that you would hardly

suffer me to come to a conclusion. It was impossible, I found, to give you satisfaction, without reciting the main of what passed in those two days between my friend and me in our country-retirement. Again and again I bid you beware. "You knew not the danger of this philosophical
"passion; nor considered what you might possibly draw upon yourself, and make me the
"author of. I was far enough engaged already,
"and you were pushing me further, at your own
"hazard."

All I could say made not the least impression on you. But rather than proceed any further this night, I engaged, for your sake, to turn writer, and draw up the memoirs of those two philosophical days; beginning with what had passed this last day between ourselves; as I have accordingly done, you see, by way of introduction to my story.

By this time, being got late to town, some hours after the latest of our company, you set me down at my own lodging; and thus we bade good-night.

P A R T II.

S E C T. I.

Retirement. Happiness. Good. Pleasure. Pleasure and pain. Futurity. Self. Friendship. Friendship, private and public. Gratitude. Bounty. Love of mankind. Good-breeding. Good-nature. Mystical love. Genius of a country. Nature. Genius of the world.

PHILOCLES to PALEMON.

AFTER such a day as yesterday, I might well have thought it hard, when I awaked the next morning, to find myself under positive engagements of proceeding in the same philosophical way, without intermission, and upon harder terms than ever. For it was no longer the agreeable part of a companion which I had now to bear. Your conversation, Palemon, which had hitherto supported me, was at an end. I was now alone; confined to my closet, obliged to meditate by myself, and reduced to the hard circumstances of an author and historian, in the most difficult subject.

But here, methought, propitious Heaven in some manner assisted me. For if dreams were, as Homer teaches, sent from the throne of Jove; I might conclude I had a favorable one, of the

true sort; towards the morning-light; which, as I recollected myself, gave me a clear and perfect idea of what I desired so earnestly to bring back to my memory.

I found myself transported to a distant country, which presented a pompous rural scene. It was a mountain not far from the sea, its brow adorned with ancient wood, and at its foot a river and well-inhabited plain; beyond which the sea appearing, closed the prospect.

No sooner had I considered the place, than I discerned it to be the very same where I had talked with Theocles the second day I was with him in the country. I looked about to see if I could find my friend; and calling Theocles, I awaked. But so powerful was the impression of my dream, and so perfect the idea raised in me, of the person, words, and manner of my friend; that I could now fancy myself philosophically inspired, as that Roman sage by his *Ægeria*, and invited on this occasion to try my historical Muse. For justly might I hope for such assistance in behalf of Theocles, who so loved the muses, and was, I thought, no less beloved by them.

To return, therefore, to that original rural scene, and that heroic Genius, the companion and guide of my first thoughts in these profounder subjects; I found him the first morning with his beloved Mantuan Muse, roving in the fields; where, as I had been informed at his house, he was gone out, after his usual way, to read. The

moment he saw me, his book vanished, and he came with friendly haste to meet me. After we had embraced, I discovered my curiosity to know what he was reading; and asked, "if it were of a secret kind, to which I could not be admitted?"

On this he showed me his poet; and looking pleasantly, Now, tell me truly, said he, Philocles, did you not expect some more mysterious book than this? I owned I did, considering his character, which I took to be of so contemplative a kind. And do you think, said he, that without being contemplative, one can truly relish these diviner poets? Indeed, said I, I never thought there was any need of growing contemplative, or retiring from the world, to read Virgil or Horace.

You have named two, said he, who can hardly be thought so very like, though they were friends, and equally good poets. Yet joining them, as you are pleased to do, I would willingly learn from you, whether, in your opinion, there be any disposition so fitted for reading them, as that in which they writ themselves. In this, I am sure, they both joined heartily, to love retirement; when, for the sake of such a life and habit as you call contemplative, they were willing to sacrifice the highest advantages, pleasures, and favor of a court. But I will venture to say more in favor of retirement: "That not only the best authors, but the best company, require this seasoning." Society itself cannot be rightly enjoyed without some absti-

nence and separate thought. All grows insipid, dull, and tiresome, without the help of some intervals of retirement. Say, Philocles; whether you yourself have not often found it so? Do you think those lovers understand the interests of their loves, who by their good-will would never be parted for a moment? or would they be discreet friends, think you, who would chuse to live together on such terms? What relish then must the world have, that common world of mixed and undistinguished company, without a little solitude, without stepping now and then aside, out of the road and beaten track of life, that tedious circle of noise and show, which forces wearied mankind to seek relief from every poor diversion?

By your rule, said I, Theocles, there should be no such thing as happiness or good in life, since every enjoyment wears out so soon, and growing painful, is diverted by some other thing, and that again by some other, and so on. I am sure, if solitude serves as a remedy or diversion to any thing in the world, there is nothing which may not serve as diversion to solitude, which wants it more than any thing besides. And thus there can be no good which is regular or constant. Happiness is a thing out of the way, and only to be found in wandering.

O Philocles, replied he, I rejoice to find you in the pursuit of happiness and good, however you may wander. Nay, though you doubt whether there be that thing; yet if you reason, it is

sufficient; there is hope still. But see how you have unawares engaged yourself! For if you have destroyed all good, because in all you can think of there is nothing will constantly hold so, then you have set it as a maxim, and very justly in my opinion too, "That nothing can be good but what is constant."

I own, said I, that all I know of wordly satisfaction is inconstant. The things which give it are never at a stay; and the good itself, whatever it be, depends no less on humor than on fortune. For that which chance may often spare, time will not. Age, change of temper, other thoughts; a different passion, new engagements, a new turn of life or conversation, the least of these are fatal, and alone sufficient to destroy enjoyment. Though the object be the same, the relish changes, and the short-lived Good expires. But I should wonder much, if you could tell me any thing in life, which was not of as changeable a nature, and subject to the same common fate of satiety and disgust.

I find then, replied he, that the current notion of good is not sufficient to satisfy you. You can afford to scepticize, where no one else will so much as hesitate. For almost every one philosophizes dogmatically on this head. All are positive in this, "That our real good is Pleasure."

If they would inform us, "which" said I "or what sort," and ascertain once the very species and distinct kind, such as must constantly remain the same, and equally eligible at all times; I

should then perhaps be better satisfied. But when will and pleasure are synonymous, when every thing which pleases us is called Pleasure¹, and we never chuse or prefer but as we please, it is trifling to say, "Pleasure is our good." For this has as little meaning as to say, "We chuse what we think eligible;" and, "We are pleased with what delights or pleases us." The question is, "Whether we are rightly pleased, and chuse as we should do?" For as highly pleased as children are with baubles, or with whatever affects their tender senses; we cannot in our hearts sincerely admire their enjoyment, or imagine them possessors of any extraordinary good. Yet are their senses, we know, as keen and susceptible of pleasure as our own. The same reflection is of force as to mere animals, who, in respect of the liveliness and delicacy of sensation, have many of them the advantage of us. And as for some low and sordid pleasures of human kind, should they be ever so lastingly enjoyed, and in the highest credit with their enjoyers; I should never afford them the name of happiness or good.

Would you then appeal, said he, from the immediate feeling and experience of one who is pleased and satisfied with what he enjoys?

Most certainly I should appeal, said I, continuing the same zeal which Theocles had stirred in me, against those dogmatizers on pleasure. For is there that sordid creature on earth, who

¹ Vol. 1. p. 265, 266. and vol. 3. Misc. 4. chap. 1. parag. 26.

does not prize his own enjoyment? Does not the forwardest, the most rancorous, distempered creature do as much? Is not malice and cruelty of the highest relish with some natures? Is not a hoggish life the height of some men's wishes? You would not ask me surely to enumerate the several species of sensations, which men of certain tastes have adopted, and owned for their chief pleasure and delight. For with some men even diseases have been thought valuable and worth the cherishing, merely for the pleasure found in allaying the ardor of an irritating sensation. And to these absurd Epicures those other are near akin, who, by studied provocatives, raise unnatural thirst and appetite; and, to make way for fresh repletion, prepare emetics, as the last dessert, the sooner to renew the feast. It is said, I know, proverbially, "That tastes are different, and must not be disputed." And I remember some such motto as this placed once on a device, which was found suitable to the notion. A fly was represented feeding on a certain lump. The food, however vile, was natural to the animal. There was no absurdity in the case. But should you show me a brutish or a barbarous man thus taken up, and solaced in his pleasure; should you show me a sot in his solitary debauch, or a tyrant in the exercise of his cruelty, with this motto over him, to forbid my appeal; I should hardly be brought to think the better of his enjoyment: nor can I possibly suppose, that a mere sordid wretch, with a base abject soul, and the best fortune in the world, was ever capable of any real enjoyment.

By this zeal, replied Theocles, which you have shown in the refuting a wrong hypothesis, one would imagine you had in reality some notion of a right, and began to think that there might possibly be such a thing at last as good.

That there is something nearer to good, and more like it than another, I am free, said I, to own. But what real Good is, I am still to seek, and must therefore wait till you can better inform me. This I only know, "That either all pleasure is good, or only some." If all, then every kind of sensuality must be precious and desirable. If some only, then we are to seek what kind; and discover, if we can, what it is which distinguishes between one pleasure and another; and makes one indifferent, sorry, mean; another valuable and worthy. And by this stamp, this character, if there be any such, we must define Good; and not by pleasure itself, which may be very great, and yet very contemptible. Nor can any one truly judge the value of any immediate sensation, otherwise than by judging first of the situation of his own mind. For that which we esteem a happiness in one situation of mind, is otherwise thought of in another. Which situation therefore is the justest, must be considered; "How to gain that point of sight, whence probably we may best discern, and how to place ourselves in that unbiassed state, in which we are fittest to pronounce."

O Philocles, replied he, if this be unfeignedly your sentiment; if it be possible you should have

the fortitude to with-hold your assent in this affair², and go in search of what the meanest of mankind think they already know so certainly: it is from a nobler turn of thought than what you have observed in any of the modern sceptics you have conversed with. For, if I mistake not, there are hardly any where at this day a sort of people more peremptory, or who deliberate less on the choice of good. They who pretend to such a scrutiny of other evidences, are the readiest to take the evidence of the greatest deceivers in the world, their own passions. Having gained, as they think, a liberty from some seeming constraints of religion, they suppose they employ this liberty to perfection, by following the first motion of their will, and assenting to the first dictate or report of any prepossessing fancy³, any foremost opinion, or conceit of Good. So that their privilege is only that of being perpetually amused, and their liberty that of being imposed on in their most important choice. I think one may say with assurance, "That the greatest of fools is he who
 " imposes on himself, and, in his greatest concern,
 " thinks certainly he knows that which he has
 " least studied, and of which he is most profoundly
 " ignorant." He who is ignorant, but knows his ignorance, is far wiser. And to do justice to these fashionable men of wit, they are not all of them indeed so insensible as not to perceive something

² Vol. I. p. 67.

³ Vol. I. p. 275. &c.

of their own blindness and absurdity. For often, when they seriously reflect on their past pursuits and engagements, they freely own, "That, for what remains of life, they know not whether they shall be of a piece with themselves; or whether their fancy, humor, or passion will not hereafter lead them to a quite different choice in Pleasure, and to a disapprobation of all they ever enjoyed before." — Comfortable reflection!

To bring the satisfactions of the mind, continued he, and the enjoyments of reason and judgment under the denomination of Pleasure, is only a collusion, and a plain receding from the common notion of the word. They deal not fairly with us, who, in their philosophical hour, admit that for pleasure, which, at an ordinary time, and in the common practice of life, is so little taken for such. The mathematician who labors at his problem, the bookish man who toils, the artist who endures voluntarily the greatest hardships and fatigues, none of these are said "to follow pleasure." Nor will the men of pleasure, by any means, admit them to be of their number. The satisfactions which are purely mental, and depend only on the motion of a thought, must, in all likelihood, be too refined for the apprehensions of our modern Epicures, who are so taken up with pleasure of a more substantial kind. They who are full oft the idea of such a sensible, solid good, can have but a slender fancy for the mere spiritual and intellectual sort. But it is this latter they set

up and magnify upon occasion, to save the ignominy which may redound to them from the former. This done, the latter may take its chance. Its use is presently at an end. For it is observable, that when the men of this sort have recommended the enjoyments of the mind under the title of pleasure; when they have thus dignified the word, and included in it whatever is mentally good or excellent, they can afterwards suffer it contentedly to slide down again into its own genuine and vulgar sense, whence they raised it only to serve a turn. When pleasure is called in question, and attacked, then reason and virtue are called in to her aid, and made principal parts of her constitution. A complicated form appears, and comprehends straight all which is generous, honest, and beautiful in human life. But when the attack is over, and the objection once solved, the spectre vanishes: Pleasure returns again to her former shape. She may even be pleasure still, and have as little concern with dry, sober reason, as in the nature of the thing, and according to common understanding, she really has. For if this rational sort of enjoyment be admitted into the notion of good, how is it possible to admit withal that kind of sensation which in effect is rather opposite to this enjoyment? It is certain, that, in respect of the mind and its enjoyments, the eagerness and irritation of mere pleasure, is as disturbing as the importunity and vexation of pain. If either throws the mind off its bias, and deprives it of the satisfaction it takes in its natural exercise and employment;
the

the mind, in this case, must be a sufferer as well by one as by the other. If neither does this, there is no harm on either side. —

By the way, said I, interrupting him, As sincere as I am in questioning, “Whether Pleasure be really good?” I am not such a sceptic as to doubt, “Whether Pain be really ill.”

Whatever is grievous, replied he, can be no other than Ill. But that what is grievous to one, is not so much as troublesome to another, let sportsmen, soldiers, and others of the hardy kinds, be witness. Nay, that what is pain to one, is pleasure to another, and so alternately, we very well know: since men vary in their apprehension of these sensations, and on many occasions confound one with the other. Has not even Nature herself, in some respects, as it were blended them together, and, as a wise man said once, “joined the extremity of one so nicely to the other, that it absolutely runs into it, and is undistinguishable?”

In fine then, said I, if pleasure and pain be thus convertible and mixed; if, according to your account, “that which is now pleasure, by being strained a little too far, runs into pain, and pain, when carried far, creates again the highest pleasure, by mere cessation, and a kind of natural succession; if some pleasures to some are pains, and some pains to others are pleasures:” all this, if I mistake not, makes still for my opinion, and shows that there is nothing you can assign which can really stand as Good. For if pleasure be not Good, nothing is: and if pain be

Ill, as I must necessarily take for granted, we have a shrewd chance on the ill side indeed, but none at all on the better. So that we may fairly doubt, "Whether Life itself be not mere misery;" since gainers by it we can never be: losers we may sufficiently, and are like to be, every hour of our lives. Accordingly, what our English poets says of good, should be just and proper: "It is good not to be born." — And thus, for any thing of good which can be expected in life, we may even "beg pardon of Nature; and return her present on her hands, without waiting for her call." For what should hinder us? or what are we the better for living?

The query, said he, is pertinent. But why such dispatch, if the case be doubtful? This, surely, my good Philocles! is a plain transgression of your sceptical bounds. We must be sufficiently dogmatical, to come to this determination. It is a deciding as well concerning death as life: "What possibly may be hereafter, and what not." Now, to be assured that we can never be concerned in any thing hereafter, we must understand perfectly what it is which concerns or engages us in any thing present. We must truly know ourselves, and in what this self of ours consists. We must determine against pre-existence, and give a better reason for our having never been concerned in ought before our birth, than merely, "Because we remember not, nor are conscious." For in many things we have been concerned to purpose, of which we have now no memory or conscious-

ness remaining. And thus we may happen to be again and again, to perpetuity, for any reason we can show to the contrary. All is revolution in us. We are no more the self-same matter, or system of matter, from one day to another. What succession there may be hereafter, we know not; since even now we live by succession, and only perish and are renewed. It is in vain we flatter ourselves with the assurance of our interest's ending with a certain shape or form. What interested us at first in it, we know not; any more than how we have since held on, and continue still concerned in such an assemblage of fleeting particles. Where besides, or in what else we may have to do, perchance, in time to come, we know as little; nor can tell how chance or providence, hereafter, may dispose of us. And if providence be in the case, we have still more reason to consider how we undertake to be our own disposers. It must needs become a Sceptic above all men to hesitate in matters of exchange. And though he acknowledges no present good or enjoyment in life, he must be sure, however, of bettering his condition, before he attempts to alter it. But as yet, Philocles, even this point remains undetermined between us: "Whether in this present life there be not such a thing as real Good."

Be you therefore, said I, my instructor, sagacious Theocles! and inform me, "What that Good is, or where, which can afford contentment and satisfaction always alike, without variation or diminution." For though on some occasions,

and in some subjects, the mind may possibly be so bent, and the passion so wrought up, that for the time no bodily sufferance or pain can alter it; yet this is what can seldom happen, and is unlikely to last long: since, without any pain or inconvenience, the passion in a little time does its own work, the mind relaxes with its bent, and the temper wearied with repetition, finds no more enjoyment, but runs to something new.

Hear then! said Theocles. For though I pretend not to tell you at once the nature of this which I call Good; yet I am content to show you something of it in yourself, which you will acknowledge to be naturally more fixed and constant, than any thing you have hitherto thought on. Tell me, my friend! if ever you were weary of doing good to those you loved; Say when you ever found it unpleasing to serve a friend? or whether when you first proved this generous pleasure, you did not feel it less than at this present; after so long experience? Believe me, Philocles, this pleasure is more debauching than any other. Never did any soul do good, but it came readier to do the same again, with more enjoyment. Never was love, or gratitude, or bounty practised but with increasing joy, which made the practiser still more in love with the fair act. Answer me, Philocles, you who are such a judge of beauty, and have so good a taste of pleasure; is there any thing you admire so fair as friendship? or any thing so charming as a generous action? What would it be therefore, if all life were in reality but one

continued friendship, and could be made one such entire act? Here surely would be that fixed and constant Good you sought. Or would you look for any thing beyond?

Perhaps not, said I. But I can never, surely, go beyond this, to seek for a chimera, if this Good of yours be not thoroughly chimerical. For though a poet may possibly work up such a single action, so as to hold a play out, I can conceive but very faintly how this high strain of friendship can be so managed as to fill a life. Nor can I imagine where the object lies of such a sublime, heroic passion.

Can any friendship, said he, be so heroic, as that towards mankind? Do you think the love of friends in general, and of one's country, to be nothing? or that particular friendship can well subsist without such an enlarged affection, and sense of obligation to society? Say, if possible, you are a friend, but hate your country. Say, you are true to the interest of a companion, but false to that of society. Can you believe yourself? or will you lay the name aside, and refuse to be called the friend, since you renounce the Man?

That there is something, said I, due to mankind, is what I think will not be disputed by one who claims the name of friend. Hardly indeed could I allow the name of man to one who never could call or be called friend. But he who justly proves himself a friend, is Man enough; nor is he wanting to society. A single friendship may acquit him. He has deserved a friend, and is man's

friend, though not in strictness, or according to your high moral sense, the friend of mankind. For to say truth, as to this sort of friendship, it may by wiser heads be esteemed perhaps more than ordinarily manly, and even heroic, as you assert it: but for my part, I see so very little worth in mankind, and have so indifferent an opinion of the public, that I can propose little satisfaction to myself in loving either.

Do you, then, take bounty and gratitude to be among the acts of friendship and good-nature?

Undoubtedly: for they are the chief.

Suppose, then, that the obliged person discovers in the obliger several failings; does this exclude the gratitude of the former? Not in the

least. Or does it make the exercise of gratitude less pleasing? I think rather the contrary. For when deprived of other means of making a return, I might rejoice still in that sure way of showing my gratitude to my benefactor, by bearing his failings as a friend. And

as to bounty: Tell me, I beseech you, is it to those only who are deserving that we should do good? Is it only to a good neighbour, or relation, a good father, child, or brother? Or does nature, reason, and humanity better teach us, to do good still to a father, because a father; and to a child, because a child; and so to every relation in human life? I think, said I, this last is rightest.

O Philocles, replied he, consider then what it was you said, when you objected against the love

of mankind because of human frailty; and seemed to scorn the public, because of its misfortunes. See if this sentiment be consistent with that humanity which elsewhere you own and practise. For where can generosity exist, if not here? Where can we ever exert friendship, if not in this chief subject? To what should we be true or grateful in the world, if not to mankind, and that society to which we are so deeply indebted? What are the faults or blemishes which can excuse such an omission, or in a grateful mind can ever lessen the satisfaction of making a grateful, kind return? Can you then out of good-breeding merely, and from a temper natural to you, rejoice to show civility, courteousness, obligingness, seek objects of compassion, and be pleased with every occurrence where you have power to do some service even to people unknown? Can you delight in such adventures abroad, in foreign countries, or in the case of strangers here at home; to help, assist, relieve all who require it, in the most hospitable, kind, and friendly manner? And can your country, or, what is more, your Kind, require less kindness from you, or deserve less to be considered, than even one of these chance-creatures? — O Philocles! how little do you know the extent and power of good-nature, and to what a heroic pitch a soul may rise, which knows the thorough force of it; and distributing it rightly, frames in itself an equal, just, and universal friendship!

Just as he had ended these words, a servant came to us in the field, to give notice of some

company, who were come to dine with us, and waited our coming in. So we walked homewards. I told Theocles, going along, that I feared I should never make a good friend or lover after his way. As for a plain natural love of one single person in either sex, I could compass it, I thought, well enough; but this complex, universal sort was beyond my reach. I could love the individual, but not the species. This was too mysterious; too metaphysical an object for me. In short, I could love nothing of which I had not some sensible, material image.

How! replied Theocles, can you never love except in this manner? when yet I know that your admired and loved a friend long ere you knew his person. Or was Palemon's character of no force, when it engaged you in that long correspondence which preceded your late personal acquaintance? The fact, said I, I must, of necessity, own to you. And now, methinks, I understand your mystery, and perceive how I must prepare for it: for in the same manner as when I first began to love Palemon, I was forced to form a kind of material object, and had always such a certain image of him, ready drawn, in my mind, whenever I thought of him; so I must endeavour to order it in the case before us; if possibly by your help I can raise any such image, or spectre, as may represent this odd being you would have me love.

Methinks, said he, you might have the same indulgence for Nature or Mankind, as for the

people of old Rome; whom, notwithstanding their blemishes, I have known you in love with, many ways; particularly under the representation of a beautiful youth called the Genius of the people. For I remember, that viewing once some pieces of antiquity, where the people were thus represented, you allowed them to be no disagreeable object.

Indeed, replied I, were it possible for me to stamp upon my mind such a figure as you speak of, whether it stood for mankind or nature, it might probably have its effect; and I might become perhaps a lover after your way; but more especially, if you could so order it, as to make things reciprocal between us, and bring me to fancy of this Genius, that it could be “sensible of my
“love, and capable of a return.” For without this I should make but an ill lover, though of the perfectest beauty in the world.

It is enough, said Theocles, I accept the terms: and if you promise to love, I will endeavour to show you that Beauty which I count the perfectest, and most deserving of Love; and which will not fail of a return. — To-morrow, when the eastern sun, as poets describe, with his first beams adorns the front of yonder hill; there, if you are content to wander with me in the woods you see, we will pursue those loves of ours, by favor of the sylvan nymphs: and invoking first the genius of the place, we will try to obtain at least some faint and distant view of the sovereign Genius and first beauty. This if you can come once to

contemplate, I will answer for it, that all those forbidding features and deformities, whether of nature or mankind, will vanish in an instant, and leave you that lover I could wish. — But now, enough! — Let us to our company, and change this conversation for some other more suitable to our friends and table.

S E C T. II.

Friendship. Virtue. Motives. Temperance. Liberty, civil, moral. Virtue. Religion and virtue. Zeal. Atheism. Moralists, nominal, real. Naturalists.

YOU see here, Palemon, what a foundation is laid for the enthusiasms I told you of; and which, in my opinion, I told you too, were the more dangerous, because so very odd, and out of the way. But curiosity had seized you, I perceived, as it had done me before. For, after this first conversation, I must own, I longed for nothing so much as the next day, and the appointed morning-walk in the woods.

We had only a friend or two at dinner with us; and for a good while we discoursed of news and indifferent things, till I, who had my head still running upon those other subjects, gladly laid hold of something dropt by chance concerning friendship; and said, that, for my own part, truly, though I once thought I had known friendship,

and really counted myself a good friend during my whole life; yet I was now persuaded to believe myself no better than a learner; since Theocles had almost convinced me, "That to be a friend
" to any one in particular, it was necessary to be
" first a friend to mankind." But how to qualify myself for such a friendship, was, methought, no little difficulty.

Indeed, said Theocles, you have given us a very indifferent character of yourself, in saying so. If you had spoken thus of the friendship of any great man at court, or perhaps of a court itself, and had complained, "How hard it was for you
" to succeed, or make interest with such as go-
" verned there;" we should have concluded in your behalf, that there were such terms to be complied with, as were unworthy of you. But
" to deserve well of the public," and "to be
" justly styled the friend of mankind," requires no more than to be good and virtuous; terms which, for one's own sake, one would naturally covet.

How comes it then, said I, that even these good terms themselves are so ill accepted, and hardly ever taken, if I may so express it, except on further terms? For Virtue, by itself, is thought but an ill bargain: and I know few, even of the religious and devout, who take up with it any otherwise than as children do with physic, where the rod and sweetmeat are the potent motives.

They are children indeed, replied Theocles, and should be treated so, who need any force or

persuasion to do what conduces to their health and good. But where, I beseech you, are those forbidding circumstances which should make virtue go down so hardly? Is it not, among other things, that you think yourself by this means precluded the fine tables and costly eating of our modern epicures; and that perhaps you fear the being reduced to eat always as ill as now, upon a plain dish or two, and no more?

This, I protested, was injuriously supposed of me. For I wished never to eat otherwise than I now did, at his table; which, by the way, had more resemblance, I thought, of Epicurus's, than those which now-a-days preposterously passed under his name. For, if his opinion might be taken, the highest pleasures in the world were owing to temperance, and moderate use.

If then the merest studier of pleasure, answered Theocles, even Epicurus himself, made that favorable report of temperance, so different from his modern disciples; if he could boldly say, "That with such fare as a mean garden afforded, he could vie even with the gods for happiness;" how shall we say of this part of virtue, that it needs be taken upon terms? if the immediate practice of temperance be thus harmless, are its consequences injurious? Does it take from the vigor of the mind, consume the body, and render both the one and the other less apt to their proper exercises, "the enjoyments of reason or sense, or the employments and offices of civil life?" Or is it that

a man's circumstances are the worse for it, as he stands towards his friends, or mankind? Is a gentleman in this sense to be pitied, "as one
"burdensome to himself and others; one whom
"all men will naturally shun, as an ill friend,
"and a corrupter of society and good man-
"ners?" — Shall we consider our gentleman in a public trust, and see whether he is like to succeed best with this restraining quality; or whether he may be more relied on, and thought more incorrupt, if his appetites are high, and his relish strong towards that which we call pleasure? Shall we consider him as a soldier, in a campaign, or siege; and advise with ourselves how we might be best defended, if we had occasion for such a one's service? "Which officer would
"make the best for the soldiers, which soldier
"for the officers; or which army for their
"country?" — What think you of our gentleman, for a fellow-traveller? Would he, as a temperate man, be an ill choice? Would it indeed be more eligible and delightful "to have
"a companion, who, in any shift or necessity,
"would prove the most ravenous, and eager to
"provide in the first place for himself, and his
"own exquisite sensations?" — I know not what to say where beauty is concerned. Perhaps the amorous gallants, and exquisite refiners on this sort of pleasure, may have so refined their minds and tempers, that, notwithstanding their accustomed indulgence, they can, upon occasion, renounce their enjoyment, rather than

violate, honor, faith, or justice. — And thus, at last, there will be little virtue or worth ascribed to this patient sober character. “The dull
 “temperate man is no fitter to be trusted than
 “the elegant luxurious one. Innocence, youth,
 “and fortune, may be as well committed to the
 “care of this latter gentleman. He would prove
 “as good an executor, as good a trustee, as
 “good a guardian, as he would a friend. The
 “family which intrusted him would be secure;
 “and no dishonor, in any likelihood, would
 “happen from the honest man of pleasure.”

The seriousness with which Theocles spoke this, made it the more pleasant; and set our other company upon saying a great many good things on the same subject, in commendation of a temperate life. So that our dinner by this time being ended, and the wine, according to custom, placed before us; I found still we were in no likelihood of proceeding to a debauch. Every one drank only as he fancied, in no order or proportion, and with no regard to circular healths or pledges: A manner which the sociable men of another scheme of morals would have censured, no doubt, as a heinous irregularity, and corruption of good-fellowship.

I own, said I, I am far from thinking temperance so disagreeable a character. As for this part of virtue, I think there is no need of taking it on any other terms to recommend it, than the mere advantage of being saved from intemperance, and from the desire of things unnecessary.

How! said Theocles, are you thus far advanced? And can you carry this temperance so far as to estates and honors, by opposing it to avarice and ambition? — Nay, then truly, you may be said to have fairly embarked yourself in this cause. You have passed the channel, and are more than half-seas over. There remains no further scruple in the case of virtue, unless you will declare yourself a coward, or conclude it a happiness to be born one. For if you can be temperate withal towards life, and think it not so great a business, whether it be of fewer or more years; but satisfied with what you have lived, can rise a thankful guest from a full liberal entertainment; is not this the sum of all, the finishing stroke and very accomplishment of virtue? In this temper of mind, what is there can hinder us from forming for ourselves as heroic a character as we please? What is there either good, generous, or great, which does not naturally flow from such a modest temperance? Let us once gain this simple plain-looking virtue, and see whether the more shining virtues will not follow. See what that country of the mind will produce, when by the wholesome laws of this legislatrix it has obtained its liberty! You, Philocles, who are such an admirer of civil liberty, and can represent it to yourself with a thousand several graces and advantages; can you imagine no grace or beauty in that original, native liberty, which sets us free from so many in-born tyrannies, gives us the privilege

of ourselves, and makes us our own, and independent? A sort of property, which, methinks, is as material to us to the full, as that which secures us our lands or revenues.

I should think, said he, carrying on this humor, that one might draw the picture of this moral dame to as much advantage as that of her political sister; whom you admire, as described to us “in her Amazon-dress, with a free, manly
“air becoming her; her guards, the laws, with
“their written tables, like bucklers, surrounding
“her; riches, traffic, and plenty, with the cornucopia, serving as her attendants; and in her
“train the arts and sciences, like children,
“playing.” — The rest of the piece is easy to imagine: “Her triumph over tyranny, and
“lawless rule of lust and passion.” — But what a triumph would her sister’s be! What monsters of savage passions would there appear subdued! “There fierce ambition, lust, uproar,
“misrule, with all the fiends which rage in human breasts, would be securely chained. And
“when Fortune herself, the queen of flatteries,
“with that prince of terrors, Death, were at
“the chariot-wheels, as captives; how natural
“would it be to see fortitude, magnanimity,
“justice, honor, and all that generous band,
“attend as the companions of our inmate lady
“Liberty! She, like some new-born goddess,
“would grace her mother’s chariot, and own
“her birth from humble Temperance, that nursing mother of the virtues; who, like the
parent

“ parent of the gods, old reverend Cybele, would
“ properly appear drawn by reined lions, patient
“ of the bit, and on her head a turret-like attire:
“ the image of defensive power, and strength of
“ mind.”

By this picture Theocles, I found, had given entertainment to the company; who, from this rough draught of his, fell to designing upon the same subject, after the ancient manner; till Prodicus and Cebes, and all the ancients, were exhausted.

Gentlemen, said I, the descriptions you have been making, are, no doubt, the finest in the world: but, after all, when you have made Virtue as glorious and triumphant as you please, I will bring you an authentic picture of another kind, where we shall see this triumph in reverse;
“ Virtue herself a captive in her turn; and by
“ a proud conqueror triumphed over, degraded,
“ spoiled of all her honors, and defaced, so as
“ to retain hardly one single feature of real
“ beauty.”

I offered to go on further, but could not, being so violently decried by my two fellow-guests; who protested they would never be brought to own so detestable a picture: and one of them, a formal sort of gentleman, somewhat advanced in years, looking earnestly upon me, said, in an angry tone, “ That he had hitherto,
“ indeed, conceived some hopes of me, not-
“ withstanding he observed my freedom of
“ thought, and heard me quoted for such a pas-

“ fionate lover of liberty: but he was sorry to
“ find, that my principle of liberty extended in
“ fine to a liberty from all principles,” so he
expressed himself, “ And none, he thought,
“ beside a libertine in principle, would approve
“ of such a picture of virtue, as only an Atheist
“ could have the impudence to make.”

Theocles the while sat silent, though he saw I minded not my antagonist, but kept my eye fixed steadily on himself, expecting to hear what he would say. At last, fetching a deep sigh, O Philocles, said he, how well you are master of that cause you have taken on you to defend! How well you know the way to gain advantage to the worst of causes, from the imprudent management of those who defend the best!—I dare not, for my own share, affirm to you, as my worthy friends have done, “ That it is the
“ Atheist alone can lay this load on virtue, and
“ picture her thus disgracefully.”—No;—there are other over-officious and less suspected hands, which do her perhaps more injury, though with a better color^{*}.

That Virtue should, with any show of reason, be made a victim, continued he, turning himself to his guests, must have appeared strange to you, no doubt, to hear asserted with such assurance as has been done by Philocles. You could conceive no tolerable ground for such a spectacle. In this reversed triumph, you expected perhaps

^{*} Misc. 5. chap. 3. parag. 19. in vol. 3.

to see some foreign conqueror exalted; as either vice itself, or pleasure, wit, spurious philosophy, or some false image of truth or nature. Little were you aware, that the cruel enemy opposed to virtue should be Religion itself! But you will call to mind, that even innocently, and without any treacherous design, Virtue is often treated so, by those who would magnify to the utmost the corruption of man's heart, and in exposing, as they pretend, the falshood of human virtue, think to extol Religion. How many religious authors, how many sacred orators, turn all their edge this way, and strike at moral virtue, as a kind of stepdame, or rival to Religion! —
“Morality must not be named; Nature has no
“pretence; Reason is an enemy; Common Jus-
“tice, folly; and Virtue, misery. Who would
“not be vicious, had he his choice? Who would
“forbear, but because he must? Or who would
“value Virtue, but for hereafter?” —

Truly, said the old gentleman, interrupting him, if this be the triumph of Religion, it is such as her greatest enemy, I believe, would scarce deny her: and I must still be of opinion, with Philocles's leave, that it is no great sign of tenderness for Religion, to be so zealous in honoring her at the cost of Virtue.

Perhaps so, said I. Yet that there are many such zealots in the world, you will acknowledge. And that there is a certain harmony between this zeal and what you call Atheism, Theocles, you hear, has allowed. — But let us hear him

out ; if perhaps he will be so free as to discover to us what he thinks of the generality of our religious writers, and their method of encountering their common enemy, the Atheist. This is a subject which possibly may need a better clearing. For it is notorious, that the chief opposers of Atheism write upon contrary principles to one another, so as in a manner to confute themselves. Some of them hold zealously for virtue, and are realists in the point. Others, one may say, are only nominal moralists, by making Virtue nothing in itself, a creature of will only, or a mere name of fashion. It is the same in natural philosophy; some take one hypothesis, and some another. I should be glad to discover once the true foundation; and distinguish those who effectually refute their other antagonists as well as the Atheists, and rightly assert the joint cause of Virtue and Religion.

Here, Palemon, I had my wish. For by degrees I engaged Theocles to discover himself fully upon these subjects, which served as a prelude to those we were to engage in the next morning; for the approach of which I so impatiently longed. If his speculations proved of a rational kind, this previous discourse, I knew, would help me to comprehend them; if only pleasing fancies, this would help me, however, to please myself the better with them.

Here then began his criticism of authors; which grew by degrees into a continued discourse. So that had this been at a university, Theocles might

very well have passed for some grave divinity-professor, or teacher of ethics, reading an afternoon-lecture to his pupils.

S E C T. III.

Divinity. Divines. Atheist. Punishment. Magistrate. Philosophy. Jealousy of authors. Authors. Fundamental principles. Theists, nominal, real. Divine love. Mystics. Religion, liberal, illiberal. Rewards and punishments. Supplemental motives. Object of love. Future state. Previous proof. A providence. Order. Recapitulation. Future state. Favorers of the opinion. Ancients. Friendship. Conclusion.

IT would be undoubtedly, said he, a happy cause which could have the benefit of such managers as should never give their adversaries any handle of advantage against it. I could wish that in the cause of Religion we had reason to boast as much. But since it is not impossible to write ill, even in the best of causes, I am inclined to think this great one of religion may have run at least an equal hazard with any other; since they who write in defence of it, are apt generally to use so much the less caution, as they are more exempt from the fear of censure or criticism in their own person. Their adversary is well secured and silenced to their hand. They may safely

provoke him to a field, where he cannot appear openly, or as a professed antagonist. His weapons are private, and can often reach the cause, without offence to its maintainers; whilst no direct attack robs them of their imaginary victory. They conquer for themselves, and expect to be approved still for their zeal, however the cause itself may have suffered in their hands. —

Perhaps then, said I, interrupting him, it may be true enough, what was said once by a person who seemed zealous for religion, “That none
“writ well against the Atheists, beside the clerk
“who drew the warrant for their execution.”

If this were the true writing, replied he, there would be an end of all dispute or reasoning in the case. For where force is necessary, reason has nothing to do. But, on the other hand, if reason be needful, force in the mean while must be laid aside. For there is no enforcement of reason, but by reason. And therefore, if Atheists are to be reasoned with at all, they are to be reasoned with like other men; since there is no other way in nature to convince them.

This I own, said I, seems rational and just; but I am afraid that most of the devout people will be found ready to abandon the patient, for the more concise method. And though force without reason may be thought somewhat hard, yet your other way of reason without force, I am apt to think, would meet with fewer admirers.

But perhaps, replied Theocles, it is a mere

found which troubles us. The word or name of Atheist may possibly occasion some disturbance, by being made to describe two characters so very different as his who absolutely denies, and his who only doubts. Now, he who doubts, may possibly lament his own unhappiness, and wish to be convinced. He who denies, is daringly presumptuous, and sets up an opinion against the interest of mankind, and being of society. It is easily seen, that one of these persons may bear a due respect to the magistrate and laws, though not the other; who being obnoxious to them, is therefore punishable. But how the former is punishable by man, will be hard to say; unless the magistrate had dominion over minds, as well as over actions and behaviour, and had power to exercise an inquisition within the inmost bosoms and secret thoughts of men.

I apprehend you, said I. And by your account, as there are two sorts of people who are called Atheists, so there are two ways of writing against them, which may be fitly used apart, but not so well jointly. You would set aside mere menaces, and separate the philosopher's work from the magistrate's, taking it for granted, that the more discreet and sober part of unbelievers, who come not under the dispatching pen of the magistrate, can be affected only by the more deliberate and gentle one of philosophy. Now, the language of the magistrate, I must confess, has little in common with that of philosophy. Nothing can be more unbecoming the magisterial authority than

a philosophical style; and nothing can be more unphilosophical than a magisterial one. A mixture of these must needs spoil both. And therefore, in the cause before us, "If any one besides the
 "magistrate can be said to write well, it is He,
 "according to your account, who writes as be-
 "comes philosophy, with freedom of debate, and
 "fairness towards his adversary."

Allow it, replied he. For what can be more equitable? Nothing. But will the world be of the same opinion? And may this method of writing be justly practised in it? Undoubtedly it may. And for a proof, we have many instances in antiquity to produce. The freedom taken in this philosophical way, was never esteemed injurious to religion, or prejudicial to the vulgar; since we find it to have been a practice, both in writing and converse, among the great men of a virtuous and religious people; and that even those magistrates who officiated at the altars, and were the guardians of the public worship, were sharers in these free debates.

Forgive me, Theocles, said I, if I presume to say, that still this reaches not the case before us. We are to consider Christian times, such as are now present. You know the common fate of those who dare to appear fair authors. What was that pious and learned man's case, who wrote the intellectual system of the universe? I confess it was pleasant enough to consider, that though the whole world were no less satisfied with his capacity and learning, than with his sincerity in the

cause of Deity ; yet was he accused of giving the upper-hand to the Atheists, for having only stated their reasons, and those of their adversaries, fairly together. And among other writings of this kind, you may remember how a certain Fair Inquiry, as you called it, was received, and what offence was taken at it.

I am sorry, said Theocles, it proved so. But now indeed you have found a way which may perhaps force me to discourse at large with you on this head, by entering the lists in defence of a friend unjustly censured for this philosophical liberty.

I confessed to Theocles and the company, that this had really been my aim ; and that for this reason alone I made myself the accuser of this author ; “ whom I here actually charged, as I
“ did all those other moderate calm writers, with
“ no less than profaneness, for reasoning so un-
“ concernedly and patiently, without the least show
“ of zeal or passion, upon the subject of a Deity,
“ and a future state ”

And I, on the other side, replied Theocles, am rather for this patient way of reasoning, and will endeavour to clear my friend of this imputation, if you can have patience enough to hear me out, in an affair of such a compass.

We all answered for ourselves, and he began thus.

Of the many writers engaged in the defence of religion, it seems to me that the greatest part are employed, either in supporting the truth of

the Christian faith in general, or in refuting such particular doctrines as are esteemed innovations in the Christian church. There are not, it is thought, many persons in the world who are loose in the very grounds and principles of all religion; and to such as these we find indeed there are not many writers who purposely apply themselves. They may think it a mean labor, and scarce becoming them, to argue sedately with such as are almost universally treated with detestation and horror. But as we are required by our religion, to have charity for all men, so we cannot surely avoid having a real concern for those whom we apprehend to be under the worst of errors, and whom we find by experience to be with the greatest difficulty reclaimed. Neither ought they perhaps, in prudence, to be treated with so little regard, whose number, however small, is thought to be rather increasing; and this too among the people of no despicable rank. So that it may well deserve some consideration, “Whether, in our age and country, the same remedies may serve which have hitherto been tried; or whether some other may not be preferred, as being suitable to times of less strictness in matters of religion, and places less subject to authority.”

This might be enough to put an author upon thinking of such a way of reasoning with these deluded persons, as, in his opinion, might be more effectual for their benefit, than the repeated exclamations and invectives with which most of

the arguments used against them are commonly accompanied. Nor was it so absurd to imagine that a quite different method might be attempted; by which a writer might offer reason to these men with so much more favor and advantage, as he appeared unprepossessed, and willing to examine every thing with the greatest unconcern and indifference. For to such persons as these, it is to be feared, it will always appear, "That what was never questioned, was never proved; and that whatever subject had not, at some time or other, been examined with perfect indifference, was never rightly examined, nor could rightly be believed." And in a treatise of this kind, offered as an essay or inquiry only, they would be far from finding that impartiality and indifference which is requisite; if, instead of a readiness to comply with whatever consequences such an examination as this, and the course of reasoning, brought forth, the author should show a previous inclination to the consequences only on one side, and an abhorrence of any conclusion on the other.

Others therefore, in different circumstances, may perhaps have found it necessary, and becoming their character, to show all manner of detestation both of the persons and principles of these men. Our author, on the contrary, whose character exceeds not that of a layman, endeavours to show civility and favor, by keeping the fairest measures he possibly can with the men of this sort, allowing them all he is able, and argu-

ing with a perfect indifference, even on the subject of a Deity. He offers to conclude nothing positive himself, but leaves it to others to draw conclusions from his principles; having this one chief aim and intention, "How, in the first
" place, to reconcile these persons to the prin-
" ciples of virtue; that, by this means, a way
" might be laid open to religion; by removing
" those greatest, if not only obstacles to it, which
" arise from the vices and passions of men."

It is upon this account he endeavours chiefly to establish virtue on principles, by which he is able to argue with those who are not as yet induced to own a God, or future state. If he cannot do thus much, he reckons he does nothing. For how can supreme goodness be intelligible to those who know not what goodness itself is? Or how can virtue be understood to deserve reward; when as yet its merit and excellence is unknown? We begin surely at the wrong end, when we would prove Merit by favor, and Order by a Deity. — This our friend seeks to redress. For being, in respect of Virtue, what you lately called, a realist, he endeavours to show, "That it is really some-
" thing in itself, and in the nature of things:
" not arbitrary or factitious, if I may so speak;
" not constituted from without, or dependent
" on custom, fancy, or will; not even on the
" supreme will itself, which can no way govern
" it: but being necessarily good, is governed by
" it, and ever uniform with it." And notwith-

standing he has thus made Virtue his chief subject, and in some measure independent on religion, yet I fancy he may possibly appear at last as high a divine as he is a moralist.

I would not willingly advance it as a rule, "That those who make only a name of Virtue make no more of Deity, and cannot without affectation defend the principles of religion." But this I will venture to assert, "That whoever sincerely defends Virtue, and is a realist in Morality, must of necessity, in a manner, by the same scheme of reasoning, prove as very a realist in Divinity."

All affectation, but chiefly in philosophy, I must own, I think unpardonable. And you, Philocles, who can give no quarter to ill reasoning, nor endure any unsound or inconsistent hypothesis; you will be so ingenuous, I dare say, as to reject our modern Deism, and challenge those who assume a name to which their philosophy can never in the least entitle them.

Commend me to honest Epicurus, who raises his Deities aloft in the imaginary spaces; and setting them apart out of the universe and nature of things, makes nothing of them beyond a word. This is ingenuous, and plain dealing: for this every one who philosophizes may easily understand.

The same ingenuity belongs to those philosophers whom you, Philocles, seem inclined to favor. When a sceptic questions, "Whether a real theology can be raised out of philosophy

“alone, without the help of revelation;” he does no more than pay a handsome compliment to authority and the received religion. He can impose on no one who reasons deeply: since whoever does so, will easily conceive, that at this rate theology must have no foundation at all. For revelation itself, we know, is founded on the acknowledgment of a divine existence: and it is the province of philosophy alone to prove what revelation only supposes.

I look on it, therefore, as a most unfair way, for those who would be builders, and undertake this proving part, to lay such a foundation as is insufficient to bear the structure. Supplanting and undermining may, in other cases, be fair war: but in philosophical disputes, it is not allowable to work under-ground, or as in sieges by the sap. Nothing can be more unbecoming, than to talk magisterially and in venerable terms of “A supreme Nature, an infinite being, and “a Deity;” when all the while a providence is never meant, nor any thing like order or the government of a mind admitted. For when these are understood, and real divinity acknowledged, the notion is not dry and barren; but such consequences are necessarily drawn from it as must set us in action, and find employment for our strongest affections. All the duties of Religion evidently follow hence; and no exception remains against any of those great maxims which revelation has established.

Now, whether our friend be unfeignedly and

sincerely of this latter sort of real theologists, you will learn best from the consequences of his hypothesis. You will observe, whether, instead of ending in mere speculation, it leads to practice: and you will then surely be satisfied, when you see such a structure raised, as with the generality of the world must pass at least for high religion, and with some, in all likelihood, for no less than Enthusiasm.

For I appeal to you, Philocles, whether there be any thing in divinity which you think has more the air of enthusiasm, than that notion of divine Love, such as separates from every thing worldly, sensual, or meanly-interested? A Love which is simple, pure, and unmixed; which has no other object than merely the excellency of that being self, nor admits of any other thought of happiness, than in its single fruition. Now, I dare presume you will take it as a substantial proof of my friend's being far enough from irreligion, if it be shown that he has espoused this notion, and thinks of making out this high point of divinity, from arguments familiar even to those who oppose religion.

According, therefore, to his hypothesis, he would, in the first place, by way of prevention, declare to you, that though the disinterested love of God were the most excellent principle; yet he knew very well, that, by the indiscreet zeal of some devout well-meaning people, it had been stretched too far, perhaps even to extravagance and enthusiasm; as formerly among the

Mystics of the ancient church, whom these of latter days have followed. On the other hand, that there were those who in opposition to this devout mystic way, and as professed enemies to what they call enthusiasm, had so far exploded every thing of this ecstatic kind, as in a manner to have given up devotion; and in reality had left so little of zeal, affection, or warmth, in what they call their rational religion, as to make them much suspected of their sincerity in any. For though it be natural enough, he would tell you, for a mere political writer, to ground his great argument for religion on the necessity of such a belief as that of a future reward and punishment; yet, if you will take his opinion, it is a very ill token of sincerity in religion, and in the Christian religion more especially, to reduce it to such a philosophy as will allow no room to that other principle of love; but treats all of that kind as enthusiasm, for so much as aiming at what is called disinterestedness, or teaching the love of God or virtue for God or Virtue's sake.

Here, then, we have two sorts of people, according to my friend's account, who in these opposite extremes expose religion to the insults of its adversaries. For as, on one hand, it will be found difficult to defend the notion of that high-raised love, espoused with so much warmth by those devout Mystics; so, on the other hand, it will be found as hard a task, upon the principles of these cooler men, to guard religion from the
imputation

imputation of mercenariness, and a slavish spirit. For how shall one deny, that to serve God by compulsion, or for interest merely, is servile and mercenary? Is it not evident, that the only true and liberal service paid either to that supreme being, or to any other superior, is that “ which
“ proceeds from an esteem or love of the person
“ served, a sense of duty or gratitude, and a
“ love of the dutiful and grateful part, as good
“ and amiable in itself?” And where is the injury to religion, from such a concession as this? Or what detraction is it from the belief of an after-reward or punishment, to own “ that the
“ service caused by it, is not equal to that which
“ is voluntary and with inclination, but is rather
“ disingenuous and of the slavish kind?” It is not still for the good of mankind, and of the world, that obedience to the rule of right should some way or other be paid; if not in the better way, yet at least in this imperfect one? And is it not to be shown, “ That although this service of fear
“ be allowed ever so low or base; yet Religion
“ still being a discipline, and progress of the soul
“ towards perfection, the motive of reward and
“ punishment is primary and of the highest moment with us; till being capable of more sublime instruction, we are led from this servile
“ state, to the generous service of affection and
“ love?”

To this it is that, in our friend's opinion, we ought all of us to aspire, so as to endeavour
“ that the excellence of the object, not the

“reward or punishment, should be our motive:
“but that where, through the corruption of our
“nature, the former of these motives is found
“insufficient to excite to virtue, there the latter
“should be brought in aid, and on no account
“be undervalued or neglected.”

Now, this being once established, how can Religion be any longer subject to the imputation of mercenariness? But thus we know religion is often charged. “Godliness, say they, is great gain: nor is God devoutly served for nought.” —Is this therefore a reproach? Is it confessed there may be a better service, a more generous love? —Enough, there needs no more. On this foundation our friend presumes it easy to defend Religion, and even that devoutest part, which is esteemed so great a paradox of faith. For if there be in nature such a service as that of affection and love, there remains then only to consider of the object, whether there be really that supreme one we suppose. For if there be divine excellence in things; if there be in nature a supreme or Deity; we have then an object consummate, and comprehensive of all which is good or excellent. And this object, of all others, must of necessity be the most amiable, the most engaging, and of highest satisfaction and enjoyment. Now, that there is such a principal object as this in the world, the world alone, if I may say so, by its wise and perfect order, must evince. This order, if indeed perfect, excludes all real ill. And that it really does so, is what

our author so earnestly maintains, by solving the best he can those untoward phenomena and ill signs, taken from the course of providence, in the seemingly unequal lot of Virtue in this world.

It is true, though the appearances hold ever so strongly against Virtue, and in favor of vice, the objection which arises hence against a Deity may be easily removed, and all set right again on the supposal of a future state. This to a Christian, or one already convinced of so great a point, is sufficient to clear every dark cloud of providence. For he needs not be over and above solicitous as to the fate of Virtue in this world, who is secure of hereafter. But the case is otherwise as to the people we are here to encounter. They are at a loss for providence, and seek to find it in the world. The aggravation of the appearing disorders in wordly affairs, and the blackest representation of society and human nature, will hardly help them to this view. It will be difficult for them to read providence in such characters. From so uncomely a face of things below, they will presume to think unfavorably of all above. By the effects they see, they will be inclined to judge the cause; and by the fate of Virtue, to determine of a providence. But being once convinced of order and a providence as to things present, they may soon, perhaps, be satisfied even of a future state. For if virtue be to itself no small reward, and vice in a great measure its own punishment, we have a solid ground to go upon.

The plain foundations of a distributive justice, and due order in this world, may lead us to conceive a further building. We apprehend a larger scheme and easily resolve ourselves why things were not completed in this state, but their accomplishment reserved rather to some further period. For had the good and virtuous of mankind been wholly prosperous in this life; had goodness never met with opposition, nor merit ever lain under a cloud; where had been the trial, victory, or crown of Virtue? where had the virtues had their theatre, or whence their names? where had been temperance or self-denial? where patience, meekness, magnanimity? Whence have these their being? What merit, except from hardship? What virtue without a conflict, and the encounter of such enemies as arise both within, and from abroad?

But as many as are the difficulties which Virtue has to encounter in this world, her force is yet superior. Exposed as she is here, she is not however abandoned or left miserable. She has enough to raise her above pity, though not above our wishes; and as happy as we see her here, we have room for further hopes in her behalf. Her present portion is sufficient to show providence already engaged on her side. And since there is such provision for her here, such happiness and such advantages even in this life; how probable must it appear, that this providential care is extended yet further to a succeeding life, and perfected hereafter?

This is what, in our friend's opinion, may be

said in behalf of a future state, to those who question revelation. It is this must render revelation probable; and secure that first step to it, the belief of a Deity and providence. A providence must be proved from what we see of order in things present. We must contend for order; and in this part chiefly, where virtue is concerned. All must not be referred to a hereafter. For a disordered state, in which all present care of things is given up, vice uncontrouled, and virtue neglected, represents a very chaos, and reduces us to the beloved atoms, chance, and confusion of the Atheists.

What therefore can be worse done in the cause of a Deity, than to magnify disorder, and exaggerate, as some zealous people do, the misfortunes of Virtue, so far as to render it an unhappy choice with respect to this world? They err widely, who propose to turn men to the thoughts of a better world, by making them think so ill of this. For to declaim in this manner against Virtue to those of a looser faith, will make them the less believe a Deity, but not the more a future state. Nor can it be thought sincerely, that any man, by having the most elevated opinion of Virtue, and of the happiness it creates, was ever the less inclined to the belief of a future state. On the contrary, it will ever be found, that as they who are favorers of vice are always the least willing to hear of a future existence; so they who are in love with Virtue, are the readiest to embrace that opinion which

renders it so illustrious, and makes its cause triumphant.

Thus it was, that among the ancients the great motive which inclined so many of the wisest to the belief of this doctrine unrevealed to them, was purely the love of Virtue in the persons of those great men, the founders and preservers of societies, the legislators, patriots, deliverers, heroes, whose virtues they were desirous should live, and be immortalized. Nor is there at this day any thing capable of making this belief more engaging among the good and virtuous, than the love of friendship, which creates in them a desire not to be wholly separated by death, but that they may enjoy the same blessed society hereafter. How is it possible, then, that an author should, for exalting Virtue merely, be deemed an enemy to a future state? How can our friend be judged false to religion, for defending a principle on which the very notion of God and goodness depends? For this he says only, and this is the sum of all: "That by
" building a future state on the ruins of Virtue,
" Religion in general, and the cause of a Deity,
" is betrayed; and by making rewards and punishments the principal motives to duty, the
" Christian religion in particular is overthrown,
" and its greatest principle, that of love, rejected
" and exposed."

Upon the whole, then, we may justly as well as charitably conclude, that it is truly our author's design, in applying himself with so much fairness

to the men of looser principles, to lead them into such an apprehension of the constitution of mankind and of human affairs, as might form in them a notion of order in things, and draw hence an acknowledgment of that wisdom, goodness, and beauty, which is supreme; that being thus far become profelytes, they might be prepared for that divine love which our religion would teach them, when once they should embrace its precepts, and form themselves to its sacred character.

Thus, continued he, I have made my friend's apology; which may have shown him to you perhaps a good moralist, and, I hope, no enemy to religion. But if you find still that the divine has not appeared so much in his character as I promised, I can never think of satisfying you in any ordinary way of conversation. Should I offer to go further, I might be engaged deeply in spiritual affairs, and be forced to make some new model of a sermon upon his system of divinity. However, I am in hopes, now that in good earnest matters are come well-nigh to preaching, you will acquit me for what I have already performed.

S E C T. IV.

Organization. Whole and parts. Proportion. Union. System. Animal system. System of the world. Universal system. Appearance of ill necessary. Solution. Example. Universal mind. Disturbance, whence. Human affairs. Selfishness. Virtue and vice. Their power, effect. A mind. Improvement. Temper. Appetites. Balance. Virtue. Deity. Matter and thought. Atheistical hypothesis. Nature arraigned. Nature in man; in brutes. Nature in man. Volatiles. Anatomy. The brain. Parts. Balance. Distribution. Principal part. Reason. Instinct. Animals. Human kind. Society. State of nature.

JUST as he had made an end of speaking, came in some visitants, who took us up the remaining part of the afternoon in other discourses. But these being over, and our strangers gone, all except the old gentleman, and his friend, who had dined with us, we began anew with Theocles, by laying claim to his sermon, and entreating him again and again to let us hear him, at large, in his theological way.

This he complained was persecuting him: As you have seen company, said he, often persecute a reputed singer, not out of any fancy for the music, but to satisfy a malicious sort of curiosity, which ends commonly in censure and dislike.

However it might be, we told him we were resolved to persist. And I assured our companions,

that if they would second me heartily in the manner I intended to press him, we should easily get the better.

In revenge then, said he, I will comply, on this condition, That since I am to sustain the part of the divine and preacher, it shall be at Philocles's cost; who shall bear the part of the infidel, and stand for the person preached to.

Truly, said the old gentleman, the part you have proposed for him is so natural and suitable, that, I doubt not, he will be able to act it without the least pain. I could wish rather, that you had spared yourself the trouble of putting him thus in mind of his proper character. He would have been apt enough of his own accord to interrupt your discourse by his perpetual cavils. Therefore, since we have now had entertainment enough by way of dialogue, I desire the law of Sermon may be strictly observed; and "that there be no answering" to whatever is argued or advanced."

I consented to all the terms, and told Theocles I would stand his mark willingly: and besides, if I really were that infidel he was to suppose me, I should count it no unhappiness; since I was sure of being so thoroughly convinced by him, if he would vouchsafe to undertake me.

Theocles then proposed we should walk out the evening being fine, and the free air suiting better, as he thought, with such discourses, than a chamber.

Accordingly we took our evening-walk in the fields, from whence the laborious hinds were now

retiring. We fell naturally into the praises of a country-life; and discoursed a while of husbandry, and the nature of the soil. Our friends began to admire some of the plants, which grew here to great perfection. And it being my fortune, as having acquired a little insight into the nature of simples, to say something they mightily approved upon this subject, Theocles immediately turning about to me: "O my ingenious friend!" said he, "whose reason, in other respects, must be allowed
" so clear and happy, how is it possible, that with
" such insight, and accurate judgment in the
" particulars of natural beings and operations,
" you should no better judge of the structure of
" things in general, and of the order and frame
" of Nature? Who better than yourself can show
" the structure of each plant and animal body,
" declare the office of every part and organ, and
" tell the uses, ends, and advantages to which
" they serve? How therefore should you prove so
" ill a naturalist in this Whole, and understand so
" little the anatomy of the world and Nature,
" as not to discern the same relation of parts,
" the same consistency and uniformity in the
" universe!

" Some men perhaps there are of so confused
" a thought, and so irregularly formed within
" themselves, that it is no more than natural for
" them to find fault, and imagine a thousand
" inconsistencies and defects in this wider constitu-
" tion. It was not, we may presume, the absolute
" aim or interest of the universal nature, to render

“ every private one infallible, and without defect.
 “ It was not its intention to leave us without
 “ some pattern of imperfection: such as we per-
 “ ceive in minds, like these, perplexed with
 “ froward thought. But you, my friend, are
 “ master of a nobler mind. You are conscious of
 “ better order within, and can see workmanship
 “ and exactness in yourself, and other innumerable
 “ parts of the creation. Can you answer it to
 “ yourself, allowing thus much, not to allow
 “ all? Can you induce yourself ever to believe
 “ or think, that where there are parts so variously
 “ united, and conspiring fitly within themselves,
 “ the whole itself should have neither union nor
 “ coherence; and where inferior and private natu-
 “ res are often found so perfect, the universal one
 “ should want perfection, and be esteemed like
 “ whatsoever can be thought of, most monstrous,
 “ rude, and imperfect?

“ Strange! that there should be in nature the
 “ idea of an order and perfection, which Nature
 “ herself wants! That beings which arise from
 “ Nature should be so perfect, as to discover
 “ imperfection in her constitution, and be wise
 “ enough to correct that wisdom by which they
 “ were made!

“ Nothing surely is more strongly imprinted on
 “ our minds, or more closely interwoven with
 “ our souls, than the idea or sense of order and
 “ proportion. Hence all the force of numbers,
 “ and those powerful arts founded on their ma-
 “ nagement and use. What a difference there is

“ between harmony and discord! cadency and
 “ convulsion! What a difference between com-
 “ posed and orderly motion, and that which is
 “ ungoverned and accidental! between the regular
 “ and uniform pile of some noble architect, and
 “ a heap of sand or stones! between an orga-
 “ nized body, and a mist or cloud driven by the
 “ wind!

“ Now, as this difference is immediately per-
 “ ceived by a plain internal sensation, so there
 “ is withal in reason this account of it, That
 “ whatever things have order, the same have
 “ unity of design, and concur in one, are parts
 “ constituent of one Whole, or are, in themselves,
 “ entire systems. Such is a tree, with all its
 “ branches; an animal, with all its members; an
 “ edifice, with all its exterior and interior orna-
 “ ments. What else is even a tune or symphony,
 “ or any excellent piece of music, than a certain
 “ system of proportioned sounds?

“ Now, in this which we call the Universe,
 “ whatever the perfection may be of any particu-
 “ lar systems, or whatever single parts may have
 “ proportion, unity, or form within themselves;
 “ yet if they are not united all in general, in one
 “ system¹, but are, in respect of one another, as

¹ *Vid.* Locke of human understanding, book 4. chap. 6. § II.

Ac mihi quidem veteres illi majus quiddam animo complexi, multo plus etiam vidisse videntur, quam quantum nostrorum ingeniorum acies intueri potest: qui omnia hæc, quæ supra et subter, unum esse, et una vi, atque una consensione naturæ constricta esse dixerunt. Nullum est enim genus rerum, quod aut avulsum a cæteris per

“ the driven sands, or clouds, or breaking waves;
 “ then there being no coherence in the whole,
 “ there can be inferred no order, no proportion,
 “ and consequently no project or design. But if
 “ none of these parts are independent, but all
 “ apparently united, then is the Whole a system
 “ complete, according to one simple, consistent,
 “ and uniform Design.

“ Here then is our main subject, insisted on,
 “ That neither man, nor any other animal, though
 “ ever so complete a system of parts, as to all
 “ within, can be allowed in the same manner
 “ complete, as to all without; but must be confi-
 “ dered as having a further relation abroad to the
 “ system of his kind. So even this system of his
 “ kind to the animal system; this to the world,
 “ our earth; and this again to the bigger world,
 “ and to the universe.

“ All things in this world are united. For as the
 “ branch is united with the tree, so is the tree as
 “ immediately with the earth, air, and water,
 “ which feed it. As much as the fertile mould is

seipsum constare, aut quo cætera si careant, vim suam, atque æternitatem conservare possint. Cicero de oratore, lib. 3.

Omne hoc quod vides, quo divina atque humana conclusa sunt, unum est: membra sumus corporis magni. Seneca, epist. 95.

Societas nostra lapidum fornicationi simillima est: quæ casura, nisi invicem obstarent, hoc ipso sustinetur. Ibidem.

*Estne Dei sedes, nisi terra, et pontus, et æther,
 Et cælum, et virtus? Superos quid quærimus ultra?
 Jupiter est quodcunque vides, quocunque moveris.*

Lucan. lib. 9.

“ fitted to the tree, as much as the strong and
“ upright trunk of the oak or elm is fitted to the
“ twining branches of the vine or ivy; so much
“ are the very leaves, the feeds, and fruits of
“ these trees fitted to the various animals: these
“ again to one another, and to the elements where
“ they live, and to which they are, as appendices,
“ in a manner fitted and joined; as, either by
“ wings for the air, fins for the water, feet for
“ the earth, and by other correspondent inward
“ parts of a more curious frame and texture.
“ Thus, in contemplating all on earth, we must,
“ of necessity, view all in one, as holding to one
“ common stock. Thus too in the system of the
“ bigger world. See there the mutual dependency
“ of things! the relation of one to another; of
“ the sun to this inhabited earth, and of the earth
“ and other planets to the sun! the order, union,
“ and coherence of the whole! And know, my
“ ingenious friend, that, by this survey, you will
“ be obliged to own the Universal System, and
“ coherent scheme of things, to be established on
“ abundant proof, capable of convincing any fair
“ and just contemplator of the works of nature.
“ For scarce would any one, till he had well
“ surveyed this universal scene, believe a union
“ thus evidently demonstrable, by such numerous
“ and powerful instances of mutual correspondency
“ and relation, from the minutest ranks and orders
“ of beings to the remotest spheres.
“ Now, in this mighty Union, if there be such
“ relations of parts one to another as are not easily

“ discovered; if, on this account, the end and use
“ of things does not every where appear, there is
“ no wonder; since it is no more indeed than what
“ must happen of necessity: nor could supreme
“ wisdom have otherwise ordered it. For, in an
“ infinity of things thus relative, a mind which
“ sees not infinitely, can see nothing fully. And
“ since each particular has relation to all in ge-
“ neral, it can know no perfect or true relation
“ of any thing, in a world not perfectly and fully
“ known.

“ The same may be considered in any dissected
“ animal, plant, or flower; where he who is no
“ anatomist, nor versed in natural history, sees that
“ the many parts have a relation to the whole: for
“ thus much even a slight view affords. But he
“ who like you, my friend, is curious in the
“ works of nature, and has been let into a
“ knowledge of the animal and vegetable worlds,
“ he alone can readily declare the just relation of
“ all these parts to one another, and the several
“ uses to which they serve.

“ But if you would willingly enter further
“ into this thought and consider how much we
“ ought not only to be satisfied with this our
“ view of things, but even to admire its clear-
“ ness; imagine only some person entirely a
“ stranger to navigation, and ignorant of the
“ nature of the sea or waters, how great his
“ astonishment would be; when, finding himself
“ on board some vessel, anchoring at sea, remote
“ from all land-prospect, whilst it was yet a calm,

“ he viewed the ponderous machine firm and
“ motionless, in the midst of the smooth ocean,
“ and considered its foundations beneath, to-
“ gether with its cordage, masts, and sails above.
“ How easily would he see the whole one regular
“ structure, all things depending on one another;
“ the uses of the rooms below, the lodgments,
“ and conveniencies of men and stores? But being
“ ignorant of the intent or design of all above,
“ would he pronounce the masts and cordage to
“ be useless and cumbersome, and for this reason
“ condemn the frame, and despise the architect?
“ O my friend! let us not thus betray our
“ ignorance; but consider where we are, and in
“ what a universe. Think of the many parts of
“ the vast machine, in which we have so little
“ insight, and of which it is impossible we should
“ know the ends and uses; when, instead of
“ seeing to the highest pendants, we see only
“ some lower deck, and are in this dark case of
“ flesh, confined even to the hold, and meanest
“ station of the vessel.

“ Now, having recognised this uniform con-
“ sistent fabric, and owned the universal system,
“ we must, of consequence, acknowledge a uni-
“ versal Mind; which no ingenious man can
“ be tempted to disown, except through the
“ imagination of disorder in the universe, its
“ feat. For can it be supposed of any one in
“ the world, that, being in some desert far from
“ men, and hearing there a perfect symphony of
“ music, or seeing an exact pile of regular
architecture

“ architecture arising gradually from the earth ; in
“ all its orders and proportions , he should be
“ persuaded , that at the bottom there was no
“ design accompanying this , no secret spring of
“ thought , no active mind ? Would he , because
“ he saw no hand , deny the handy - work , and
“ suppose that each of these complete and perfect
“ systems were framed , and thus united in just
“ symmetry , and conspiring order , either by the
“ accidental blowing of the winds , or rolling of
“ the sands ?

“ What is it then should so disturb our views
“ of nature , as to destroy that unity of design ,
“ and order of a mind , which otherwise would
“ be so apparent ? All we can see either of the
“ heavens or earth , demonstrates order and per-
“ fection , so as to afford the noblest subjects of
“ contemplation to minds , like yours , enriched
“ with sciences and learning. All is delightful ,
“ amiable , rejoicing , except with relation to man
“ only , and his circumstances , which seem un-
“ equal. Here the calamity and ill arises ; and
“ hence the ruin of this goodly frame. All pe-
“ rishes on this account ; and the whole order
“ of the universe , elsewhere so firm , entire , and
“ immoveable , is here overthrown , and lost by
“ this one view ; in which we refer all things
“ to ourselves ; submitting the interest of the whole
“ to the good and interest of so small a part.

“ But how is it you complain of the unequal
“ state of man , and of the few advantages allowed
“ him above the beasts ? What can a creature

“ claim , so little differing from them , or whose
“ merit appears so little above them , except in
“ wisdom and virtue , to which so few conform ?
“ Man may be virtuous ; and by being so , is
“ happy. His merit is reward. By virtue he
“ deserves , and in virtue only can meet his hap-
“ piness deserved. But if even Virtue itself be
“ unprovided for , and Vice more prosperous be
“ the better choice ; if this , as you suppose , be
“ in the nature of things , then is all order in
“ reality inverted , and supreme wisdom lost :
“ imperfection and irregularity being , after this
“ manner , undoubtedly too apparent in the moral
“ world.

“ Have you then , ere you pronounced this
“ sentence , considered of the state of virtue and
“ vice , with respect to this life merely ; so as to
“ say with assurance , when , and how far , in
“ what particulars , and how circumstantiated ,
“ the one or the other is good or ill ? You who
“ are skilled in other fabrics and compositions ,
“ both of art and nature , have you considered
“ of the fabric of the mind , the constitution of
“ the soul , the connexion and frame of all its
“ passions and affections ; to know accordingly
“ the order and symmetry of the part , and how
“ it either improves or suffers ; what its force
“ is , when naturally preserved in its sound state ;
“ and what becomes of it , when corrupted and
“ abused ? Till this , my friend ! be well exa-
“ mined and understood , how shall we judge
“ either of the force of virtue or power of vice ?

“ or in what manner either of these may work to
“ our happiness or undoing ?

“ Here , therefore , is that Inquiry we should
“ first make. But who is there can afford to
“ make it as he ought ? If happily we are born of
“ a good nature , if a liberal education has formed
“ in us a generous temper and disposition , well-
“ regulated appetites , and worthy inclinations , it
“ is well for us ; and so indeed we esteem it. But
“ who is there endeavours to give these to him-
“ self , or to advance his portion of happiness in
“ this kind ? Who thinks of improving , or so
“ much as of preserving his share , in a world
“ where it must of necessity run so great a hazard ,
“ and where we know an honest nature is so easily
“ corrupted ? All other things relating to us ,
“ are preserved with care , and have some art or
“ œconomy belonging to them ; this which is
“ nearest related to us , and on which our hap-
“ piness depends , is alone committed to chance ;
“ and temper is the only thing ungoverned , whilst
“ it governs all the rest.

“ Thus we inquire concerning what is good
“ and suitable to our appetites ; but what appe-
“ tites are good and suitable to us , is no part of
“ our examination. We inquire what is accord-
“ ing to interest , policy , fashion , vogue ; but
“ it seems wholly strange , and out of the way ,
“ to inquire what is according to Nature. The
“ balance of Europe , of trade , of power , is
“ strictly sought after ; while few have heard of
“ the balance of their passions , or thought of

“ holding these scales even. Few are acquainted
“ with this province, or knowing in these affairs.
“ But were we more so, as this inquiry would make
“ us, we should then see beauty and decorum
“ here, as well as elsewhere in nature; and the
“ order of the moral world would equal that of
“ the natural. By this the beauty of Virtue would
“ appear; and hence, as has been shown, the
“ supreme and sovereign Beauty, the original of
“ all which is good or amiable.

But, lest I should appear at last too like an
“ enthusiast, I chuse to express my sense, and
“ conclude this philosophical sermon, in the
“ words of one of those ancient philologists,
“ whom you are used to esteem. For divinity
“ itself, says he, is surely beauteous, and of all
“ beauties the brightest; though not a beauteous
“ body, but that from whence the beauty of
“ bodies is derived: not a beauteous plain, but
“ that from whence the plain looks beautiful.
“ The river's beauty, the sea's, the heaven's,
“ and heavenly constellations', all flow from
“ hence as from a source eternal and incorrupt-
“ ible. As beings partake of this, they are
“ fair, and flourishing, and happy; as they
“ are lost to this, they are deformed, perished
“ and lost.”

When Theocles had thus spoken, he was formally complimented by our two companions. I was going to add something in the same way; but he presently stopped me, by saying, he should be scandalized, if, instead of commending

him, I did not, according to my character, chuse rather to criticize some part or other of his long discourse.

If it must be so then, replied I, in the first place, give me leave to wonder, that, instead of the many arguments commonly brought for proof of a Deity, you make use only of one single one to build on. I expected to have heard from you, in customary form, of a first cause, a first being, and a beginning of motion; how clear the idea was of an immaterial substance; and how plainly it appeared, that, at some time or other, matter must have been created. But as to all this you are silent. As for what is said of "a material, " unthinking substance being never able to have " produced an immaterial thinking one;" I readily grant it; but on the condition, that this great maxim of Nothing being ever made from nothing, may hold as well on my side as my adversary's: and then I suppose, that whilst the world endures, he will be at a loss how to assign a beginning to matter, or how to suggest a possibility of annihilating it. The spiritual men may, as long as they please, represent to us, in the most eloquent manner. " That matter, considered in a thousand " different shapes, joined and disjoined, varied " and modified to eternity, can never, of itself, " afford one single thought, never occasion or give " rise to any thing like sense or knowledge." Their argument will hold good against a Democritus, an Epicurus, or any of the elder or later atomists. But it will be turned on them by an

examining academist: and when the two substances are fairly set asunder, and considered apart, as different kinds; it will be as strong sense, and as good argument, to say as well of the immaterial kind, "That do with it as you please, modify it, a thousand ways, purify it, exalt it, sublime it, torture it ever so much, or rack it, as they say, with thinking, you will never be able to produce or force the contrary substance out of it." The poor dregs of sorry matter can no more be made out of the simple, pure substance of immaterial thought, than the high spirits of thought or reason can be extracted from the gross substance of heavy matter. So let the dogmatists make of this argument what they can.

But for your part, continued I, as you have stated the question, it is not about what was first or foremost, but what is instant, and now in being. "For if Deity be now really extant; if, by any good token, it appears, that there is at this present a universal mind, it will easily be yielded there ever was one." — This is your argument, — You go, if I may say so, upon fact, and would prove that things actually are in such a state and condition, which if they really were, there would indeed be no dispute left. Your Union is your main support. Yet how is it you prove this? What demonstration have you given? What have you so much as offered at, beyond bare probability? So far are you from demonstrating any thing, that if this uniting scheme be the chief argument for Deity, as you tacitly allow,

you seem rather to have demonstrated, "That
" the case itself is incapable of demonstration."
For, "How, say you, can a narrow mind see all
" things? — And yet if, in reality, it sees not all,
it had as good see nothing. The demonstrable
part is still as far behind. For grant that this all,
which lies within our view or knowledge, is orderly
and united, as you suppose; this mighty all is a
mere point still, a very nothing compared to what
remains. "It is only a separate by-world, we
" will say, of which perhaps there are, in the
" wide waste, millions besides, as horrid and
" deformed as this of ours is regular and propor-
" tioned. In length of time, amidst the infinite
" hurry and shock of beings, this single, odd world,
" by accident, might have been struck out, and
" cast into some form, as among infinite chances,
" what is there which may not happen? But,
" for the rest of matter, it is of a different hue.
" Old Father Chaos as the poets call him, in
" these wild spaces reigns absolute, and upholds
" his realms of darkness. He presses hard upon our
" frontier; and one day belike shall, by a furious
" inroad, recover his lost right, conquer his
" rebel-state, and reunite us to primitive discord
" and confusion."

This, said I, Theocles, concluding my dis-
course, is all I dare offer in opposition to your
philosophy. I imagined indeed, you might have
given me more scope: but you have retrenched
yourself in narrower bounds. So that to tell you
truth, I look upon your theology to be hardly so

fair or open as that of our divines in general. They are strict, it is true, as to names; but allow a greater latitude in things. Hardly indeed can they bear a home-charge, a downright questioning of Deity: but, in return, they give always fair play against Nature, and allow her to be challenged for her failings. She may freely err, and we as freely censure. Deity, they think, is not accountable for her; only she for herself. But you are stricter and more precise in this point. You have unnecessarily brought Nature into the controversy, and taken upon you to defend her honor so highly, that I know not whether it may be safe for me to question her.

Let not this trouble you, replied Theocles; but be free to censure Nature, whatever may be the consequence. It is only my hypothesis can suffer. If I defend it ill, my friends need not be scandalized. They are fortified, no doubt, with stronger arguments for a Deity, and can well employ those metaphysical weapons, of whose edge you seem so little apprehensive. I leave them to dispute this ground with you, whenever they think fit. For my own arguments, if they can be supposed to make any part of this defence, they may be looked upon only as distant lines, or outworks, which may easily perhaps be won; but without any danger to the body of the place.

Notwithstanding then, said I, that you are willing I should attack Nature in form, I chuse to spare her in all other subjects, except Man

only. How comes it, I entreat you, that in this noblest of creatures, and worthiest her care, she should appear so very weak and impotent; whilst in mere brutes, and the irrational species, she acts with so much strength, and exerts such hardy vigor? Why is she spent so soon in feeble man, who is found more subject to diseases, and of fewer years, than many of the wild creatures? They range secure; and proof against all the injuries of seasons and weather, want no help from art, but live in careless ease, discharged of labor, and freed from the cumbersome baggage of a necessitous human life. In infancy more helpful, vigorous in age, with senses quicker, and more natural sagacity, they pursue their interests, joys, recreations, and cheaply purchase both their food and maintenance; clothed and armed by Nature herself, who provides them both a couch and mansion. So has Nature ordered for the rest of creatures. Such is their hardiness, robustness, vigor. Why not the same for man? —

And do you stop thus short, said Theocles, in your expostulation? Methinks it were as easy to proceed, now you are in the way; and instead of laying claim to some few advantages of other creatures, you might as well stand for all, and complain, “That man, for his part, should be
“any thing less than a consummation of all ad-
“vantages and privileges which Nature can
“afford.” Ask not merely, why man is naked, why unhoofed, why slower-footed than the beasts? Ask, “Why he has not wings also for

“ the air , fins for the water , and so on ; that he
“ might take possession of each element , and reign
“ in all ? ”

Not so , said I , neither. This would be to rate him high indeed ! as if he were , by nature , Lord of all : which is more than I could willingly allow.

It is enough , replied he , that this is yielded. For if we allow once a subordination in his case , if Nature herself be not for Man , but man for Nature ; then must man , by his good leave , submit to the elements of Nature , and not the elements to him. Few of these are at all fitted to him ; and none perfectly. If he be left in air , he falls headlong ; for wings were not assigned him. In water he soon sinks. In fire he consumes. Within earth he suffocates. —

As for what dominion he may naturally have in other elements , said I , my concern truly is not very great in his behalf ; since by art he can even exceed the advantages nature has given to other creatures : but for the air , methinks it had been wonderfully obliging in nature to have allowed him wings.

And what would he have gained by it ? replied Theocles. For consider what an alteration of form must have ensued. Observe in one of those winged creatures , whether the whole structure be not made subservient to this purpose , and all other advantages sacrificed to this single operation. The anatomy of the creature shows it , in a manner , to be all wing : its chief bulk being composed of

two exorbitant muscles, which exhaust the strength of all the other, and engrofs, if I may say so, the whole œconomy of the frame. It is thus the aerial racers are able to perform so rapid and strong a motion, beyond comparison with any other kind, and far exceeding their little share of strength elsewhere: these parts of theirs being made in such superior proportion, as in a manner to starve their companions. And in man's architecture, of so different an order, were the flying engines to be affixed; must not the other members suffer, and the multiplied parts starve one another? What think you of the brain in this partition? Is it not like to prove a starveling? or would you have it be maintained at the same high rate, and draw the chief nourishment to itself from all the rest? —

I understand you, said I, Theocles, interrupting him. The brain certainly is a great starver, where it abounds; and the thinking people of the world, the philosophers and virtuosos especially, must be contented, I find, with a moderate share of bodily advantages, for the sake of what they call parts and capacity in another sense. The parts, it seems, of one kind agree ill in their œconomy with the parts of the other. But to make this even on both sides, let us turn the tables; and the case, I suppose, will stand the same with the Milos of the age, the men of bodily prowess and dexterity. For not to mention a vulgar sort, such as wrestlers, vaulters, racers, hunters; what shall we say of our fine-bred gentlemen, our riders, fencers, dancers, tennis-players, and such like?

It is the body surely is the starver here: and if the brain were such a terrible devourer in the other way, the body and bodily parts seem to have their reprisals in this rank of men.

If then, said he, the case stands thus between man and man, how must it stand between man and a quite different creature? If the Balance be so nice, that the least thing breaks it, even in creatures of the same frame and order; of what fatal effect must it be to change the order itself, and make some essential alteration in the frame? Consider therefore, how it is we censure Nature in these and such like cases. "Why," says one, was I not made by nature strong as a horse? Why not hardy and robust as this brute creature? or nimble and active as that other? — And yet when uncommon strength, agility, and feats of body are subjoined, even in our own species, see what befalls! So that for a person thus in love with an athletic, Milonian constitution, it were better, methinks, and more modest in him, to change the expostulation, and ask, "Why was I not made in good earnest a very Brute?" For that would be more suitable.

I am apt indeed, said I, to think that the excellence of Man lies somewhat different from that of a brute; and that such amongst us as are more truly men, should naturally aspire to manly qualities, and leave the brute his own. But Nature, I see, has done well to mortify us in this particular, by furnishing us with such slight stuff,

and in such a tender frame, as is indeed wonderfully commodious to support that man-excellence of thought and reason; but wretchedly scanty and ineffectual for other purposes; as if it were her very design, “to hinder us from aspiring
“ridiculously to what was misbecoming our
“character.”

I see, said Theocles, you are not one of those timorous arguers who tremble at every objection raised against their opinion or belief, and are so intent in upholding their own side of the argument, that they are unable to make the least concession in the other. Your wit allows you to divert yourself with whatever occurs in the debate; and you can pleasantly improve even what your antagonist brings as a support to his own hypothesis. This indeed is a fairer sort of practice than what is common now-a-days. But it is no more than suitable to your character. And were I not afraid of speaking with an air of compliment, in the midst of a philosophical debate; I should tell you perhaps what I thought of the becoming manner of your Scepticism, in opposition to a kind of bigot-sceptics; who forfeit their right to the philosophic character, and retain hardly so much as that of the gentleman or good-companion. — But to our argument. —

Such then, continued he, is the admirable distribution of Nature, her adapting and adjusting not only the stuff or matter to the shape and form, and even the shape itself and form to the circumstance, place, element, or region; but also

the affections, appetites, sensations, mutually to each other, as well as to the matter, form, action, and all besides: "All managed for the best, " with perfect frugality and just reserve: profuse " to none, but bountiful to all: never employing " in one thing more than enough; but with exact " œconomy retrenching the superfluous, and adding force to what is principal in every thing." And is not Thought and Reason principal in man? Would he have no reserve for these? no saving for this part of his engine? Or would he have the same stuff or matter, the same instruments or organs serve alike for different purposes, and an ounce be equivalent to a pound? — It cannot be. What wonders, then, can he expect from a few ounces of blood in such a narrow vessel, fitted for so small a district of nature? Will he not rather think highly of that Nature, which has thus managed his portion for him, to best advantage, with this happy reserve, happy indeed for him, if he knows and uses it! by which he has so much a better use of organs than any other creature? by which he holds his reason, is a man, and not a beast?

But beasts ¹, said I, have instincts, which man has not.

True, said he, they have indeed perceptions, sensations, and presentations ², if I may use the

¹ Supra, p. 75, &c. and 107.; Misc. 4. chap. 2. parag. 9, 10. &c. in vol. 3.

² Infra, part 3. § 2. parag. 43.

expression, which man, for his part, has not in any proportionable degree. Their females, newly pregnant, and before they have born young, have a clear prospect or presentation of their state which is to follow; know what to provide, and how, in what manner, and at what time. How many things do they preponderate? how many at once comprehend? The seasons of the year, the country, climate, place, aspect, situation, the basis of their building, the materials, architecture; the diet and treatment of their offspring; in short, the whole œconomy of their nursery: and all this as perfectly at first, and when unexperienced, as at any time of their life afterwards. And

“Why not this” say you “in human kind?”

Nay, rather on the contrary, I ask, “Why this?”

“Where was the occasion or use? Where the

“necessity? Why this sagacity for men? Have

“they not what is better, in another kind? Have

“they not reason and discourse? Does not this

“instruct them? What need then of the other?

“Where would be the prudent management at

“this rate? Where the reserve?”

The young of most other kinds, continued he, are instantly helpful to themselves, sensible, vigorous, know to shun danger, and seek their good. A human infant is of all the most helpless, weak, infirm. And wherefore should it not have been thus ordered? Where is the loss in such a species? Or what is man the worse for this defect, amidst such large supplies? Does not this defect engage him the more strongly to

society, and force him to own that he is purposely, and not by accident, made rational and sociable; and can no otherwise increase or subsist, than in that social intercourse and community which is his natural state? Is not both conjugal affection, and natural affection to parents, duty to magistrates, love of a common city, community, or country, with the other duties and social parts of life, deduced from hence, and founded in these very wants? What can be happier than such a deficiency, as is the occasion of so much good? What better than a want so abundantly made up, and answered by so many enjoyments? Now, if there are still to be found among mankind such as even in the midst of these wants seem not ashamed to affect a right of independency, and deny themselves to be by Nature sociable; where would their shame have been, had Nature otherwise supplied these wants? What duty or obligation had been ever thought of? What respect or reverence of parents, magistrates, their country, or their kind? Would not their full and self-sufficient state more strongly have determined them to throw off nature, and deny the ends and author of their creation?

Whilst Theocles argued thus concerning Nature, the old gentleman, my adversary, expressed great satisfaction in hearing me, as he thought, refuted, and my opinions exposed. For he would needs believe these to be strongly my opinions, which I had only started as objections in the discourse. He endeavoured to reinforce the argument by
many

many particulars from the common topics of the schoolmen and civilians. He added withal, "That it was better for me to declare my sentiments openly; for he was sure I had strongly imbibed that principle, That the state of nature was a state of war³."

That it was no state of government, or public rule, replied I, you yourself allow. I do so.

Was it then a state of fellowship, or society?

No: "For when men entered first into society, they passed from the state of nature into that new one which is founded upon compact."

And was that former state a tolerable one?

Had it been absolutely intolerable, there had never been any such. Nor could we properly call that a state, which could not stand or endure for the least time. If man therefore could endure to live without society; and if it be true that he actually lived so, when in the state of nature; how can it be said, "That he is by nature sociable"

The old gentleman seemed a little disturbed at my question. But having recovered himself, he said in answer, "That man indeed, from his own natural inclination, might not, perhaps, have been moved to associate; but rather from some particular circumstances."

His nature then, said I, was not so very good, it seems; since, having no natural affection, or friendly inclination belonging to him, he was

³ Vol. I. p. 92.

forced into a social state against his will; and this not from any necessity in respect of outward things, for you have allowed him a tolerable subsistence, but in probability from such inconveniencies as arose chiefly from himself, and his own malignant temper and principles. And indeed it was no wonder if creatures who were naturally thus unfociable, should be as naturally mischievous and troublesome. If, according to their nature, they could live out of society, with so little affection for one another's company, it is not likely that upon occasion they would spare one another's persons. If they were so sullen, as not to meet for love, it is more than probable they would fight for interest. And thus from your own reasoning it appears, "That the state of nature must in all likelihood have been little different from a state of war."

He was going to answer me with some sharpness, as by his looks appeared; when Theocles interposing, desired, that as he had occasioned this dispute, he might be allowed to try if he could end it, by setting the question in a fairer light. You see, said he to the old gentleman, what artifice Philocles made use of, when he engaged you to allow, that the state of nature, and that of society, were perfectly distinct. But let us question him now in his turn, and see whether he can demonstrate to us, "That there can be naturally any human state which is not social."

What is it then, said the old gentleman, which we call the state of nature?

Not that imperfect, rude condition of mankind, said Theocles, which some imagine; but which, if it ever were in nature, could never have been of the least continuance, or any way tolerable, or sufficient for the support of human race. Such a condition cannot indeed so properly be called a state. For what if, speaking of an infant just coming into the world, and in the moment of the birth, I should fancy to call this a state; would it be proper?

Hardly so, I confess.

Just such a state, therefore, was that which we suppose of man, ere yet he entered into society, and became in truth a human creature. It was the rough draught of man, the essay or first effort of Nature, a species in the birth, a kind as yet unformed; not in its natural state, but under violence, and still restless, till it attained its natural perfection.

And thus, said Theocles, addressing still more particularly to the old gentleman, the case must necessarily stand, even on the supposal, “that
“there was ever such a condition or state of
“men, when as yet they were unassociated,
“unacquainted, and consequently without any
“language or form of art.” But “that it was
“their natural state, to live thus separately,”
can never without absurdity be allowed. For sooner may you divest the creature of any other feeling or affection, than that towards society and his likeness. Allowing you, however, the power of divesting him at pleasure; allowing

you to reduce even whole parts and members of his present frame; would you transform him thus, and call him still a man? Yet better might you do this indeed, than you could strip him of his natural affections, separate him from all his kind, and inclosing him like some solitary insect in a shell, declare him still a man. So might you call the human egg, or embryo, the man. The bug which breeds the butterfly is more properly a fly, though without wings, than this imaginary creature is a man. For though his outward shape were human, his passions, appetites, and organs, must be wholly different. His whole inward make must be reversed, to fit him for such a recluse œconomy, and separate subsistence.

To explain this a little further, continued he, let us examine this pretended state of nature; how and on what foundation it must stand. "For either man must have been from eternity, or not. If from eternity, there could be no primitive or original state, no state of nature, other than we see at present before our eyes. If not from eternity, he arose either all at once, and consequently he was at the very first as he is now, or by degrees, through several stages and conditions, to that in which he is at length settled, and has continued for so many generations."

For instance, let us suppose he sprang as the old poets feigned, from a big-bellied oak; and then belike he might resemble more a man-drake

than a Man. Let us suppose him at first with little more of life than is discovered in that plant which they call the sensitive. But when the mother-oak had been some time delivered, and the false birth by some odd accident or device was wrought into form, the members were then fully displayed, and the organs of sense began to unfold themselves. "Here sprang an ear: there peeped an eye. "Perhaps a tail too came in company. For what "superfluities, Nature may have been charged "with at first, is difficult to determine. They "dropped off, it seems, in time; and happily "have left things, at last, in a good posture, and, "to a wonder! just as they should be."

This surely is the lowest view of the original affairs of human kind. For if a Providence, and not Chance, gave man his being, our argument for his social nature must surely be the stronger. But admitting his rise to be, as we have described, and as a certain sort of philosophers would needs have it; Nature has then had no intention at all, no meaning or design in this whole matter. So how any thing can be called natural in the case, how any state can be called a state of nature; or according to nature, one more than another, I know not.

Let us go on, however, and on their hypothesis consider, which state we may best call Nature's own. "She has by accident, through "many changes and chances, raised a creature, "which springing at first from rude seeds of "matter, proceeded till it became what now it

“ is ; and arrived where for many generations
“ it has been at a stay.” In this long procession, for I allow it any length whatever, I ask,
“ Where was it that this state of nature could
“ begin ? ” The creature must have endured many changes ; and each change, whilst he was thus growing up, was as natural, one as another. So that either there must be reckoned a hundred different states of nature ; or if one, it can be only that in which nature was perfect, and her growth complete. Here where she rested, and attained her end, here must be her state, or nowhere.

Could she then rest, think you, in that desolate state before society ? Could she maintain and propagate the species, such as it now is, without fellowship or community ? Show it us in fact any where amongst any of our own kind. For as for creatures which may much resemble us in outward form, if they differ yet in the least part of their constitution, if their inwards are of a different texture, if their skin and pores are otherwise formed or hardened ; if they have other excrescences of body, another temper, other natural, inseparable habits or affections, they are not truly of our kind. If, on the other hand, their constitution be as ours ; their natural parts or inward faculties as strong, and their bodily frame as weak as ours ; if they have memory, and senses, and affections, and a use of organs as ours ; it is evident they can no more by their good-will abstain from society, than they can possibly preserve themselves without it.

And here, my friends! we ought to remember what we discoursed a while since, and was advanced by Philocles himself, concerning the weakness of human bodies*, and the necessitous state of man, in respect of all other creatures: "His long and helpless infancy, his feeble and defenceless make, by which he is more fitted to be a prey himself, than live by prey on others." Yet it is impossible for him to subsist like any of those grazing kinds. He must have better provision, and choicer food, than the raw herbage; a better couch and covering than the bare earth or open sky. How many conveniences of other kinds does he stand in need of? What union and strict society is required between the sexes, to preserve and nurse their growing offspring? This kind of society will not, surely, be denied to man, which to every beast of prey is known proper, and natural. And can we allow this social part to man, and go no further? Is it possible he should pair, and live in love and fellowship with his partner and offspring, and remain still wholly wild and speechless, and without those arts of storing, building, and other œconomy, as natural to him surely as to the beaver, or to the ant, or bee? Where, therefore, should he break off from this society, if once begun? For that it began thus as early as generation, and grew into a household and œconomy, is plain. Must not this have grown soon into a

* Supra, p. 248.

tribe? and this tribe into a nation? Or though it remained a tribe only, was not this a society for mutual defence and common interest? In short, if generation be natural, if natural affection, and the care and nurture of the offspring be natural, things standing as they do with man, and the creature being of that form and constitution he now is; it follows, "That society must be also
 "natural to him;" and, "That out of society
 "and community he never did, nor ever can
 "subsist."

To conclude, said he, addressing still to the two companions, I will venture to add a word in behalf of Philocles: That since the learned have such a fancy for this notion, and love to talk of this imaginary state of nature, I think it is even charity to speak as ill of it as we possibly can. Let it be a state of war, rapine, and injustice. Since it is unsocial; let it even be as uncomfortable and as frightful as it is possible. To speak well of it, is to render it inviting, and tempt men to turn hermits. Let it, at least, be looked on as many degrees worse than the worst government in being. The greater dread we have of anarchy, the better countrymen we shall prove, and value more the laws and constitution under which we live, and by which we are protected from the outrageous violences of such an unnatural state. In this I agree heartily with those transformers of human nature, who, considering it abstractedly and apart from government or society, represent it under monstrous visages of dragons,

leviathans, and I know not what devouring creatures. They would have done well, however, to have expressed themselves more properly in their great maxim. For to say in disparagement of man, "That he is to man a wolf," appears somewhat absurd, when one considers that wolves are to wolves very kind and loving creatures. The sexes strictly join in the care and nurture of the young; and this union is continued still between them. They howl to one another, to bring company; whether to hunt, or invade their prey, or assemble on the discovery of a good carcase. Even the swinish kinds want not common affection, and run in herds to the assistance of their distressed fellows. The meaning therefore of this famous sentence, if it has any meaning at all, must be, "That man is naturally to man as a wolf is to a tamer creature;" as, for instance, to a sheep. But this will be as little to the purpose as to tell us, "That there are different species or characters of men; that all have not this wolfish nature," "but that one half at least are naturally innocent and mild." And thus the sentence comes to nothing. For without belying Nature, and contradicting what is evident from natural history, fact, and the plain course of things, it is impossible to assent to this ill-natured proposition, when we have even done our best to make tolerable sense of it. — But such is mankind! And even here

⁵ Vol. 1. p. 73. 100.

human nature shows itself, such as it is; not perfect, or absolutely successful, though rightly tending, and moved by proper and just principles. It is here, therefore, in philosophy, as in the common conversations of the world. As fond as men are of company, and as little able to enjoy any happiness out of it, they are yet strangely addicted to the way of satire. And in the same manner as a malicious censure craftily worded, and pronounced with assurance, is apt to pass with mankind for shrewd wit; so a virulent maxim in bold expressions, though without any justness of thought, is readily received for true philosophy.

S E C T. V.

Miracles. Prodigies. Scepticism. Imposture. Wonderment. Credulity. Fanaticism. Miracles, past, present. Human testimony. Divine testimony. Miracles no proof of divinity. Revelation. Atheism from superstition.

IN these discourses the evening ended; and night advancing, we returned home from our walk. At supper, and afterwards for the rest of that night, Theocles said little. The discourse was now managed chiefly by the two companions, who turned it upon a new sort of philo-

sophy; such as you will excuse me, good Palemon! if I pass over with more haste.

There was much said, and with great learning, on the nature of spirits and apparitions; of which the most astonishing accounts were the most ravishing with our friends; who endeavoured to exceed one another in this admirable way, and performed to a miracle in raising one another's amazement. Nothing was so charming with them, as that which was disagreeing and odd; nothing so soothing, as that which moved horror. In short, whatever was rational, plain, and easy, bore no relish; and nothing came amiss which was cross to nature, out of sort and order, and in no proportion or harmony with the rest of things. Monstrous births, prodigies enchantments, elementary wars, and convulsions, were our chief entertainment. One would have thought, that in a kind of rivalry between Providence and Nature, the latter lady was made to appear as homely as possible; that her deformities might recommend and set off the beauties of the former. For, to do our friends justice, I must own I thought their intention to be sincerely religious. But this was not a face of religion I was like to be enamoured with. It was not from hence I feared being made enthusiastic or superstitious. If ever I became so, I found it would rather be after Theocles's manner. The monuments and church-yards were not so powerful scenes with me, as the mountains, the plains, the solemn woods and groves; of whose inhabitants I chose

much rather to hear than of the other. And I was readier to fancy truth in those poetical fictions which Theocles made use of, than in any of his friend's ghastly stories, so pompously set off, after the usual way, in a lofty tone of authority, and with an assuming air of truth.

You may imagine, Palemon, that my scepticism¹, with which you so often reproach me, could not well forsake me here: nor could it fail to give disturbance to our companions, especially to the grave gentleman, who had clashed with me some time before. He bore with me a while; till having lost all patience, One must certainly, said he, be master of no small share of assurance, to hold out against the common opinion of the world, and deny things which are known by the report of the most considerable part of mankind.

This, said I, is far from being my case. You have never yet heard me deny any thing, though I have questioned many. If I suspend my judgment, it is because I have less sufficiency than others. There are people, I know, who have so great a regard to every fancy of their own, that they can believe their very dreams. But I who could never pay any such deference to my sleeping fancies, am apt sometimes to question even my waking thoughts, and examine, "Whether these are not dreams too;" since men have a faculty of dreaming sometimes with their eyes open. You

¹ Misc. 2. chap. 2. parag. 14. — 18, &c. Misc. 5. chap. 1. parag. 17. — 21, &c. Misc. 5. chap. 3. parag. 32. — 55, &c. in vol. 3.

will own it is no small pleasure with mankind, to make their dreams pass for realities; and that the love of truth is, in earnest, not half so prevalent as this passion for novelty and surprise, joined with a desire of making impression, and being admired. However, I am so charitable still, as to think there is more of innocent delusion than voluntary imposture in the world; and that they who have most imposed on mankind, have been happy in a certain faculty of imposing first upon themselves; by which they have a kind of salvo for their consciences, and are so much the more successful, as they can act their part more naturally, and to the life. Nor is it to be esteemed a riddle, that men's dreams should sometimes have the good fortune of passing with them for truth; when we consider, that, in some cases, that which was never so much as dreamed of, or related as truth, comes afterwards to be believed by one who has often told it.

So that the greatest impostor in the world, replied he, at this rate may be allowed sincere.

As to the main of his imposture, said I, perhaps he may; notwithstanding some pious frauds made use of between whiles, in behalf of a belief thought good and wholesome. And so very natural do I take this to be, that in all religions, except the true, I look upon the greatest zeal to be accompanied with the strongest inclination to deceive. For the design and end being the truth, it is not customary to hesitate or be scrupulous about the choice of means. Whether this be true or no, I

appeal to the experience of the last age ; in which it will not be difficult to find very remarkable examples, where imposture and zeal, bigotry and hypocrisy have lived together in one and the same character.

Let this be as it will, replied he, I am sorry, upon the whole, to find you of such an incredulous temper.

It is just, said I, that you should pity me as a sufferer, for losing that pleasure which I see others enjoy. For what stronger pleasure is there with mankind, or what do they earlier learn, or longer retain, than the love of hearing and relating things strange and incredible? How wonderful a thing is the love of wondering, and of raising wonder! It is the delight of children to hear tales they shiver at, and the vice of old age to abound in strange stories of times past. We come into the world wondering at every thing; and when our wonder about common things is over, we seek something new to wonder at. Our last scene is to tell wonders of our own, to all who will believe them. And amidst all this, it is well if Truth comes off, but moderately tainted.

It is well, replied he, if, with this moderate Faith of yours, you can believe any miracles whatever.

No matter, said I, how incredulous I am of modern miracles, if I have a right faith in those of former times, by paying the deference due to sacred writ. It is here I am so much warned against credulity, and enjoined never to believe even the

greatest miracles which may be wrought, in opposition to what has been already taught me. And this injunction I am so well fitted to comply with, that I can safely engage to keep still in the same faith, and promise never to believe amiss.

But is this a promise which can well be made?

If not, and that my belief indeed does not absolutely depend upon myself, how am I accountable for it? I may be justly punished for actions, in which my will is free; but with what justice can I be challenged for my belief, if in this I am not at my liberty? If credulity and incredulity are defects only in the judgment; and the best-meaning person in the world may err on either side, whilst a much worse man, by having better parts, may judge far better of the evidence of things; how can you punish him who errs, unless you would punish weakness, and say, it is just for men to suffer for their unhappiness, and not their fault?

I am apt to think, said he, that very few of those who are punished for their incredulity, can be said to be sufferers for their weakness.

Taking it for granted then, replied I, that simplicity and weakness is more the character of the credulous than of the unbelieving; yet I see not, but that even this way still we are as liable to suffer by our weakness, as in the contrary case by an over-refined wit. For if we cannot command our own belief, how are we secure against those false prophets, and their deluding miracles, of

which we have such warning given us? How are we safe from heresy and false religion? credulity being that which delivers us up to all impostures of this sort, and which actually at this day holds the Pagan and Mahometan world in error and blind superstition. Either therefore there is no punishment due to wrong belief, because we cannot believe as we will ourselves; or if we can, why should we not promise never to believe amiss? Now, in respect of miracles to come, the surest way never to believe amiss, is never to believe at all. For being satisfied of the truth of our religion by past miracles, so as to need no other to confirm us; the belief of new may often do us harm, but can never do us good. Therefore as the truest mark of a believing Christian is to seek after no sign or miracle to come; so the safest station in Christianity is his who can be moved by nothing of this kind, and is thus miracle-proof. For if the miracle be on the side of his faith, it is superfluous, and he needs it not; if against his faith, let it be as great as possible, he will never regard it in the least, or believe it any other than imposture, though coming from an angel. So that, with all that incredulity for which you reproach me so severely, I take myself to be still the better and more orthodox Christian. At least I am more sure of continuing so than you, who with your credulity may be imposed upon by such as are far short of angels. For having this preparatory disposition, it is odds you may come in time to believe miracles in any of the different sects, who, we know,

know, all pretend to them. I am persuaded therefore, that the best maxim to go by, is that common one, "That miracles are ceased:" and I am ready to defend this opinion of mine to be the most probable in itself, as well as most suitable to Christianity.

This question, upon further debate, happened to divide our two companions. For the elderly gentleman, my antagonist, maintained, "That the giving up of miracles for the time present, would be of great advantage to the Atheists." The younger gentleman, his companion, questioned, "Whether the allowing them might not be of as great advantage to the enthusiasts and sectaries, against the national church: this of the two being the greatest danger, he thought, both to religion and the state." He was resolved, therefore, for the future, to be as cautious in examining these modern miracles, as he had before been eager in seeking them. He told us very pleasantly what an adventurer he had been of that kind, and on how many parties he had been engaged, with a sort of people who were always on the hot scent of some new prodigy or apparition, some upstart revelation or prophecy. This, he thought, was true fanaticism errant. He had enough of this visionary chase, and would ramble no more in blind corners of the world, as he had been formerly accustomed, in ghostly company of spirit-hunters, witch-finders, and layers-out for hellish stories, and diabolical transactions. There was no need, he thought, of such intelligences

from hell, to prove the power of heaven, and being of a God. And now at last he begun to see the ridicule of laying such a stress on these matters; as if a providence depended on them, and religion were at stake, when any of these wild feats were questioned. He was sensible there were many good Christians who made themselves strong partisans in this cause; though he could not avoid wondering at it, now he began to consider and look back.

The Heathens, he said, who wanted scripture, might have recourse to miracles: and Providence perhaps had allowed them their oracles and prodigies, as an imperfect kind of revelation. The Jews too, for their hard heart, and harder understanding, had this allowance, when stubbornly they asked for signs and wonders. But Christians, for their parts, had a far better and truer revelation; they had their plainer oracles, a more rational law, and clearer scripture, carrying its own force, and withal so well attested, as to admit of no dispute. And were I, continued he, to assign the exact time when miracles probably might first have ceased, I should be tempted to fancy it was when sacred writ took place, and was completed.

This is fancy indeed, replied the grave gentleman, and a very dangerous one to that scripture you pretend is of itself so well attested. The attestation of men dead and gone, in behalf of miracles past and at an end, can never surely be of equal force with miracles present: and of these, I maintain, there are never wanting a number

sufficient in the world to warrant a divine existence. If there were no miracles now - a - days, the world would be apt to think there never were any. The present must answer for the credibility of the past. This is "GOD witnessing for himself;" not "men for GOD." For who shall witness for men, if, in the case of religion, they have no testimony from heaven in their behalf?

What it is may make the report of men credible, said the younger gentleman, is another question. But for mere miracles, it seems to me, they cannot be properly said, "to witness either "for GOD or men." For who shall witness for the miracles themselves? And what, though they are ever so certain? What security have we that they are not acted by Dæmons? What proof that they are not wrought by magic? In short, "What "trust is there to any thing above or below, if "the signs are only of power, and not of good-
"ness?"

And are you so far improved then, replied the severe companion under your new sceptical master, pointing to me, that you can thus readily discard all miracles, as useless? —

The young gentleman, I saw, was somewhat daunted with this rough usage of his friend, who was going on still with his invective. Nay then, said I, interposing, it is I who am to answer for this young gentleman, whom you make to be my disciple. And since his modesty, I see, will not allow him to pursue what he has so handsomely

begun, I will endeavour it myself, if he will give me leave.

The young gentleman assented; and I went on, representing his fair intention of establishing, in the first place, a rational and just foundation for our faith; so as to vindicate it from the reproach of having no immediate miracles to support it. He would have done this, I said, undoubtedly, by showing how good proof we had already for our sacred oracles, from the testimony of the dead; whose characters and lives might answer for them, as to the truth of what they reported to us from God. This, however, was by no means "witnessing for GOD," as the zealous gentleman had hastily expressed himself. For this was above the reach either of men or miracles. Nor could God witness for himself, or assert his being any other way to men, than "by revealing himself to their reason, appealing to their judgment, and submitting his ways to their censure, and cool deliberation." The contemplation of the universe, its laws and government, was, I averred, the only means which could establish the sound belief of a Deity. For what though innumerable miracles from every part assailed the sense, and gave the trembling soul no respite? What though the sky should suddenly open, and all kinds of prodigies appear, voices be heard, or characters read? What would this evince more than "that there were certain Powers could do all this?" But "what Powers; whether one or more; whether superior or subaltern, mortal or immortal, wise or foolish,

“just or unjust, good or bad:” this would still remain a mystery; as would the true intention, the infallibility or certainty of whatever these Powers asserted. Their word could not be taken in their own case. They might silence men indeed, but not convince them; since “Power can never serve as proof for goodness”; and Goodness is “the only pledge of truth.” By Goodness alone trust is created. By Goodness superior Powers may win belief. They must allow their works to be examined, their actions criticized: and thus, thus only, they may be confided in; “when, by repeated marks, their benevolence is proved, and their character of sincerity and truth established.” To whom, therefore, the laws of this universe, and its government, appear just and uniform; to him they speak the government of one Just one; to him they reveal and witness a God; and laying in him the foundation of this first faith, they fit him for a subsequent one¹. He can then hearken to historical revelation; and is then fitted, and not till then, for the reception of any message or miraculous notice from above, where he knows beforehand all is just and true. But this no power of miracles, nor any power besides his Reason, can make him know or apprehend.

But now, continued I, since I have been thus long the defendant only, I am resolved to take

¹ Vol. 1. p. 79, 80. and vol. 3. Misc. 2. chap. 3. parag. 36.

² Vol. 1. p. 256. and *supra*, p. 222.

up offensive arms, and be aggressor in my turn; provided Theocles be not angry with me for borrowing ground from his hypothesis.

Whatever you borrow of his, replied my antagonist, you are pretty sure of spoiling it: and as it passes through your hands, you had best beware lest you seem rather to reflect on him than me.

I will venture it, said I, whilst I maintain, that most of those maxims you build upon, are fit only to betray your own cause. For whilst you are laboring to unhinge nature; whilst you are searching heaven and earth for prodigies, and studying how to miraculize every thing, you bring confusion on the world, you break its uniformity, and destroy that admirable simplicity of order, from whence the one infinite and perfect principle is known. Perpetual strifes, convulsions, violences, breach of laws, variation and unsteadiness of order, show either no control, or several uncontrolled and unsubordinate powers in nature. We have before our eyes either the chaos and atoms of the Atheists, or the magic and dæmons of the Polytheists. Yet is this tumultuous system of the universe asserted with the highest zeal by some who would maintain a Deity. This is that face of things, and these the features by which they represent divinity. Hither the eyes of our more inquisitive and ingenuous youth are turned with care, lest they see any thing otherwise than in this perplexed and amazing view; as if Atheism were the most natural inference which could be

drawn from a regular and orderly state of things! But after all this mangling and disfigurement of nature; if it happens, as oft it does, that the amazed disciple, coming to himself, and searching leisurely into nature's ways, finds more of order, uniformity, and constancy in things than he suspected, he is of course driven into Atheism: and this merely by the impressions he received from that preposterous system, which taught him to seek for Deity in confusion, and to discover Providence in an irregular, disjointed world.

And when you, replied he, with your newly-espoused system, have brought all things to be as uniform, plain, regular, and simple, as you could wish, I suppose you will send your disciple to seek for Deity in mechanism; that is to say, in some exquisite system of self-governed matter. For what else is it you naturalists make of the world than a mere machine?

Nothing else, replied I, if to the machine you allow a mind. For in this case it is not a self-governed, but a God-governed machine.

And what are the tokens, said he, which should convince us? What signs should this dumb machine give of its being thus governed?

The present, replied I, are sufficient. It cannot possibly give stronger signs of life and steady thought. Compare our own machines with this great one; and see, whether, by their order, management, and motions, they betoken either so perfect a life, or so consummate an intelligence. The one is regular, steady, permanent;

the other are irregular, variable, inconstant. In one there are the marks of wisdom and determination; in the other, of whimsy and conceit: in one there appears judgment, in the other, fancy, only: in one, will; in the other, caprice: in one, truth, certainty, knowledge; in the other, error, folly, and madness. — But to be convinced there is something above, which thinks and acts, we want, it seems, the latter of these signs; as supposing there can be no thought or intelligence beside what is like our own. We sicken and grow weary with the orderly and regular course of things. Periods, and stated laws, and revolutions just and proportionable, work not upon us, nor win our admiration. We must have riddles, prodigies, matter for surprise and horror! By harmony, order, and concord, we are made Atheists; by irregularity and discord, we are convinced of Deity! “The world is mere accident, if it proceeds in course; but an effect of wisdom, if it runs mad!”

Thus I took upon me the part of a sound Theist, whilst I endeavoured to refute my antagonist, and show that his principles favored Atheism. The zealous gentleman took high offence; and we continued debating warmly till late at night. But Theocles was moderator; and we retired at last to our repose, all calm and friendly. However, I was not a little rejoiced to hear, that our companions were to go away early the next morning, and leave Theocles to me alone.

For now, Palemon! that morning was approaching for which I so much longed. What your longing may prove, I may have reason to fear. You have had enough, one would think, to turn the edge of your curiosity in this kind. Can it be imagined, that after the recital of two such days already past, you can with patience hear of another yet to come, more philosophical than either? — But you have made me promise; and now, whatever it cost, take it you must, as follows.

P A R T III.

S E C T. I.

Meditation. Unity. Personality. Self. Identity. Matter. Form. A genius. The supreme one. Substance, material, immaterial. Metaphysics. A mind. Particular minds. Mind of the whole. Nature subject to a mind. Contrary belief. Two sorts. Faith of Atheism. Faith of Theism. Energy of nature. Distempers. General good. Resignation. Principle of order; why universal. Phenomena of ill, whence. Demonstration. Manicheism. Conclusion. Meditation.

P H I L O C L E S to P A L E M O N.

IT was yet deep night, as I imagined, when I waked with the noise of people up in the house. I called to know the matter; and was told, that Theocles had a little before parted with his friends; after which he went out to take his morning-walk, but would return, they thought, pretty soon; for so he had left word; and that no body in the mean time should disturb my rest.

This was disturbance sufficient, when I heard it. I presently got up; and finding it light enough to see the hill, which was at a little distance from the house, I soon got thither; and at the foot

of it, overtook Theocles; to whom I complained of his unkindness. For I was not certainly, I told him, so effeminate and weak a friend, as to deserve that he should treat me like a woman: nor had I shown such an aversion to his manners or conversation, as to be thought fitter for the dull luxury of a soft bed and ease, than for business, recreation, or study with an early friend. He had no other way therefore of making me amends, than by allowing me henceforward to be a party with him in his serious thoughts, as he saw I was resolved to be in his hours and exercises of this sort.

You have forgot then, said Theocles, the assignation you had yesterday with the sylvan nymphs at this place and hour? No, truly, said I: for, as you see, I am come punctually to the place appointed. But I never expected you should have come hither without me. Nay then, said Theocles, there is hope you may in time become a lover with me: for you already begin to show jealousy. How little did I think these nymphs could raise that passion in you? Truly, said I, for the nymphs you mention, I know little of them as yet. My jealousy and love regard you only. I was afraid you had a mind to escape me. But now that I am again in possession of you, I want no nymph to make me happy here; unless it were perhaps to join forces against you, in the manner your beloved poet makes the nymph *Ægle* join with his two youths in forcing the god *Silenus* to sing to them.

I dare trust your gallantry, replied Theocles, that if you had such fair company as you speak of, you would otherwise bestow your time than in an adventure of philosophy. — But do you expect I should imitate the poet's god you mentioned, and sing "the rise of things from atoms; " the birth of order from confusion; and the " origin of union, harmony, and concord, from " the sole powers of Chaos, and blind chance?" The song indeed was fitted to the god. For what could better suit his jolly character, than such a drunken creation; which he loved often to celebrate, by acting it to the life? But even this song was too harmonious for the night's debauch. Well has our poet made it of the morning, when the god was fresh: for hardly should we be brought ever to believe, that such harmonious numbers could arise from a mere chaos of the mind. But we must hear our poet speaking in the mouth of some soberer demi-god or hero. He then presents us with a different principle of things; and, in a more proper order of precedency, gives thought the upper hand. He makes mind originally to have governed body, not body mind: for this had been a chaos everlasting, and must have kept all things in a chaos-state to this day, and for ever, had it ever been. But

*The active mind, infused through all the space,
Unites and mingles with the mighty mass:
Hence men and beasts. —*

Here, Philocles, we shall find our sovereign genius; if we can charm the genius of the place, more chaste and sober than your Silenus, to inspire us with a truer song of Nature, teach us some celestial hymn, and make us feel divinity present in these solemn places of retreat.

Haste then, I conjure you, said I, good Theocles, and stop not one moment for any ceremony or rite. For well I see, methinks, that, without any such preparation, some divinity has approached us, and already moves in you. We are come to the sacred groves of the Hamadryads, which formerly were said to render oracles. We are on the most beautiful part of the hill; and the sun, now ready to rise, draws off the curtain of night, and shows us the open scene of Nature in the plains below. Begin: for now I know you are full of those divine thoughts which meet you ever in this solitude. Give them but voice and accents: you may be still as much alone as you are used, and take no more notice of me than if I were absent.

Just as I had said this, he turned away his eyes from me, musing a while by himself; and soon afterwards, stretching out his hand, as pointing to the objects round him, he began.

“ Ye fields and woods, my refuge from the
“ toilsome world of business, receive me in your
“ quiet sanctuaries, and favor my retreat and
“ thoughtful solitude. — Ye verdant plains, how
“ gladly I salute ye! — Hail all ye blissful man-
“ sions! known seats! delightful prospects! majestic

“ beauties of this earth, and all ye rural powers
“ and graces! — Blessed be ye chaste abodes of
“ happiest mortals, who here in peaceful inno-
“ cence enjoy a life unenvied, though divine;
“ whilst with its blessed tranquillity it affords a
“ happy leisure and retreat for man; who made
“ for contemplation, and to search his own and
“ other natures, may here best meditate the cause
“ of things; and placed amidst the various scenes
“ of Nature, may nearer view her works.

“ O glorious Nature! supremely fair, and so-
“ vereignly good! all-loving and all-lovely all-
“ divine! whose looks are so becoming, and of
“ such infinite grace; whose study brings such
“ wisdom, and whose contemplation such delight;
“ whose every single work affords an ampler
“ scene, and is a nobler spectacle, than all which
“ ever art presented! — O mighty Nature! wise
“ substitute of Providence! empowered Creatress!
“ Or thou empowering Deity, supreme Creator!
“ thee I invoke, and thee alone adore. To thee
“ this solitude, this place, these rural meditations
“ are sacred; whilst thus inspired with harmony
“ of thought, though unconfined by words, and
“ in loose numbers, I sing of Nature's order in
“ created beings, and celebrate the beauties which
“ resolve in thee, the source and principle of all
“ beauty and perfection.

“ Thy being is boundless, unsearchable, im-
“ penetrable. In thy immensity all thought is
“ lost; fancy gives over its flight; and wearied
“ imagination spends itself in vain; finding no

“ coast nor limit of this ocean, nor, in the widest
“ tract through which it soars, one point yet
“ nearer the circumference than the first centre
“ whence it parted. — Thus having oft essayed,
“ thus sallied forth into the wide expanse, when
“ I return again within myself, struck with the
“ sense of this so narrow being, and of the ful-
“ nefs of that immense one; I dare no more behold
“ the amazing depths, nor sound the abyfs of
“ Deity. —

“ Yet since by thee, O sovereign Mind! I
“ have been formed such as I am, intelligent
“ and rational; since the peculiar dignity of my
“ nature is to know and contemplate thee; per-
“ mit that with due freedom I exert those facul-
“ ties with which thou hast adorned me. Bear
“ with my venturous and bold approach. And since
“ nor vain curiosity, nor fond conceit, nor love
“ of ought save thee alone, inspires me with
“ such thoughts as these, be thou my assistant,
“ and guide me in this pursuit; whilst I venture
“ thus to tread the labyrinth of wide Nature,
“ and endeavour to trace thee in thy works.”

Here he stopped short; and starting, as out of a dream; Now, Philocles, said he, inform me, how have I appeared to you in my fit? Seemed it a sensible kind of madness, like those transports which are permitted to our poets? or was it downright raving?

I only wish, said I, that you had been a little stronger in your transport, to have proceeded as you began, without ever minding me. For I

was beginning to see wonders in that nature you taught me, and was coming to know the hand of your divine artificer. But if you stop here, I shall lose the enjoyment of the pleasing vision. And already I begin to find a thousand difficulties in fancying such a universal genius as you describe.

Why, said he, is there any difficulty in fancying the universe to be one entire thing? Can one otherwise think of it, by what is visible, than that all hangs together, as of a piece?

Grant it: And what follows? Only this, that if it may indeed be said of the world, "That it is simply one," there should be something belonging to it which makes it one.

As how? No otherwise than as you may observe in every thing. For, to instance in what we see before us, I know you look upon the trees of this vast wood to be different from one another: and this tall oak, the noblest of the company, as it is by itself a different thing from all its fellows of the wood, so with its own wood of numerous, spreading branches, which seem so many different trees, it is still, I suppose, one and the self-same tree. Now, should you, as a mere caviller, and not as a fair sceptic, tell me, that if a figure of wax, or any other matter, were cast in the exact shape and colors of this tree, and tempered, if possible, to the same kind of substance, it might therefore possibly be a real tree of the same kind or species; I would have done with you, and reason no longer. But if
you

you questioned me fairly, and desired I should satisfy you what I thought it was which made this oneness or sameness in the tree, or any other plant; or by what it differed from the waxen figure, or from any such figure accidentally made, either in the clouds, or on the sand by the sea-shore; I should tell you, that neither the wax, nor sand, nor cloud, thus pieced together by our hand or fancy, had any real relation within themselves, or had any nature by which they corresponded any more in that near situation of parts, than if scattered ever so far asunder. But this I should affirm, "That wherever there was such
" a sympathizing of parts, as we saw here, in our
" real tree; wherever there was such a plain concurrence in one common end, and to the support,
" nourishment, and propagation of so fair a form;
" we could not be mistaken in saying there was a
" peculiar nature belonging to this form, and
" common to it with others of the same kind."

By virtue of this, our tree is a real tree; lives, flourishes, and is still one and the same; even when, by vegetation and change of substance, not one particle in it remains the same.

At this rate indeed, said I, you have found a way to make very adorable places of these sylvan habitations. For besides the living genius of each place, the woods too, which, by your account, are animated, have their Hamadryads, no doubt, and the springs and rivulets their nymphs in store belonging to them; and these too, by what I

can apprehend, of immaterial and immortal substances.

We injure them then, replied Theocles, to say, "They belong to these trees; and not rather these trees to them." But as for their immortality, let them look to it themselves. I only know that both theirs, and all other natures, must for their duration depend alone on that nature on which the world depends: and that every genius else must be subordinate to that one good Genius, whom I would willingly persuade you to think belonging to this world, according to our present way of speaking.

Leaving, therefore, these trees, continued he, to personate themselves the best they can, let us examine this thing of personality between you and me; and consider how you, Philocles, are you, and I am myself. For that there is a sympathy of parts in these figures of ours, other than in those of marble formed by a Phidias or Praxiteles; sense, I believe, will teach us. And yet that our own marble, or stuff, whatever it be, of which we are composed, wears out in seven, or, at the longest, in twice seven years, the meanest anatomist can tell us. Now, where, I beseech you, will that same one be found at last, supposing it to lie in the stuff itself, or any part of it? For when that is wholly spent, and not one particle of it left, we are ourselves still as much as before.

What you philosophers are, replied I, may be hard perhaps to determine: but for the rest of

mankind, I dare affirm, that few are so long themselves as half seven years. It is good fortune if a man be one and the same only for a day or two. A year makes more revolutions than can be numbered.

True, said he: but though this may happen to a man, and chiefly to one whose contrary vices set him at odds so often with himself; yet when he comes to suffer, or be punished for those vices, he finds himself, if I mistake not, still one and the same. And you, Philocles! who, though you disown philosophy, are yet so true a proselyte to Pyrrhonism; should you at last, feeling the power of the Genius I preach, be wrought upon to own the divine hypothesis, and, from this new turn of thought, admit a total change in all your principles and opinions; yet would you be still the self-same Philocles; though better yet, if you will take my judgment, than the present one, as much as I love and value him. You see therefore, there is a strange simplicity in this you and me, that in reality they should be still one and the same, when neither one atom of body, one passion, nor one thought remains the same. And for that poor endeavour of making out this sameness or identity of being, from some self-same matter, or particle of matter, supposed to remain with us when all besides is changed; this is by so much the more contemptible, as that matter itself is not really capable of such simplicity. For I dare answer you will allow this you and me to be each of us

simply and individually one, better than you can allow the same to any thing of mere matter; unless quitting your inclination for scepticism, you fall so in love with the notion of an Atom, as to find it full as intelligible and certain to you, as that you are yourself.

But whatever, continued Theocles, be supposed of uncompounded matter, a thing, at best, pretty difficult to conceive; yet being compounded, and put together in a certain number of such parts as unite and conspire in these frames of ours, and others like them; if it can present us with so many innumerable instances of particular forms who share this simple principle, by which they are really one, live, act, and have a nature or genius peculiar to themselves, and provident for their own welfare; how shall we at the same time overlook this in the whole, and deny the great and general One of the world? How can we be so unnatural as to disown divine nature, our common parent, and refuse to recognise the universal and sovereign Genius?

Sovereigns, said I, require no notice to be taken of them, when they pass incognito, nor any homage where they appear not in due form. We may even have reason to presume they should be displeased with us for being too officious, in endeavouring to discover them, when they keep themselves either wholly invisible, or in very dark disguise. As for the notice we take of these invisible powers in the common way of our religion, we have our visible sovereigns to answer

for us. Our lawful superiors teach us what we are to own, and to perform, in worship. And we are dutiful in complying with them, and following their example. But in a philosophical way, I find no warrant for our being such earnest recognisers of a controverted title. However it be, you must allow one at least to understand the controversy, and know the nature of these powers described. May one not inquire, "What substances they are of? Whether material or immaterial?"

May one not, on the other hand, replied Theocles, inquire as well, "What substance, or which of these two substances you account your real and proper self?" Or would you rather be no substance, but chuse to call yourself a mode or accident?

Truly, said I, as accidental as my life may be or as that random humor is, which governs it; I know nothing, after all, so real or substantial as myself. Therefore, if there be that thing you call a substance, I take for granted I am one. But for any thing further relating to this question, you know my sceptic principles; I determine neither way.

Allow me, then, replied he, good Philocles! the same privilege of scepticism in this respect; since it concerns not the affair before us, which way we determine, or whether we come to any determination at all in this point. For be the difficulty ever so great, it stands the same, you may perceive, against your own being, as against

that which I am pretending to convince you of. You may raise what objections you please on either hand; and your dilemma may be of notable force against the manner of such a supreme being's existence. But after you have done all, you will bring the same dilemma home to you, and be at a loss still about yourself. When you have argued ever so long upon these metaphysical points of mode and substance, and have philosophically concluded from the difficulties of each hypothesis, "That there cannot be in a nature such a universal one as this;" you must conclude, from the same reasons, "That there cannot be any such particular one as yourself." But that there is actually such a one as this latter, your own mind, it is hoped, may satisfy you. And of this mind it is enough to say, "That it is something which acts upon a body, and has something passive under it, and subject to it: That it has not only body or mere matter for its subject, but in some respect even itself too, and what proceeds from it: That it superintends and manages its own imaginations, appearances, fancies; correcting, working, and modelling these, as it finds good; and adorning and accomplishing, the best it can, this composite order of body and understanding." Such a Mind and governing part, I know there is somewhere in the world. Let Pyrrho, by the help of such another, contradict me, if he pleases. We have our several understandings and thoughts, however we came by them. Each understands and

thinks the best he can for his own purpose: he for himself; I for another self. And who, I beseech you, for the whole? — No one? Nothing at all? — The world, perhaps, you suppose to be mere body; a mass of modified matter. The bodies of men are part therefore of this body. The imaginations, sensations, apprehensions of men are included in this body, and inherent in it, produced out of it, and resumed again into it; though the body, it seems, never dreams of it! The World itself is never the wiser for all the wit and wisdom it breeds! it has no apprehension at all of what is doing; no thought kept to itself, for its own proper use, or purpose; not a single imagination or reflection, by which to discover or be conscious of the manifold imaginations and inventions which it sets afoot, and deals abroad with such an open hand! The goodly bulk so prolific, kind, and yielding for every one else, has nothing left at last for its own share; having unhappily lavished all away! — By what chance I would fain understand, “How? or by what necessity? — Who gives “the law? — Who orders and distributes thus?”

Nature, say you. And what is Nature? Is it sense? is it a person? Has she reason or understanding? No. Who then understands for her, or is interested or concerned in her behalf? No one; not a soul; but every one for himself.

Come on then. Let us hear further: Is not this Nature still a self? Or, tell me, I beseech

you, How are you one? By what token? or by virtue of what? "By a principle which joins certain parts, and which thinks and acts consonantly for the use and purpose of those parts."

Say, therefore, What is your whole system a part of? or is it, indeed, no part, but a whole, by itself, absolute, independent, and unrelated to any thing besides? If it be indeed a part, and really related; to what else, I beseech you, than to the whole of Nature? Is there then such a uniting principle in Nature? If so, how are you then a self, and nature not so? How have you something to understand and act for you, and Nature, who gave this understanding, nothing at all to understand for her, advice her, or help her out, poor being! on any occasion, whatever necessity she may be in? Has the World such ill fortune in the main? Are there so many particular, understanding, active principles every where? and is there nothing, at last, which thinks, acts, or understands for all? nothing which administers or looks after all?

No, says one of a modern hypothesis, for the World was from eternity, as you see it; and is no more than barely what you see: "Matter modified; a lump in motion, with here and there a thought, or scattered portion of dissoluble intelligence." — No, says one of an ancients hypothesis: for the world was once without any intelligence or thought at all; "Mere matter, chaos, and a play of atoms; till thought, by chance, came into play, and

“made up a harmony which was never designed, or thought of.” — Admirable conceit! — Belief it who can. For my own share, thank Providence, I have a mind in my possession, which serves, such as it is, to keep my body and its affections, my passions, appetites, imaginations, fancies, and the rest, in tolerable harmony and order. But the order of the universe, I am persuaded still, is much the better of the two. Let Epicurus, if he please, think his the better; and believing no genius or wisdom above his own, inform us by what chance it was dealt him, and how atoms came to be so wise.

In fine, continued Theocles, raising his voice and action, being thus, even by scepticism itself, convinced the more still of my own being, and, of this self of mine, “That it is a real self-drawn out, and copied from another principal and original Self, the great one of the world,” I endeavour to be really one with it, and conformable to it, as far as I am able. I consider, that as there is one general mass, one body of the whole; so to this body there is an order, to this order a Mind: that to this general Mind each particular one must have relation; as being of like substance, as much as we can understand of substance; alike active upon body, original to motion and order; alike simple, uncompounded, individual; of like energy, effect, and operation; and more like still, if it co-operates with it to general good, and strives to will according to the best of wills. So that it cannot surely but seem

natural, "That the particular Mind should seek
 "its happiness in conformity with the general one,
 "and endeavour to resemble it in its highest sim-
 "plicity and excellence."

Therefore now, said I, good Theocles, be once again the enthusiast, and let me hear anew that divine song with which I was lately charmed. I am already got over my qualm, and begin better than ever to fancy such a nature as you speak of; infomuch that I find myself mightily in its interest, and concerned that all should go happily and well with it. Though, at the rate it often runs, I can scarce help being in some pain on its account.

Fear not, my friend, replied he: for know, that every particular Nature certainly and constantly produces what is good to itself; unless something foreign disturbs or hinders it, either by overpowering and corrupting it within, or by violence from without. Thus Nature in the patient struggles to the last, and strives to throw off the distemper. Thus, even in these plants we see round us, every particular Nature thrives, and attains its perfection, if nothing from without obstructs it, nor any thing foreign has already impaired or wounded it. And even in this case, it does its utmost still to redeem itself. What are all weaknesses, distortions, sicknesses, imperfect births, and the seeming contradictions and perversities of nature, other than of this sort? And how ignorant must one be of all natural causes and operations, to think that any of these disorders

happen by a miscarriage of the particular nature, and not by the force of some foreign nature, which overpowers it? If therefore every particular nature be thus constantly and unerringly true to itself, and certain to produce only what is good for itself, and conducing to its own right state; shall not the general one, the Nature of the whole, do full as much? Shall that alone miscarry or fail? Or is there any thing foreign, which should at any time do violence upon it, or force it out of its natural way? If not, then all it produces is to its own advantage and good; the good of all in general: and what is for the good of all in general, is just and good.

It is so, said I, I confess.

Then you ought to rest satisfied, replied he; and not only so, but be pleased and rejoice at what happens, knowing whence it comes, and to what perfection it contributes.

Bless me! said I, Theocles, into what a superstition are you like to lead me! I thought it heretofore the mark of a superstitious mind, to search for providence in the common accidents of life, and ascribe to the divine power those common disasters and calamities which nature has entailed on mankind. But now, I find, I must place all in general to one account: and viewing things through a kind of magical glass, I am to see the worst of ills transformed to good, and admire equally whatever comes from one and the same perfect hand. — But no matter; I can surmount all. Go on, Theocles; and let me advise

you in my own behalf, that since you have rekindled me, you do not, by delaying, give me time to cool again.

I would have you know, replied he, I scorn to take the advantage of a warm fit, and be beholden to temper or imagination for gaining me your assent. Therefore, ere I go yet a step farther, I am resolved to enter again into cool reason with you, and ask, if you admit for proof what I advanced yesterday upon that head, "of a universal Union, coherence, or sympathizing of things?"

By force of probability, said I, you overcame me. Being convinced of a consent and correspondence in all we saw of things, I considered it as unreasonable not to allow the same throughout!

Unreasonable indeed! replied he. For in the infinite residue, were there no principle of union, it would seem next to impossible, that things within our sphere should be consistent, and keep their order. "For what was infinite, would be predominant."

It seems so.

Tell me then, said he, after this union owned, how you can refuse to allow the name of demonstration to the remaining arguments, which establish the government of a perfect mind.

Your solutions, said I, of the ill appearances are not perfect enough to pass for demonstration. And whatever seems vicious or imperfect in the creation, puts a stop to further conclusions, till the thing be solved.

Did you not then, said he, agree with me,

when I averred , that the appearances must of necessity stand as they are , and things seem altogether as imperfect , even on the concession of a perfect , supreme mind existent ?

I did so.

And is not the same reason good still , viz.
“ That in an infinity of things mutually relative ,
“ a mind which sees not infinitely , can see no-
“ thing fully ; and must therefore frequently see
“ that as imperfect , which in itself is really
“ perfect ? ”

The reason is still good.

Are the appearances then any objection to our hypothesis ?

None , whilst they remain appearances only.

Can you then prove them to be any more ?
For if you cannot , you prove nothing. And that it lies on you to prove , you plainly see ; since the appearances do not only agree with the hypothesis , but are a necessary consequence from it. To bid me prove therefore , in this case , is in a manner the same as to bid me be infinite. For nothing beside what is infinite can see infinite connexions.

The presumption , I must confess , said I , by this reckoning , is wholly on your side. Yet still this is only presumption.

Take demonstration then , said he , if you can endure I should reason thus abstractedly and drily. The appearances of Ill , you say , are not necessarily that Ill they represent to us.

I own it.

Therefore what they represent may possibly be Good.

It may.

And therefore there may possibly be no real Ill in things ; but all may be perfectly concurrent to one interest ; the interest of that universal One.

It may be so.

Why then , if it may be so , be not surprised , “ it follows that it must be so ; ” on the account of that great unit and simple self-principle which you have granted in the whole. For whatever is possible in the whole , the nature or mind of the whole will put in execution for the whole's good ; and if it be possible to exclude Ill , it will exclude it. Therefore , since , notwithstanding the appearances , it is possible that Ill may actually be excluded ; count upon it , “ that actually “ it is excluded.” For nothing merely passive can oppose this universally active principle. If any thing active oppose it , it is another principle.

Allow it.

It is impossible. For were there in nature two or more principles , either they must agree or not. If they agree not , all must be confusion , till one be predominant. If they agree , there must be some natural reason for their agreement ; and this natural reason cannot be from chance , but from some particular design , contrivance , or thought ; which brings us up again to one principle , and makes the other two to be subordinate. And thus when we have compared each of the three opinions , viz. “ That there is no designing,

“ active principle ; That there is more than one ; ”
or , “ That finally there is but one ; ” we shall
perceive , that the only consistent opinion is the
last. And since one or other of these opinions
must of necessity be true ; what can we deter-
mine , other than that the last is , and must be so
demonstrably ? if it be demonstration , “ That
“ in three opinions , one of which must necessa-
“ rily be true , two being plainly absurd , the
“ third must be the truth.”

Enough , said I , Theocles. My doubts are
vanished. Malice and Chance , vain phantoms !
have yielded to that all-prevalent Wisdom which
you have established. You are conqueror in the
cool way of reason , and may , with honor now
grow warm again , in your poetic vein. Return
therefore , I entreat you , once more to that perfection
of being ; and address yourself to it as before ,
on our approaches to these sylvan scenes , where
first it seemed to inspire you. I shall now no
longer be in danger of imagining either magic or
superstition in the case ; since you invoke no other
Power than that single one , which seems so
natural.

Thus I continue then , said Theocles , address-
ing myself , as you would have me , to that guar-
dian Deity and inspirer , whom we are to imagine
present here ; but not here only. For “ O mighty
“ Genius ! sole-animating and inspiring Power !
“ author and subject of these thoughts ! thy
“ influence is universal , and in all things thou
“ art inmost. From thee depend their secret

“ springs of action. Thou movest them with an
“ irresistible, unwearied force, by sacred and
“ inviolable laws, framed for the good of each
“ particular being, as best may suit with the
“ perfection, life, and vigor of the whole. The
“ vital principle is widely shared, and infinitely
“ varied; dispersed throughout; no where extinct.
“ All lives, and by succession still revives. The
“ temporary beings quit their borrowed forms,
“ and yield their elementary substance to new
“ comers. Called, in their several turns, to life,
“ they view the light, and viewing pass; that
“ others too may be spectators of the goodly scene,
“ and greater numbers still enjoy the privilege of
“ Nature. Munificent and great, she imparts
“ herself to most; and makes the subjects of her
“ bounty infinite. Nought stays her hastening
“ hand. No time nor substance is lost or unim-
“ proved. New forms arise; and when the old
“ dissolve, the matter whence they were composed,
“ is not left useless, but wrought with equal
“ management and art, even in corruption,
“ Nature’s seeming waste, and vile abhorrence.
“ The abject state appears merely as the way or
“ passage to some better. But could we nearly
“ view it, and with indifference, remote from the
“ antipathy of sense, we then perhaps should
“ highest raise our admiration; convinced that
“ even the way itself was equal to the end. Nor
“ can we judge less favorably of that consummate
“ art exhibited through all the works of nature;
“ since our weak eyes, helped by mechanic art,
discover

“ discover in these works a hidden scene of won-
“ ders ; worlds within worlds , of infinite minute-
“ nefs , though as to art still equal to the greatest ,
“ and pregnant with more wonders than the
“ most discerning sense , joined with the greatest
“ art , or the acuteft reason , can penetrate or
“ unfold.

“ But it is in vain for us to search the bulky
“ mafs of Matter ; seeking to know its nature ;
“ how great the whole itself , or even how small
“ its parts.

“ If , knowing only some of the rules of
“ Motion , we seek to trace it further , it is in
“ vain we follow it into the bodies it has reached.
“ Our tardy apprehensions fail us , and can reach
“ nothing beyond the body itself , through which
“ it is diffused. Wonderful Being , if we may
“ call it fo , which bodies never receive , except
“ from others which lose it , nor ever lose ,
“ unless by imparting it to others. Even without
“ change of place it has its force ; and bodies
“ big with motion labor to move , yet stir not ,
“ whilst they exprefs an energy beyond our
“ comprehension.

“ In vain too we pursue that phantom Time ,
“ too small , and yet too mighty for our grasp ;
“ when , shrinking to a narrow point , it escapes
“ our hold , or mocks our scanty thought , by
“ swelling to eternity ; an object unproportioned
“ to our capacity , as is thy being. O thou an-
“ cient Cause ! older than time , yet young with
“ fresh eternity.

“ In vain we try to fathom the abyfs of Space;
“ the feat of thy extensive being; of which no
“ place is empty, no void which is not full.

“ In vain we labor to understand that principle
“ of Sense and Thought, which seeming in us to
“ depend fo much on motion, yet differs fo much
“ from it, and from matter itfelf, as not to fuffer
“ us to conceive how thought can more refult
“ from this, than this arife from thought. But
“ thought we own pre- eminent, and confefs the
“ realleft of beings; the only exiftence of which
“ we are made fure, by being confcious. All elfe
“ may be only dream and fhadow. All which
“ even fenfe fuggelts may be deceitful. The Senfe
“ itfelf remains ftill; Reason fubfifts; and Thought
“ maintains its elderfhip of being. Thus are we
“ in a manner confcious of that original and eter-
“ nally exiftent Thought, whence we derive our
“ own. And thus the affurance we have of the
“ exiftence of beings above our fenfe, and of
“ thee, the great exemplar of thy works, comes
“ from thee, the All-true, and perfect, who haft
“ thus communicated thyfelf more immediately to
“ us, fo as in fome manner to inhabit within our
“ fouls; thou who art original foul, diffufive,
“ vital in all, infpiring the whole.

“ All Nature’s wonders ferve to excite and
“ perfect this idea of their Author. It is here
“ he fuffers us to fee, and even converse with
“ him, in a manner fuitable to our frailty. How
“ glorious is it to contemplate him, in this nobleft
“ of his works apparent to us, the fystem of the
“ bigger world!” —

Here I must own, it was no small comfort to me; to find, that, as our meditation turned, we were likely to get clear of an entangling, abstruse philosophy. I was in hopes Theocles, as he proceeded, might stick closer to Nature, since he was now come upon the borders of our world. And here I would willingly have welcomed him, had I thought it safe at present to venture the least interruption.

“ Besides the neighbouring planets,” continued he, in his rapturous strain, “ what multitudes of
“ fixed stars did we see sparkle, not an hour ago,
“ in the clear night, which yet had hardly yielded,
“ to the day? How many others are discovered
“ by the help of art? Yet how many remain still,
“ beyond the reach of our discovery! Crowded as
“ they seem, their distance from each other is as
“ unmeasurable by art, as is the distance between
“ them and us. Whence we are naturally taught
“ the immensity of that Being, who through these
“ immense spaces has disposed such an infinity of
“ bodies, belonging each, as we may well pre-
“ sume, to systems as complete as our own world;
“ since even the smallest spark of this bright
“ galaxy may vie with this our sun; which shin-
“ ing now full out, gives us new life, exalts
“ our spirits, and makes us feel Divinity more
“ present.

“ Prodigious orb! bright source of vital heat,
“ and spring of day! — soft flame, yet how in-
“ tense, how active! how diffusive, and how
“ vast a substance! yet how collected thus within

“ itself, and in a glowing mass confined to the
 “ centre of this planetary world! — Mighty
 “ being! brightest image and representative of
 “ the Almighty! supreme of the corporeal world!
 “ unperishing in grace, and of undecaying youth!
 “ fair, beautiful, and hardly mortal creature! by
 “ what secret ways dost thou receive the supplies
 “ which maintain thee still in such unwearied vigor,
 “ and unexhausted glory; notwithstanding those
 “ eternally-emitted streams, and that continual
 “ expence of vital treasures, which enlighten and
 “ invigorate the surrounding worlds?

“ Around him all the planets, with this our
 “ earth, single, or with attendants, continually
 “ move; seeking to receive the blessing of his
 “ light, and lively warmth! Towards him they
 “ seem to tend with prone descent, as to their
 “ centre; but happily controuled still by another
 “ impulse, they keep their heavenly order; and,
 “ in just numbers and exactest measure, go the
 “ eternal rounds.

“ But, O thou who art the author and modifier
 “ of these various motions! O sovereign and sole
 “ mover, by whose high art the rolling spheres
 “ are governed, and these stupendous bodies of
 “ our world hold their unrelenting courses! O
 “ wise œconomist, and powerful chief, whom all
 “ the elements and powers of Nature serve! how
 “ hast thou animated these moving worlds? what
 “ spirit or soul infused? what bias fixed? or
 “ how compassed them in liquid æther, driving
 “ them as with the breath of living winds, thy

“ active and unwearied ministers in this intricate
“ and mighty work ?

“ Thus powerfully are the systems held entire,
“ and kept from fatal interfering. Thus is our
“ ponderous globe directed in its annual course,
“ daily revolving on its own centre; whilst the
“ obsequious moon, with double labor, monthly
“ surrounding this our bigger orb, attends the
“ motion of her sister-planet, and pays in common
“ her circular homage to the sun.

“ Yet is this mansion-globe, this man-container,
“ of a much narrower compass even than other
“ its fellow-wanderers of our system. How
“ narrow then must it appear, compared with the
“ capacious system of its own sun? And how
“ narrow, or as nothing, in respect of those in-
“ numerable systems of other apparent suns? Yet
“ how immense a body it seems, compared with
“ ours of human form, a borrowed remnant of
“ its variable and oft-converted surface? though
“ animated with a sublime celestial spirit, by
“ which we have relation and tendency to thee
“ our heavenly fire, centre of souls; to whom
“ these spirits of ours by nature tend, as earthly
“ bodies to their proper centre. — O did they
“ tend as unerringly and constantly! — But thou
“ alone composest the disorders of the corporeal
“ world, and from the restless and fighting ele-
“ ments raisest that peaceful concord, and con-
“ spiring beauty of the ever-flourishing creation.
“ Even so canst thou convert these jarring motions
“ of intelligent beings, and in due time and man-

“ner cause them to find their rest; making them
“contribute to the good and perfection of the
“universe, thy all-good and perfect work.”

Here again he broke off, looking on me as if he expected I should speak; which when he found plainly I would not, but continued still in a posture of musing thought; Why, Philocles! said he, with an air of wonder, what can this mean, that you should suffer me thus to run on, without the least interruption? Have you at once given over your scrupulous philosophy, to let me range thus at pleasure through these aerial spaces and imaginary regions, where my capricious fancy or easy faith has led me? I would have you to consider better, and know, my Philocles, that I had never trusted myself with you in this vein of enthusiasm, had I not relied on you to govern it a little better.

I find then, said I, rousing myself from my musing posture, you expect I should serve you in the same capacity as that musician, whom an ancient orator made use of at his elbow, to strike such moving notes as raised him when he was perceived to sink; and calmed him again, when his impetuous spirit was transported in too high a strain.

You imagine right, replied Theocles; and therefore I am resolved not to go on, till you have promised to pull me by the sleeve when I grow extravagant.

Be it so, said I; you have my promise. But how if, instead of rising in my transports, I should grow flat and tiresome?

what lyre or instrument would you employ to raise me?

The danger, I told him, could hardly be supposed to lie on this hand. His vein was a plentiful one; and his enthusiasm in no likelihood of failing him. His subject too, as well as his numbers, would bear him out. And with the advantage of the rural scene around us, his numbered prose, I thought, supplied the room of the best pastoral song. For in the manner I was now wrought up, it was as agreeable to me to hear him, in this kind of passion, invoke his stars and elements, as to hear one of those amorous shepherds complaining to his flock, and making the woods and rocks resound the name of her whom he adored. — Begin therefore, continued I, still pressing him, begin anew, and lead me boldly through your elements. Wherever there is danger, be it on either hand, I promise to give you warning, when I perceive it.

Let us begin then, said he, with this our element of earth, which yonder we see cultivated with such care by the early swains now working in the plain below. — “ Unhappy, restless men,
“ who first disdained these peaceful labors, gentle,
“ rural tasks, performed with such delight! What
“ pride or what ambition bred this scorn? Hence
“ all those fatal evils of your race. Enormous
“ Luxury, despising homely fare, ranges through
“ seas and lands, rifles the globe; and men ingenious to their misery, work out for themselves
“ the means of heavier labor, anxious cares, and

“ sorrow : not satisfied to turn and manure for
“ their use the wholesome and beneficial mould
“ of this their earth, they dig yet deeper; and
“ seeking out imaginary wealth, they search its
“ very entrails.

“ Here, led by curiosity, we find minerals of
“ different natures, which by their simplicity
“ discover no less of the divine art, than the
“ most compounded of Nature’s works. Some are
“ found capable of surprising changes; others as
“ durable, and hard to be destroyed or changed
“ by fire, or utmost art. So various are the
“ subjects of our contemplation that even the
“ study of these inglorious parts of Nature, in
“ the nether world, is able itself alone to yield
“ large matter and employment for the busiest
“ spirits of men, who in the labor of these experiments can willingly consume their lives.—
“ But the noisome, poisonous steams which the
“ earth breathes from these dark caverns, where
“ she conceals her treasures, suffer not prying
“ mortals to live long in this search.

“ How comfortable is it to those who come
“ out hence alive, to breathe a purer air; to
“ see the rejoicing light of day! and tread the
“ fertile ground! How gladly they contemplate
“ the surface of the earth, their habitation, heated
“ and enlivened by the sun, and tempered by
“ the fresh air of fanning breezes! These exercise
“ the resty plants, and scour the unactive globe.
“ And when the sun draws hence thick-clouded
“ steams and vapors, it is only to digest and exalt

“ the unwholesome particles, and commit them
“ to the sprightly air; which soon imparting its
“ quick and vital spirit, renders them again with
“ improvement to the earth, in gentle breathings,
“ or in rich dews and fruitful showers. The same
“ air, moving about the mighty mass, enters its
“ pores, impregnating the whole: and both the
“ sun and air conspiring, so animate this mother-
“ earth, that though ever breeding, her vigor is
“ as great, her beauty as fresh, and her looks as
“ charming, as if she newly came out of the form-
“ ing hands of her Creator.

“ How beautiful is the water among the inferior
“ earthly works! heavy, liquid, and transparent;
“ without the springing vigor and expansive force
“ of air; but not without activity. Stubborn and
“ unyielding, when compressed, but placidly avoid-
“ ing force, and bending every way with ready
“ fluency! Insinuating, it dissolves the lumpish
“ earth, frees the entangled bodies, procures their
“ intercourse, and summons to the field the keen
“ terrestrial particles; whose happy strifes soon
“ ending in strict union, produce the various forms
“ which we behold. How vast are the abysses of
“ the sea, where this soft element is stored; and
“ whence the sun and winds extracting, raise it
“ into clouds! These soon converted into rain,
“ water the thirsty ground, and supply afresh the
“ springs and rivers; the comfort of the neigh-
“ bouring plains; and sweet refreshment of all
“ animals.

“ But whither shall we trace the sources of the

“ light? or in what ocean comprehend the lumi-
“ nous matter, so wide diffused through the im-
“ mense spaces which it fills? What seats shall
“ we assign to that fierce element of fire, too
“ active to be confined within the compass of the
“ sun, and not excluded even the bowels of the
“ heavy earth? The air itself submits to it, and
“ serves as its inferior instrument. Even this our
“ sun, with all those numerous suns, the glittering
“ host of heaven, seem to receive from hence the
“ vast supplies which keep them ever in their
“ splendid state. The invisible, ethereal substance,
“ penetrating both liquid and solid bodies, is
“ diffused throughout the universe. It cherishes
“ the cold, dull, massy globe, and warms it to its
“ centre. It forms the minerals; gives life and
“ growth to vegetables; kindles a soft, invisible,
“ and vital flame in the breasts of living creatures;
“ frames, animates, and nurses all the various
“ forms; sparing, as well as employing for their
“ use, those sulphurous and combustible matters
“ of which they are composed. Benign and gentle
“ amidst all, it still maintains this happy peace
“ and concord, according to its stated and peculiar
“ laws. But these once broken, the acquitted
“ being takes its course unrulèd. It runs impetuous
“ through the fatal breach, and breaking into vi-
“ sible and fierce flames, passes triumphant over
“ the yielding forms, converting all into itself, and
“ dissolving now those systems which itself before
“ had formed. It is thus.” —

Here Theocles stopped on a sudden, when, as

he imagined, I was putting my hand out, to lay hold on his sleeve.

O Philocles, said he, it is well remembered. I was growing too warm, I find, as well I might indeed, in this hot element. And here perhaps I might have talked yet more mysteriously, had you been one who could think otherwise than in the common way of the soft flames of love. You might, perhaps, have heard wonders in this kind: "How all things had their being hence, and how " their noblest end was to be here wrapped up, " consumed, and lost." — But in these high flights, I might possibly have gone near to burn my wings.

Indeed, said I, you might well expect the fate of Icarus for your high soaring. But this, indeed, was not what I feared. For you were got above danger; and with that devouring element on your side, had mastered not only the sun himself, but every thing which stood in your way. I was afraid it might, in the issue, run to what they tell us of a universal conflagration; in which I knew not how it might go, possibly, with our Genius.

I am glad, said he, Philocles! to find this grown such a concern with you. But you may rest secure here, if the case you meant were that periodical conflagration talked of by some philosophers. For there the Genius would of necessity be all in all: and in those intervals of creation, when no form nor species existed any where out of the divine mind, all then was Deity; all was that One,

collected thus within itself, and subsisting, as they imagined, rather in a more simple and perfect manner, than when multiplied in more ways; and becoming productive, it unfolded itself in the various map of nature, and this fair visible world.

But for my part, said I, interrupting him, who can much better see Divinity unfolded, than in that involved and solitary state before creation; I could wish you would go a little further with me in the map of nature; especially, if descending from your lofty flights, you would be content to pitch upon this humble spot of Earth, where I could better accompany you, wherever you led me.

But you, replied he, who could confine me to this heavy earth, must yet allow me the same wings of fancy. How else shall I fly with you through different climates, from pole to pole, and from the frigid to the torrid zone?

O, said I, for this purpose I will allow you the Pegasus of the poets, or that winged griffin which an Italian poet of the moderns gave to one of his heroes: yet on this condition, that you take no such extravagant flight, as his was, to the moon; but keep closely to this orb of earth.

Since you will have it so, replied Theocles, let us try first on the darkest and most imperfect parts of our map, and see how you can endure the prospect. "How oblique and faintly looks the sun
"on yonder climates, far removed from him!

“ How tedious are the winters there! how deep
“ the horrors of the night, and how uncomfortable
“ even the light of day! The freezing winds
“ employ their fiercest breath, yet are not spent
“ with blowing. The sea, which elsewhere is scarce
“ confined within its limits, lies here immured in
“ walls of crystal. The snow covers the hills, and
“ almost fills the lowest valleys. How wide and
“ deep it lies, incumbent over the plains, hiding
“ the sluggish rivers, the shrubs, and trees, the
“ dens of beasts, and mansions of distressed and
“ feeble men! — See! where they lie confined,
“ hardly secure against the raging cold, or the
“ attacks of the wild beasts, now masters of the
“ wasted field, and forced by hunger out of the
“ naked woods. — Yet not disheartened, such is
“ the force of human breasts, but thus provided
“ for, by art and prudence, the kind, compensating
“ gifts of heaven, men and their herds may wait
“ for a release. For at length the sun approaching,
“ melts the snow, sets longing men at liberty,
“ and affords them means and time to make pro-
“ vision against the next return of cold. It breaks
“ the icy fetters of the main; where vast sea-
“ monsters pierce through floating islands, with
“ arms which can withstand the crystal rock:
“ whilst others, who of themselves seem great as
“ islands, are by their bulk alone armed against
“ all but man; whose superiority over creatures
“ of such stupendous size and force, should make
“ him mindful of his privilege of reason, and force
“ him humbly to adore the great composer of these

“ wondrous frames, and author of his own superior wisdom.

“ But leaving these dull climates, so little favored by the sun, for those happier regions, on which he looks more kindly, making perpetual summer; how great an alteration do we find? His purer light confounds weak-sighted mortals; pierced by his scorching beams. Scarce can they dread the glowing ground. The air they breathe cannot enough abate the fire which burns within their panting breasts. Their bodies melt. Overcome and fainting, they seek the shade, and wait the cool refreshments of the night. Yet oft the bounteous Creator bestows other refreshments. He casts a veil of clouds before them, and raises gentle gales; favored by which, the men and beasts pursue their labors; and plants refreshed by dews and showers, can gladly bear the warmest sun-beams.

“ And here the varying scene opens to new wonders. We see a country rich with gems, but richer with the fragrant spices it affords. How gravely move the largest of land-creatures on the banks of this fair river! How ponderous are their arms, and vast their strength, with courage, and a sense superior to the other beasts! Yet are they tamed, we see, by mankind, and brought even to fight their battles, rather as allies and confederates, than as slaves.— But let us turn our eyes towards these smaller, and more curious objects; the numerous and devouring insects on the trees in these wide

“ plains. How shining, strong, and lasting are the
“ subtle threads spun from their artful mouths!
“ Who, beside the All-wise, has taught them to
“ compose the beautiful, soft shells, in which recluse
“ and buried, yet still alive, they undergo such a
“ surprising change; when not destroyed by men,
“ who clothe and adorn themselves with the
“ labors and lives of these weak creatures, and
“ are proud of wearing such inglorious spoils?
“ How sumptuously apparelled, gay, and splendid,
“ are all the various insects which feed on the
“ other plants of this warm region! How beau-
“ tiful the plants themselves in all their various
“ growths, from the triumphant palm down to
“ the humble moss!

“ Now may we see that happy country where
“ precious gums and balsams flow from trees; and
“ nature yields her most delicious fruits. How
“ tame and tractable, how patient of labor and of
“ thirst, are those large creatures; who, lifting
“ up their lofty heads, go led and loaden through
“ these dry and barren places! Their shape and
“ temper show them framed by nature to submit
“ to man, and fitted for his service; who from
“ hence ought to be more sensible of his wants,
“ and of the divine bounty, thus supplying
“ them.

“ But see! not far from us, that fertilest of
“ lands, watered and fed by a friendly generous
“ stream, which, ere it enters the sea, divides
“ itself into many branches, to dispense more
“ equally the rich and nitrous manure it bestows

“ so kindly and in due time, on the adjacent
 “ plains. — Fair image of that fruitful and exuber-
 “ ant nature, who with a flood of bounty blesses
 “ all things, and, parent-like, out of her many
 “ breasts sends the nutritious draught in various
 “ streams to her rejoicing offspring! — Innumerable
 “ are the dubious forms and unknown species
 “ which drink the slimy current; whether they
 “ are such as leaving the scorched deserts, satiate
 “ here their ardent thirst, and promiscuously engen-
 “ dering, beget a monstrous race; or whether,
 “ as it is said, by the sun’s genial heat, active on
 “ the fermenting ooze, new forms are generated,
 “ and issue from the river’s fertile bed. — See
 “ there the noted tyrant of the flood, and terror
 “ of its borders! when suddenly displaying his
 “ horrid form, the amphibious ravager invades
 “ the land, quitting his watery den, and from
 “ the deep emerging, with hideous rush, sweeps
 “ over the trembling plain. The natives from afar
 “ behold with wonder the enormous bulk, sprung
 “ from so small an egg. With horror they relate
 “ the monster’s nature, cruel and deceitful: how
 “ he with dire hypocrisy, and false tears, beguiles
 “ the simple-hearted; and inspiring tenderness and
 “ kind compassion, kills with pious fraud. — Sad
 “ emblem of that spiritual plague, dire Supersti-
 “ tion! native of this soil; where first religion
 “ grew unfociable¹, and among different worship-
 “ pers bred mutual hatred, and abhorrence of each

¹ Vol. 2. Misc. 2. chap. 1. parag. 7. from the end, &c.

other’s

“ other’s temples. The infection spreads : and
 “ nations now profane one to another, war fier-
 “ cer, and in religion’s cause forget humanity :
 “ whilst savage Zeal, with meek and pious
 “ semblance, works dreadful massacre; and for
 “ Heaven’s sake, horrid pretence! makes desolate
 “ the earth. —

“ Here let us leave these monsters, glad if we
 “ could here confine them! and detesting the
 “ dire prolific soil, fly to the vast deserts of these
 “ parts. All ghastly and hideous as they appear,
 “ they want not their peculiar beauties. The
 “ wildness pleases. We seem to live alone with
 “ Nature. We view her in her inmost recesses,
 “ and contemplate her with more delight in these
 “ original wilds, than in the artificial labyrinths
 “ and feigned wildernesses of the palace. The
 “ objects of the place, the scaly serpents, the
 “ savage beasts, and poisonous insects, how terrible
 “ soever, or how contrary to human nature, are
 “ beauteous in themselves, and fit to raise our
 “ thoughts in admiration of that divine wisdom,
 “ so far superior to our short views. Unable to
 “ declare the use or service of all things in this
 “ universe, we are yet assured of the perfection of
 “ all, and of the justice of that œconomy to which
 “ all things are subservient, and in respect of
 “ which things seemingly deformed are amiable;
 “ disorder becomes regular; corruption whole-
 “ some; and poisons such as these we have seen,
 “ prove healing and beneficial.

“ But behold! through a vast tract of sky

“ before us, the mighty Atlas rears his lofty head,
“ covered with snow above the clouds. Beneath
“ the mountain's foot, the rocky country rises
“ into hills, a proper basis of the ponderous mass
“ above; where huge, embodied rocks lie piled on
“ one another, and seem to prop the high arch
“ of heaven. — See! with what trembling steps
“ poor mankind tread the narrow brink of the
“ deep precipices! From whence with giddy
“ horror they look down, mistrusting even the
“ ground which bears them, whilst they hear the
“ hollow sound of torrents underneath, and see
“ the ruin of the impending rock; with falling
“ trees which hang with their roots upwards,
“ and seem to draw more ruin after them. Here
“ thoughtless men, seized with the newness of
“ such objects, become thoughtful, and willingly
“ contemplate the incessant changes of this earth's
“ surface. They see, as in one instant, the revolu-
“ tions of past ages, the fleeting forms of things,
“ and the decay even of this our globe; whose
“ youth and first formation they consider, whilst
“ the apparent spoil, and irreparable breaches of
“ the wasted mountain, show them the world itself
“ only as a noble ruin, and make them think of
“ its approaching period. — But here mid-way the
“ mountain, a spacious border of thick wood
“ harbours our wearied travellers; who now are
“ come among the ever-green and lofty pines, the
“ firs, and noble cedars, whose towering heads
“ seem endless in the sky; the rest of trees appear-
“ ing only as shrubs beside them. And here a

“ different horror seizes our sheltered travellers,
“ when they see the day diminished by the deep
“ shades of the vast wood ; which closing thick
“ above, spreads darkness and eternal night below.
“ The faint and gloomy light looks horrid as the
“ shade itself; and the profound stillness of these
“ places imposes silence upon men, struck with
“ the hoarse echoings of every sound within the
“ spacious caverns of the wood. Here Space asto-
“ nishes. Silence itself seems pregnant; whilst an
“ unknown force works on the mind, and dubious
“ objects move the wakeful sense. Mysterious
“ voices are either heard or fancied; and various
“ forms of Deity seem to present themselves, and
“ appear more manifest in these sacred, sylvan
“ scenes; such as of old gave rise to temples, and
“ favored the religion of the ancient world. Even
“ we ourselves, who in plain characters may read
“ Divinity from so many bright parts of earth,
“ chuse rather these obscurer places, to spell out
“ that mysterious being, which, to our weak eyes,
“ appears at best under a veil of cloud.” —

Here he paused a while, and began to cast about his eyes, which before seemed fixed. He looked more calmly, with an open countenance and free air; by which, and other tokens, I could easily find we were come to an end of our descriptions; and that, whether I would or no, Theocles was now resolved to take his leave of the sublime; the morning being spent, and the forenoon by this time well advanced.

S E C T. II.

Introduction. Natural beauties. Passion of this kind. Enthusiasm. Shadows. First beauty. Original. Enjoyment. Beauty and good. Arts. A judgment. Taste. Improvement. Chief science. Beauty. Orders of beauty. First order. Second order. Third order. Beauty, moral. Offspring. Generation. Source. Pregnancy. Innate ideas. Instinct. Generation. Preconceptions. Beauty of body. Beauty of soul, as real, and necessarily moving. Idea, natural. The fit and decent. Standard owned. Confirmation. Opinion. Fashion. Measure, of virtue and vice. Falshood of this. Shame. Shame, an acknowledgment of moral beauty and deformity. Anger. Anger, an acknowledgment of just and unjust. Pride, an acknowledgment of worth and baseness. Natural impression. Good. Mental enjoyment. Body. Sense. Reason. Comparison of objects and enjoyments. Recapitulation. Knowledge of ourselves. Interest. Ability.

METHINKS, said he, Philocles, changing to a familiar voice, we had better leave these unfociable places, whither our fancy has transported us, and return to ourselves here again, in our more conversible woods, and temperate climates. Here no fierce heats nor colds annoy us, no precipices nor cataracts amaze us. Nor need we here be afraid of our own voices; whilst we hear the notes

of such a cheerful quire, and find the echoes rather agreeable, and inviting us to talk.

I confess, said I, those foreign nymphs, if there were any belonging to those miraculous woods, were much too awful beauties to please me. I found our familiar home-nymphs a great deal more to my humor. Yet, for all this, I cannot help being concerned for your breaking off just when we were got half the world over, and wanted only to take America in our way home. Indeed, as for Europe, I could excuse your making any great tour there, because of the little variety it would afford us. Besides that it would be hard to see it in any view, without meeting still that politic face of affairs, which would too much disturb us in our philosophical flights. But for the western tract, I cannot imagine why you should neglect such noble subjects as are there; unless perhaps the gold and silver, to which I find you such a bitter enemy, frightened you from a mother-soil so full of it. If these countries had been as bare of those metals as old Sparta, we might have heard more perhaps of the Perus and Mexicos than of all Asia and Africa. We might have had creatures, plants, woods, mountains, rivers, beyond any of those we have passed. How sorry am I to lose the noble Amazon! How sorry. —

Here as I would have proceeded, I saw so significant a smile on Theocles's face, that it stopt me, out of curiosity, to ask him his thought.

Nothing, said he, nothing but this very subject itself. — Go on. — I see you will finish it for me.

The spirit of this sort of prophecy has seized you. And Philocles, the cold indifferent Philocles is become a pursuer of the same mysterious Beauty.

It is true, said I, Theocles! I own it. Your genius, the genius of the place, and the great Genius have at last prevailed. I shall no longer resist the passion growing in me for things of a natural kind; where neither art, nor the conceit or caprice of man has spoiled their genuine order, by breaking in upon that primitive state. Even the rude rocks, the mossy caverns, the irregular, unwrought grottoes, and broken falls of waters, with all the horrid graces of the wilderness itself, as representing Nature more, will be the more engaging, and appear with a magnificence beyond the formal mockery of princely gardens. — But tell me, I entreat you, how comes it, that, excepting a few philosophers of your sort, the only people who are enamoured in this way, and seek the woods, the rivers, or sea-shores, are your poor, vulgar Lovers?

Say not this, replied he, of Lovers only. For is it not the same with Poets, and all those other students in Nature, and the arts which copy after her? In short, is not this the real case of all who are lovers either of the Muses or the Graces?

However, said I, all those who are deep in this romantic way, are looked upon, you know, as a people either plainly out of their wits, or

over-run with melancholy and Enthusiasm¹. We always endeavour to recal them from these solitary places. And I must own, that often when I have found my fancy run this way, I have checked myself; not knowing what it was possessed me, when I was passionately struck with objects of this kind.

No wonder, replied he, if we are at a loss, when we pursue the shadow for the substance. For if we may trust to what our reasoning has taught us, whatever in Nature is beautiful or charming, is only the faint shadow of that first beauty. So that every real Love depending on the mind, and being only the contemplation of beauty, either as it really is in itself, or as it appears imperfectly in the objects which strike the sense; how can the rational mind rest here, or be satisfied with the absurd enjoyment which reaches the sense alone?

From this time forward then, said I, I shall no more have reason to fear those beauties which strike a sort of melancholy, like the places we have named, or like these solemn groves. No more shall I avoid the moving accents of soft music, or fly from the enchanting features of the fairest human face.

If you are already, replied he, such a proficient in this new Love, that you are sure never to admire the representative Beauty, except for the

¹ See Letter of enthusiasm, towards the end, in vol. 1. See also above, p. 61. and vol. 3. Misc. 2. chap. 1. parag. 3.

fake of the original, nor aim at other enjoyment than of the rational kind, you may then be confident. I am so; and presume accordingly to answer for myself. However, I should not be ill-satisfied, if you explained yourself a little better, as to this mistake of mine you seem to fear. Would it be any help to tell you, "that the absurdity lay in seeking the enjoyment elsewhere than in the subject loved?"

The matter, I must confess, is still mysterious.

Imagine then, good Philocles, if, being taken with the beauty of the ocean, which you see yonder at a distance, it should come into your head, to seek how to command it; and, like some mighty admiral, ride master of the sea; would not the fancy be a little absurd?

Aburd enough, in conscience. The next thing I should do, it is likely, upon this frenzy, would be to hire some bark; and go in nuptial ceremony, Venetian-like, to wed the gulf, which I might call, perhaps as properly, my own.

Let who will call it theirs, replied Theocles, you will own the enjoyment of this kind to be very different from that which should naturally follow from the contemplation of the ocean's beauty. The bridegroom-doge, who in his stately bucentaur floats on the bosom of his Thetis, has less possession than the poor shepherd, who, from a hanging rock, or point of some high promontory, stretched at his ease, forgets his feeding flocks, while he admires her beauty. — But to come nearer home, and make the question still

more familiar : Suppose , my Philocles ! that viewing such a tract of country , as this delicious vale we see beneath us , you should , for the enjoyment of the prospect , require the property or possession of the land.

The covetous fancy , replied I , would be as absurd altogether as that other ambitious one.

O Philocles , said he , may I bring this yet a little nearer ? and will you follow me once more ? Suppose that being charmed , as you seem to be , with the beauty of these trees , under whose shade we rest , you should long for nothing so much as to taste some delicious fruit of theirs ; and having obtained of Nature some certain relish , by which these acorns or berries of the wood became as palatable as the figs or peaches of the garden , you should afterwards , as oft as you revisited these groves , seek hence the enjoyment of them , by satiating yourself in these new delights.

The fancy of this kind , replied I , would be fordidly luxurious , and as absurd , in my opinion , as either of the former.

Can you not then , on this occasion , said he , call to mind some other forms of a fair kind among us , where the admiration of beauty is apt to lead to as irregular a consequence ?

I feared , said I , indeed , where this would end , and was apprehensive you would force me at last to think of certain powerful forms in human kind which draw after them a set of eager desires , wishes , and hopes , no way suitable , I must

confess, to your rational and refined contemplation of beauty. The proportions of this living architecture, as wonderful as they are, inspire nothing of a studious or contemplative kind. The more they are viewed, the further they are from satisfying by mere view. Let that which satisfies, be ever so disproportionable an effect, or ever so foreign to its cause; censure it as you please; you must allow, however, that it is natural. So that you, Theocles, for ought I see, are become the accuser of Nature, by condemning a natural enjoyment.

Far be it from us both, said he, to condemn a joy which is from nature. But when we spoke of the enjoyment of these woods and prospects, we understood by it a far different kind from that of the inferior creatures, who rifling in these places, find here their choicest food. Yet we too live by tasteful food, and feel those other joys of sense in common with them. But it was not here, my Philocles! that we had agreed to place our good, nor consequently our enjoyment. We who were rational, and had minds, methought, should place it rather in those Minds, which were indeed abused, and cheated of their real good, when drawn to seek absurdly the enjoyment of it in the object of sense, and not in those objects they might properly call their own; in which kind, as I remember, we comprehended all which was truly fair, generous, or good.

So that Beauty, said I, and good with

you, Theocles, I perceive are still one and the same².

It is so, said he. And thus are we returned again to the subject of our yesterday's morning-conversation. Whether I have made good my promise to you, in showing the true good³, I know not. But so doubtless I should have done with good success, had I been able, in my poetic ecstasies, or by any other efforts, to have led you into some deep view of nature, and the sovereign Genius. We then had proved the force of divine Beauty, and formed in ourselves an object capable and worthy of real enjoyment.

O Theocles! said I, well do I remember now the terms in which you engaged me, that morning when you bespoke my love of this mysterious beauty. You have indeed made good your part of the condition, and may now claim me for a profelyte. If there be any seeming extravagance in the case, I must comfort myself the best I can and consider that all sound love and admiration is enthusiasm⁴: "The transports of poets, the sublime of orators, the rapture of musicians, the high strains of the virtuosi; all mere enthusiasm! Even learning itself, the love of arts and curiosities, the spirit of travellers and adventurers; gallantry, war, heroism; all, all enthusiasm!" — It is enough: I am content to

² See above, p. 195, 196.

³ See above, p. 202.

⁴ Vol. i. p. 45.

be this new enthusiast, in a way unknown to me before.

And I, replied Theocles, am content you should call this love of ours enthusiasm; allowing it the privilege of its fellow-passions. For is there a fair and plausible enthusiasm, a reasonable ecstasy and transport allowed to other subjects, such as architecture, painting, music; and shall it be exploded here? Are there senses by which all those other graces and perfections are perceived, and none by which this higher perfection and grace is comprehended? Is it so preposterous to bring that enthusiasm hither, and transfer it from those secondary and scanty objects, to this original and comprehensive one? Observe how the case stands in all those other subjects of art or science. What difficulty to be in any degree knowing! how long ere a true taste is gained! how many things shocking, how many offensive at first, which afterwards are known and acknowledged the highest beauties! For it is not instantly we acquire the sense by which these beauties are discoverable. Labor and pains are required, and time to cultivate a natural genius, ever so apt or forward. But who is there once thinks of cultivating this soil, or of improving any sense or faculty which Nature may have given of this kind? And is it a wonder we should be dull then, as we are, confounded, and at a loss in these affairs, blind as to this higher scene, these noble representations? Which way should we come to understand better? which way be knowing in these beauties? Is

study, science, or learning, necessary to understand all beauties else? And for the sovereign Beauty, is there no skill or science required? In painting there are shades and masterly strokes, which the vulgar understand not, but find fault with: in architecture there is the rustic; in music the chromatic kind, and skilful mixture of dissonancies: and is there nothing which answers to this in the whole?

I must confess, said I, I have hitherto been one of those vulgar who could never relish the shades, the rustic, or the dissonancies you talk of. I have never dreamed of such master-pieces in Nature. It was my way to censure freely on the first view. But I perceive I am now obliged to go far in the pursuit of beauty; which lies very absconded and deep: and if so, I am well assured that my enjoyments hitherto have been very shallow. I have dwelt, it seems, all this while upon the surface, and enjoyed only a kind of flight, superficial beauties; having never gone in search of beauty itself, but of what I fancied such. Like the rest of the unthinking world, I took for granted, that what I liked was beautiful; and what I rejoiced in was my good. I never scrupled loving what I fancied; and aiming only at the enjoyment of what I loved, I never troubled myself with examining what the subjects were, nor ever hesitated about their choice.

Begin then, said he, and chuse. See what the subjects are, and which you would prefer;

which honor with your admiration, love, and esteem. For by these again you will be honored in your turn. Such, Philocles, as is the worth of these companions, such will your worth be found. As there is emptiness or fulness here, so will there be in your enjoyment. See therefore where fulness is, and where emptiness. See in what subject resides the chief excellence; where Beauty reigns; where it is entire, perfect, absolute; where broken, imperfect, short. View these terrestrial beauties, and whatever has the appearance of excellence, and is able to attract. See that which either really is, or stands as in the room of fair, beautiful, and good: "A mass of metal; a tract
 " of land; a number of slaves; a pile of stones; a
 " human body of certain lineaments and propor-
 " tions:" is this the highest of the kind? Is beauty founded then in body only; and not in action, life, or operation? —

Hold! hold! said I, good Theocles! you take this in too high a key, above my reach. If you would have me accompany you, pray lower this strain a little, and talk in a more familiar way.

Thus then, said he, smiling, whatever passion you may have for other beauties, I know, good Philocles, you are no such admirer of wealth in any kind, as to allow much beauty to it, especially in a rude heap or mass. But in medals, coins, embossed works, statues, and well-fabricated pieces, of whatever sort, you can discover beauty, and admire the kind. True,

saïd I; but not for the metal's sake. It is
not then the metal or matter which is beautiful
with you. No. But the art.

Certainly. The art then is the beauty.

Right. And the art is that which beauti-
fies. The same. So that the beauti-

fying, not the beautified, is the really beautiful.
It seems so. For that which is

beautified, is beautiful only by the accession of
something beautifying: and by the recess or
withdrawing of the same, it ceases to be beau-
tiful. Be it. In respect of bodies,

therefore, beauty comes and goes. So we
see. Nor is the body itself any cause ei-

ther of its coming or staying. None.

So that there is no principle of beauty in body.

None at all. For body can no
way be the cause of beauty to itself. No

way. Nor govern nor regulate itself.

Nor yet this. Nor mean nor intend itself.

Nor this neither. Must not that,
therefore, which means and intends for it, re-
gulates and orders it, be the principle of beauty
to it? Of necessity? And what must

that be? Mind, I suppose; for what can
it be else?

Here then, saïd he, is all I would have ex-
plained to you before: "That the beautiful, the
" fair, the comely, were never in the matter,
" but in the art and design; never in body it-
" self, but in the form or forming power." Does
not the beautiful form confess this, and speak

the beauty of the design, whenever it strikes you? What is it but the design which strikes? What is it you admire but mind, or the effect of mind? It is mind alone which forms. All which is void of mind is horrid; and matter formless is deformity itself.

Of all forms then, said I, those, according to your scheme, are the most amiable, and in the first order of beauty, which have a power of making other forms themselves: from whence methinks they may be styled the forming forms. So far I can easily concur with you, and gladly give the advantage to the human form, above those other beauties of man's formation. The palaces, equipages, and estates, shall never in my account be brought in competition with the original living forms of flesh and blood. And for the other, the dead forms of Nature, the metals and stones, however precious and dazzling, I am resolved to resist their splendor, and make abject things of them, even in their highest pride, when they pretend to set off human beauty, and are officiously brought in aid of the fair.

Do you not see then, replied Theocles, that you have established three degrees or orders of beauty? As how? Why, first, the

dead forms, as you properly have called them, which bear a fashion, and are formed whether by man or Nature; but have no forming power, no action, or intelligence. Right.

Next, and as the second kind, the forms which form; that is, which have intelligence, action, and

and operation.

Right still.

Here

therefore is double beauty. For here is both the form, the effect of mind, and mind itself: the first kind low and despicable in respect of this other; from whence the dead form receives its lustre and force of beauty. For what is a mere body, though a human one, and ever so exactly fashioned, if inward form be wanting, and the mind be monstrous or imperfect, as in an idiot, or savage?

This too I can apprehend, said I; but where is the third order?

Have patience, replied he, and see first whether you have discovered the whole force of this second beauty. How else should you understand the force of love, or have the power of enjoyment? Tell me, I beseech you, when first you named these the forming forms, did you think of no other productions of theirs besides the dead kinds, such as the palaces, the coins, the brazen or the marble figures of men? Or did you think of something nearer life?

I could easily, said I, have added, that these forms of ours had a virtue of producing other living forms, like themselves. But this virtue of theirs I thought was from another form above them, and could not properly be called their virtue or art; if in reality there was a superior art, or something artist-like, which guided their hand, and made tools of them in this specious work.

Happily thought, said he! You have prevented a censure which I hardly imagined you could

escape. And here you have unawares discovered that third order of beauty, which forms not only such as we call mere forms, but even the forms which form. For we ourselves are notable architects in matter, and can show lifeless bodies brought into form, and fashioned by our own hands: but that which fashions even minds themselves, contains in itself all the beauties fashioned by those minds; and is consequently the principle, source, and fountain of all beauty.

It seems so.

Therefore whatever beauty appears in our second order of forms, or whatever is derived or produced from thence, all this is eminently, principally, and originally in this last order of supreme and sovereign beauty.

True.

Thus architecture, music, and all which is of human invention, resolves itself into this last order.

Right, said I: and thus all the enthusiasms of other kinds resolve themselves into ours. The fashionable kinds borrow from us, and are nothing without us. We have undoubtedly the honor of being originals.

Now therefore say again, replied Theocles; whether are those fabrics of architecture, sculpture, and the rest of that sort, the greatest beauties which man forms; or are there greater and better? None which I know, replied I.

Think, think again, said he: and setting aside those productions which just now you

excepted against, as master-pieces of another hand; think what there are which more immediately proceed from us, and may more truly be termed our issue. I am barren, said I, for this time: you must be plainer yet, in helping me to conceive.

How can I help you? replied he. Would you have me be conscious for you, of that which is immediately your own, and is solely in and from yourself? You mean my sentiments, said I.

Certainly, replied he: and together with your sentiments, your resolutions, principles, determinations, actions; whatsoever is handsome and noble in the kind; whatever flows from your good understanding, sense, knowledge, and will; whatever is engendered in your heart, good Philocles! or derives itself from your parent-mind, which, unlike to other parents, is never spent or exhausted, but gains strength and vigor by producing. So you my friend! have proved it by many a work; not suffering that fertile part to remain idle and unactive. Hence those good parts, which from a natural genius you have raised by due improvement. And here, as I cannot but admire the pregnant genius, and parent-beauty; so am I satisfied of the offspring, that it is and will be ever beautiful.

I took the compliment, and wished, I told him, the case were really as he imagined, that I might justly merit his esteem and love. My study therefore should be to grow beautiful, in his way of beauty; and from this time forward I

would do all I could to propagate that lovely race of mental children, happily sprung from such a high enjoyment, and from a union with what was fairest and best. But it is you, Theocles, continued I, must help my laboring mind, and be as it were the midwife to those conceptions; which else, I fear, will prove abortive.

You do well, replied he, to give me the midwife's part only: for the mind conceiving of itself, can only be, as you say, assisted in the birth. Its pregnancy is from its nature. Nor could it ever have been thus impregnated by any other mind, than that which formed it at the beginning, and which, as we have already proved, is original to all mental, as well as other beauty.

Do you maintain then, said I, that these mental children, the notions and principles of fair, just, and honest, with the rest of these ideas, are innate?

Anatomists, said he, tell us that the eggs, which are principles in body, are innate; being formed already in the foetus before the birth. But when it is, whether before, or at, or after the birth, or at what time after, that either these, or other principles, organs of sensation, or sensations themselves, are first formed in us, is a matter, doubtless, of curious speculation, but of no great importance. The question is, Whether the principles spoken of are from art, or nature? If from nature purely, it is no matter for the time: nor would I contend with you, though you

should deny life itself to be innate, as imagining it followed rather than preceded the moment of birth. But this I am certain of, that life, and the sensations which accompany life, come when they will, are from mere nature, and nothing else. Therefore, if you dislike the word innate, let us change it, if you will, for instinct; and call instinct that which Nature teaches, exclusive of art, culture, or discipline.

Content, said I.

Leaving then, replied he, those admirable speculations to the virtuosi, the anatomists, and school-divines, we may safely aver, with all their consents, that the several organs, particularly those of generation, are formed by Nature. Whether is there also from Nature, think you, any instinct for the after-use of them? or whether must learning and experience imprint this use?

It is imprinted, said I, enough in conscience. The impression, or instinct, is so strong in the case, that it would be absurdity not to think it natural, as well in our own species, as in other creatures: amongst whom, as you have already taught me, not only the mere engendering of the young, but the various and almost infinite means and methods of providing for them, are all foreknown. For thus much we may indeed discern in the preparatory labors and arts of these wild creatures; which demonstrate their anticipating fancies, precon-

ceptions, or presentations; if I may use a word you taught me yesterday¹.

I allow your expression, said Theocles, and will endeavour to show you that the same pre-conceptions of a higher degree, have place in human kind.

Do so, said I, I entreat you; for so far am I from finding in myself these pre-conceptions of fair and beautiful, in your sense, that methinks, till now of late, I have hardly known of any thing like them in nature.

How then, said he, would you have known that outward fair and beautiful of human kind, if such an object, a fair fleshly one, in all its beauty, had, for the first time, appeared to you, by yourself, this morning in these groves? Or do you think perhaps you should have been unmoved, and have found no difference between this form and any other, if first you had not been instructed?

I have hardly any right, replied I, to plead this last opinion, after what I have owned just before.

Well then, said he, that I may appear to take no advantage against you, I quit the dazzling form, which carries such a force of complicated beauty, and am contented to consider separately each of those simple beauties, which, taken all together, create this wonderful effect. For you will allow, without doubt, that, in respect of bodies, whatever is commonly said of the inex-

¹ Supra, p. 254.

preffible, the unintelligible, the I know-not-what of beauty; there can lie no mystery here, but what plainly belongs either to figure, color, motion, or sound. Omitting therefore the three latter, and their dependent charms; let us view the charm in what is simplest of all, mere figure. Nor need we go so high as sculpture, architecture, or the designs of those who from this study of beauty have raised such delightful arts. It is enough if we consider the simplest of figures; as either a round ball, a cube, or die. Why is even an infant pleased with the first view of these proportions? Why is the sphere or globe, the cylinder and obelisk preferred; and the irregular figures, in respect of these, rejected and despised?

I am ready, replied I, to own there is in certain figures a natural beauty*, which the eye finds as soon as the object is presented to it.

Is there then, said he, a natural beauty of figures? and is there not as natural a one of actions? No sooner the eye opens upon figures, the ear to sounds, than straight the beautiful results, and grace and harmony are known and acknowledged. No sooner are Actions viewed, no sooner the human affections and passions discerned, and they are most of them as soon discerned as felt, than straight an inward Eye distinguishes and sees the fair and shapely, the amiable and admirable, apart from the deformed, the foul, the odious, or the despicable. How is it possible therefore not

* Supra, p. 22.

to own, "That as these distinctions have their foundation in nature, the discernment itself is natural, and from Nature alone?"

If this, I told him, were as he represented it, there could never, I thought, be any disagreement among men concerning actions and behaviour; as, which was base, which worthy, which handsome, and which deformed. But now we found perpetual variance among mankind; whose differences were chiefly founded on this disagreement in opinion; "the one affirming, the other denying, that this or that was fit or decent."

Even by this then, replied he, it appears there is fitness and decency in actions; since the fit and decent is in this controversy ever presupposed: and whilst men are at odds about the subjects, the thing itself is universally agreed. For neither is there agreement in judgments about other beauties. It is controverted, "which is the finest pile, the loveliest shape or face." But without controversy, it is allowed, "there is a Beauty of each kind." This no one goes about to teach, nor is it learned by any, but confessed by all. All own the standard, rule, and measure; but, in applying it to things, disorder arises, ignorance prevails, interest and passion breed disturbance. Nor can it otherwise happen in the affairs of life, whilst that which interestes and engages men as good, is thought different from that which they admire and praise as honest. — But with us, Philocles! it is better settled; since, for our parts,

we have already decreed, "That beauty and good
"are still the same".

I remember, said I, what you forced me to acknowledge more than once before. And now, good Theocles! that I am become so willing a disciple, I want not so much to be convinced, methinks, as to be confirmed and strengthened. And I hope this last work may prove your easiest task.

Not unless you help in it yourself, replied Theocles, for this is necessary, as well as becoming. It had been indeed shameful for you to have yielded without making good resistance. To help one's self to be convinced, is to prevent reason, and bespeak error and delusion. But, upon fair conviction, to give our heart up to the evident side, and reinforce the impression, this is to help reason heartily. And thus we may be said honestly to persuade ourselves. Show me then how I may best persuade myself.

Have courage, said he, Philocles, raising his voice. Be not offended that I say, Have courage! It is Cowardice alone betrays us. For whence can false shame be, except from cowardice? To be ashamed of what one is sure can never be shameful, must needs be from the want of resolution. We seek the right and wrong in things; we examine what is honorable, what shameful; and having at last determined, we dare not stand to our own judgment, and are ashamed to own there is really

⁷ Supra, p. 195, 201. 331.

a shameful and an honorable, "Hear me," says one who pretends to value Philocles, and be valued by him. "There can be no such thing as
 " real valuableness or worth; nothing in itself
 " estimable or amiable, odious or shameful. All
 " is Opinion: it is opinion which makes beauty,
 " and unmakes it. The graceful or ungraceful in
 " things, the decorum and its contrary, the amiable
 " and unamiable, vice, virtue, honor, shame,
 " all this is founded in opinion only. Opinion is
 " the law and measure. Nor has opinion any rule
 " besides mere Chance; which varies it, as custom
 " varies; and makes now this, now that, to be
 " thought worthy, according to the reign of
 " fashion, and the ascendant power of education."

What shall we say to such a one? how represent to him his absurdity and extravagance? Will he desist the sooner? or shall we ask what shame, of one who acknowledges no shameful?

Yet he derides, and cries, Ridiculous!

By what right? what title? For thus, if I were Philocles, would I defend myself: "Am
 " I ridiculous? As how? What is ridiculous?
 " Every thing? or nothing?" Ridiculous indeed!

But something then, something there is ridiculous; and the notion, it seems, is right, "of a shameful and a ridiculous, in things."

How then shall we apply the notion? For this being wrong applied, cannot itself but be ridiculous. Or will he who cries Shame, refuse to acknowledge any in his turn? Does he not blush, nor seem discountenanced on any occasion? If he

does, the case is very distinct from that of mere grief or fear. The disorder he feels is from a sense of what is shameful and odious in itself, not of what is hurtful or dangerous in its consequences. For the greatest danger in the world can never breed shame; nor can the opinion of all the world compel us to it, where our own opinion is not a party. We may be afraid of appearing impudent, and may therefore feign a modesty. But we can never really blush for any thing beside what we think truly shameful, and what we should still blush for, were we ever so secure as to our interest, and out of the reach of all inconvenience which could happen to us from the thing we were ashamed of.

Thus, continued he, should I be able, by anticipation, to defend myself; and looking narrowly into men's lives, and that which influenced them on all occasions, I should have testimony enough to make me say within myself, "Let who will
" be my adversary in this opinion, I shall find
" him some way or other prepossessed with that
" of which he would endeavour to dispossess me." Has he gratitude or resentment, pride or shame? Whichever way it be, he acknowledges a sense of just and unjust, worthy and mean. If he be grateful, or expects gratitude, I ask, "Why? and
" on what account?" If he be angry, if he indulges revenge, I ask, "How? and in what
" case? Revenged of what? of a stone or mad-
" man?" Who is so mad? "But for
" what? For a chance-hurt? an accident against

“thought or intention?” Who is so unjust? Therefore there is just and unjust; and belonging to it a natural presumption or anticipation, on which the Resentment or Anger is founded. For what else should make the wickedest of mankind often prefer the interest of their revenge to all other interests, and even to life itself, except only a sense of wrong, natural to all men, and a desire to prosecute that wrong at any rate? Not for their own sakes, since they sacrifice their very being to it; but out of hatred to the imagined wrong, and from a certain love of Justice, which, even in unjust men, is by this example shown to be beyond the love of Life itself.

Thus, as to Pride, I ask, “Why proud? why
“conceited? and of what? Does any one who
“has pride, think meanly or indifferently of him-
“self?” No; but honorably. And how
this, if there be no real honor dignity presup-
posed? For self-valuation supposes self-worth;
and, in a person conscious of real worth, is either
no pride, or a just and noble one. In the same
manner, self-contempt supposes a self-meanness or
defectiveness; and may be either a just modesty,
or unjust humility. But this is certain, that whoever
is proud, must be proud of something. And we
know that men of thorough pride will be proud
even in the meanest circumstances, and when there
is no visible subject for them to be proud of. But
they descry a merit in themselves, which others
cannot; and it is this merit they admire. No

matter whether it be really in them, as they imagine: it is a worth still, an honor or merit which they admire, and would do, wherever they saw it, in any subject besides. For then it is, then only, that they are humbled, "when they see in a more eminent degree in others, what they respect and admire so much in themselves." — And thus as long as I find men either angry or revengeful, proud or ashamed, I am safe: for they conceive an honorable and dishonorable, a foul and fair, as well as I. No matter where they place it, or how they are mistaken in it: this hinders not my being satisfied, "that the thing is, and is universally acknowledged; that it is of Nature's impression, naturally conceived, and by no art or counter-nature to be eradicated or destroyed."

And now, what say you, Philocles, continued he, to this defence I have been making for you? It is grounded, as you see, on the supposition of your being deeply engaged in this philosophical cause. But perhaps you have yet many difficulties to get over, ere you can so far take part with beauty, as to make this to be your good.

I have no difficulty so great, said I, as not to be easily removed. My inclinations lead me strongly this way: for I am ready enough to yield there is no real good beside the enjoyment of beauty.

And I am as ready, replied Theocles, to yield there is no real enjoyment of beauty beside what is good. Excellent! But, upon reflection, I fear I am little beholden to you for your

concession. As how? Because should I offer to contend for any enjoyment of beauty out of your mental way, you would, I doubt, call such enjoyment of mine absurd; as you did once before.

Undoubtedly I should. For what is it should enjoy, or be capable of enjoyment, except Mind? or shall we say, Body enjoys?

By the help of sense, perhaps; not otherwise.

Is Beauty, then, the object of sense? Say how? which way? For otherwise the help of sense is nothing in the case: and if body be of itself incapable, and sense no help to it, to apprehend or enjoy beauty, there remains only the Mind which is capable either to apprehend or to enjoy.

True, said I; but show me, then, "Why Beauty may not be the object of the sense?"

Show me first, I entreat you, "Why, where, or in what you fancy it may be so?"

Is it not beauty which first excites the sense, and feeds it afterwards in the passion we call love?

Say in the same manner, "That it is beauty first excites the sense, and feeds it afterwards in the passion we call hunger." — you will not say it. The thought, I perceive, displeases you. As great as the pleasure is of good eating, you disdain to apply the notion of beauty to the good dishes which create it. You would hardly have applauded the preposterous fancy of some luxurious Romans of old, who could relish a fricassée the better for hearing it was composed of birds which wore a beautiful feather, or had

fung deliciously. Instead of being incited by such a historical account of meats, you would be apt, I believe, to have less appetite, the more you searched their origin, and descended into the kitchen-science, to learn the several forms and changes they had undergone, ere they were served at this elegant voluptuous table. But though the kitchen-forms be ever so disgraceful, you will allow that the materials of the kitchen, such, for instance, as the garden furnishes, are really fair and beautiful in their kind. Nor will you deny beauty to the wild field, or to these flowers which grow round us on this verdant couch. And yet, as lovely as are these forms of nature, the shining grass, or silvered moss, the flowery thyme, wild rose, or honey-suckle: it is not their Beauty allures the neighbouring herds, delights the browsing fawn, or kid, and spreads the joy we see amidst the feeding flocks: it is not the form rejoices; but that which is beneath the form: it is favouriness attracts, hunger impels; and thirst better allayed by the clear brook than the thick puddle, makes the fair Nymph to be preferred, whose form is otherwise slighted. For never can the form be of real force where it is un contemplated, unjudged of, unexamined, and stands only as the accidental note or token of what appeases provoked sense, and satisfies the brutish part. Are you persuaded of this, good Philocles? or rather than not give brutes the advantage of enjoyment, will you allow them also a mind and rational part?

Not so, I told him.

If brutes, therefore, said he, be incapable of knowing and enjoying beauty, as being brutes, and having sense only, the brutish part, for their own share; it follows, "That neither can Man, " by the same sense or brutish part, conceive or " enjoy beauty: but all the beauty and good he " enjoys is in a nobler way, and by the help of " what is noblest, his Mind and Reason." Here lies his dignity and highest interest: here is capacity toward good and happiness. His ability or incompetency, his power of enjoyment, or his impotence, is founded in this alone. As this is sound, fair, noble, worthy; so are its subjects, acts, and employments. For as the riotous Mind, captive to sense, can never enter in competition, or contend for beauty with the virtuous Mind of reason's culture; so neither can the objects which allure the former, compare with those which attract and charm the latter. And when each gratifies itself in the enjoyment and possession of its object; how evidently fairer are the acts which join the latter pair, and give a soul the enjoyment of what is generous and good? This at least, Philocles, you will surely allow, that when you place a joy elsewhere than in the mind, the enjoyment itself will be no beautiful subject, nor of any graceful or agreeable appearance. But when you think how friendship is enjoyed, how honor, gratitude, candor, benignity, and all internal beauty; how all the social pleasures, society itself, and all which constitutes the worth and happiness of mankind; you

you will here surely allow beauty in the act, and think it worthy to be viewed, and passed in review often by the glad mind, happily conscious of the generous part, and of its own advancement and growth in beauty.

Thus, Philocles, continued he, after a short pause, thus have I presumed to treat of beauty before so great a judge, and such a skilful admirer as yourself. For taking rise from nature's beauty, which transported me, I gladly ventured further in the chase; and have accompanied you in search of beauty, as it relates to us, and makes our highest good, in its sincere and natural enjoyment. And if we have not idly spent our hours, nor ranged in vain through these deserted regions; it should appear from our strict search, that there is nothing so divine as Beauty; which belonging not to body, nor having any principle or existence, except in Mind and Reason, is alone discovered and acquired by this diviner part, when it inspects itself, the only object worthy of itself. For whatever is void of mind, is void and darkness to the mind's eye. This languishes and grows dim, whenever detained on foreign subjects; but thrives and attains its natural vigor, when employed in contemplation of what is like itself. It is thus the improving Mind, slightly surveying other objects, and passing over bodies, and the common forms, where only a shadow of beauty rests, ambitiously presses onward to its source, and views the original of form and order in that which is intelligent. And thus, O

Philocles! may we improve and become artists in the kind; learning “to know ourselves, and what that is, which by improving, we may be sure to advance our worth, and real self-interest.” For neither is this knowledge acquired by contemplation of bodies, or the outward forms, the view of pageantries, the study of estates and honors: nor is he to be esteemed that self-improving artist, who makes a fortune out of these; but he, he only, is the wise and able man, who, with a slight regard to these things, applies himself to cultivate another soil, builds in a different matter from that of stone or marble, and having righter models in his eye, becomes in truth the architect of his own life and fortune: by laying within himself the lasting and sure foundations of order, peace, and concord. — But now it is time to think of returning home. The morning is far spent. Come! Let us away, and leave these uncommon subjects, till we retire again to these remote and unfrequented places.

At these words Theocles mending his pace, and going down the hill, left me at a good distance; till he heard me calling earnestly after him. Having joined him once again, I begged he would stay a little longer: or if he were resolved so soon to leave both the woods, and that philosophy which he confined to them; that he would let me, however, part with them more gradually, and leave the best impression on me he could, against my next return. For as much convinced as I was, and as great a convert to his

doctrine, my danger still, I owed to him, was very great: and I foresaw, that when the charm of these places, and his company was ceased, I should be apt to relapse, and weakly yield to that too powerful charm, the world. Tell me, continued I, how is it possible to hold out against it, and withstand the general opinion of mankind, who have so different a notion of that which we call good? Say truth now, Theocles, can any thing be more odd, or dissonant from the common voice of the world, than what we have determined in this matter?

Whom shall we follow then? replied he. Whose judgment or opinion shall we take concerning what is good, what contrary? If all, or any part of mankind are consonant with themselves, and can agree in this; I am content to leave philosophy, and follow them: if otherwise, why should we not adhere to what we have chosen? — Let us then, in another view, consider how this matter stands.

S E C T. III.

Manners of men. Contrary pursuits. Mutual censure. Disagreement with one another, and with themselves. Riches. Fame and honor. Pleasure. Life. Enslavement. Liberty. Goods of fortune. Goods of the mind. Comparison. Opinion. Opinion all, in what sense. Philosophy.

WE then walked gently homewards, it being almost noon, and he continued his discourse.

One man, said he, affects the hero; esteems it the highest advantage of life, to have seen war, and been in action in the field. Another laughs at this humor; counts it all extravagance and folly; prizes his own wit and prudence; and would take it for a disgrace to be thought adventurous. One person is assiduous and indefatigable in advancing himself to the character of a man of business. Another, on the contrary, thinks this impertinent; values not fame, or a character in the world: and by his good-will would always be in a debauch, and never live out of the stews or taverns; where he enjoys, as he thinks, the highest good. One values wealth, as a means only to indulge his palate, and to eat finely. Another loaths this, and affects popularity, and a name. One admires music and paintings,

cabinet-curiosities, and in-door-ornaments: another admires gardens, architecture, and the pomp of buildings. Another, who has no gusto of either sort, believes all those they call Virtuosi to be half-distracted. One looks upon all expense to be madness; and thinks only wealth itself to be good. One games; another dresses, and studies an equipage; another is full of heraldry, points of honor, a family, and a blood. One recommends gallantry and intrigue; another ordinary good-fellowship; another buffoonery, satire, and the common wit; another sports, and the country; another a court; another travelling, and the sight of foreign parts; another poetry, and the fashionable learning. —

All these go different ways. All censure one another, and are despicable in one another's eyes. By fits too they are as despicable in their own, and as often out of conceit with themselves, as their humor changes, and their passion turns from one thing to another. — What is it then I should be concerned for? whose censure do I fear? or by whom, after all, shall I be guided?

If I ask, "Are riches good, when only heaped up, and unemployed?" one answers, "They are." The rest deny. "How is it

"then they are to be employed in order to be good?" All disagree. All tell me different things.

"Since therefore Riches are not of themselves good, as most of you declare; and since there is no agreement among you which way they become good; why may not I hold it for

“ my opinion, that they are neither good in themselves, nor directly any cause or means of good ? ”

If there be those who wholly despise Fame; and if among those who covet it, he who desires it for one thing, despises it for another; he who seeks it with some men, despises it with others: why may not I say, “ That neither do I know how any fame can be called a good ? ”

If of those who covet Pleasure, they who admire it in one kind, are superior to it in another; why may not I say, “ That neither do I know which of these pleasures, or how pleasure itself can be called good ? ”

— If among those who covet life ever so earnestly, that life which to one is eligible and amiable, is to another despicable and vile; why may not I say, “ That neither do I know how life itself can, of itself, be thought a good ? ”

In the mean time, this I know certainly, “ That the necessary consequence of esteeming these things highly, is to be a slave, and consequently miserable. ” — But perhaps, Philocles! you are not yet enough acquainted with this odd kind of reasoning.

More, said I, than I believe you can easily imagine. I perceived the goodly lady, your celebrated beauty, was about to appear anew: and I easily knew again that fair face of liberty, which I had seen but once in the picture you drew yesterday of that moral dame¹. I can assure you, I

¹ Supra, p. 207. and vol. 3. Misc. 4. chap. 1. parag. 26.; and Misc. 5. chap. 3. parag. 19. &c.

think of her as highly as possible; and find, that, without her help, to raise one above these seemingly essential goods, and make one more easy and indifferent towards life, and towards a fortune; it will be the hardest thing in the world to enjoy either. Solicitude, cares, and anxiety will be multiplied; and in this unhappy dependency, it is necessary to make court; and be not a little servile. To flatter the great, to bear insults, to stoop and fawn, and abjectly resign one's sense and manhood; all this must courageously be endured, and carried off, with as free an air, and good countenance as possible, by one who studies greatness of this sort, who knows the general way of courts, and how to fix unsteady fortune. I need not mention the envyings, the mistrusts, and jealousies. —

No truly, said he, interrupting me, neither need you. But finding you so sensible, as I do, of this unhappy state, and of its inward foreshadowings, whatever may be its outward looks, how is it possible but you must find the happiness of that other contrary state? Can you not call to mind what we resolved concerning Nature? Can any thing be more desirable than to follow her? Or is it not by this freedom from our passions and low interests, that we are reconciled to the goodly order of the universe; that we harmonize with Nature; and live in friendship both with God and man?

Let us compare, continued he, the advantages of each state, and set their goods one against another: on one side, those which we found were

uncertainly so; and depended both on fortune, age, circumstances, and humor: on the other side, these which being certain themselves, are founded on the contempt of those others so uncertain. Is manly liberty, generosity, magnanimity, not a good? May we not esteem as happiness, that self-enjoyment which arises from a consistency of life and manners, a harmony of affections, a freedom from the reproach of shame or guilt, and a consciousness of worth and merit with all mankind, our society, country, and friends; all which is founded in virtue only? A mind subordinate to reason, a temper humanized, and fitted to all natural affection; an exercise of friendship uninterrupted; a thorough candor, benignity; and good nature, with constant security, tranquillity, equanimity, if I may use such philosophical terms; are not these ever, and at all seasons good? Is it of these one can at any time nauseate and grow weary? Are there any particular ages, seasons, places, circumstances, which must accompany these, to make them agreeable? Are these variable and inconstant? Do these, by being ardently beloved, or sought, occasion any disturbance or misery? Can these be at any time overvalued? Or to say more yet, can these be ever taken from us, or can we ever be hindered in the enjoyment of them, unless by ourselves? How can we better praise the goodness of Providence than in this, "That it has placed our
 "happiness and good in things we can bestow
 "upon ourselves?"

If this be so, said I, I see no reason we have to accuse Providence on any account. But men, I fear, will hardly be brought to this good temper, while their fancy is so strong, as it naturally is, towards those other moveable goods. And in short, if we may depend on what is said commonly, "all good is merely as we fancy it. It is conceit which makes it. All is opinion and fancy only."

Wherefore then, said he, do we act at any time? why chuse, or why prefer one thing to another? You will tell me, I suppose, it is because we fancy it, or fancy good in it. Are we therefore to follow every present fancy, opinion, or imagination of good? If so, then we must follow that at one time, which we decline at another; approve at one time, what we disapprove at another; and be at perpetual variance with ourselves. But if we are not to follow all fancy or opinion alike; if it be allowed, "that of fancies, some are true, some false;" then we are to examine every fancy; and there is some rule or other by which to judge and determine. It was the fancy of one man to set fire to a beautiful temple, in order to obtain immortal memory or fame. It was the fancy of another man to conquer the world, for the same reason, or what was very like it. If this were really the man's good, why do we wonder at him? If the fancy were wrong, say plainly in what it was so; or why the subject was not good to him, as he fancied? Either therefore, "that is every man's

“ good which he fancies, and because he fancies
 “ it, and is not content without it; ” or other-
 wise, “ there is that in which the nature of man
 “ is satisfied, and which alone must be his good.”
 If that in which the nature of man is satisfied,
 and can rest contented, be alone his good; then
 he is a fool who follows that with earnestness, as
 his good, which a man can be without, and yet
 be satisfied and contented. In the same manner
 is he a fool who flies that earnestly as his ill,
 which a man may endure, and yet be easy and
 contented. Now, a man may possibly not have
 burnt a temple, as Erostratus, and yet may be
 contented. Or, though he may not have con-
 quered the world, as Alexander, yet he may
 be easy and contented: as he may still, without
 any of those advantages of power, riches or re-
 nown; if his fancy hinders not. In short, we shall
 find, “ that without any one of those which are
 commonly called goods, a man may be con-
 tented: ” as, on the contrary, “ he may pos-
 “ sess them all, and still be discontented, and not
 “ a jot the happier.” If so, it follows, “ that happiness
 “ is from within, not from without.” A good
 fancy is the main. And thus you see I agree with
 you, “ That opinion is all in all ”. — But what
 is this, Philocles, which has seized you? You
 seem of a sudden grown deeply thoughtful.

To tell you truth, said I, I was considering
 what would become of me, if, after all, I should,

² Vol. 1. p. 265. 276. 278. and vol. 3. Misc. 4. chap. 1. parag.
 18, 19. 22. &c.

by your means, turn philosopher. The change truly would be somewhat extraordinary, replied Theocles. But be not concerned. The danger is not so great. And experience shows us every day, that for talking or writing philosophy, people are not at all the nearer being philosophers.

But, said I, the very name is a kind of reproach. The word idiot stood formerly as the opposite to philosopher: but now-a-days it means nothing more commonly than the philosopher himself.

Yet, in effect, replied he, what else is it we all do in general, than philosophize? If philosophy be, as we take it, the study of happiness; must not every one, in some manner or other, either skilfully or unskilfully philosophize? Is not every deliberation concerning our main interest, every correction of our taste; every choice and preference in life to be reckoned of this kind? For "if happiness be not allowed to be from self, and from within; then either is it from outward things alone, or from self and outward things together. If from outward things alone, show it us in fact, "that all men are happy in proportion to these; and that no one who possesses them is ever miserable by his own fault." But this, it seems, hardly any one will pretend to evince: all own the contrary. Therefore, "if happiness be partly from self, partly from outward things; then each must be considered, and a certain value set on the concerns of an

“inward kind, and which depend on self alone.”
 If so; and that I consider “how, and in what
 “these are to be preferred; when and on what
 “occasion they are in season, or out of season;
 “when properly to take place, when to yield:”
 what is this, after all, but to philosophize?

Yet even this still is enough to put one out of the ordinary way of thinking, and give one an unhappy turn for business and the world.

Right! For this also is to be considered, and well weighed. And therefore, this still is philosophy, to inquire where, and in what respect, “one may
 “be most a loser; which are the greatest gains,
 “the most profitable exchanges;” since every thing in this world goes by exchange. Nothing is had for nothing. Favor requires courtship: interest is made by solicitation: honors are acquired with hazard; riches with pains; learning and accomplishments by study and application. Security, rest, indolence, are to be had at other prices. They may be thought perhaps to come easy. For “what hardship is there? where is
 “the harm?” It is only to abate of fame and fortune. It is only to wave the point of honor, and share somewhat less of interest. If this be easy, all is well. Some patience, you see, is necessary in the case. Privacy must be endured; even obscurity and contempt. — Such are the conditions. And thus every thing has its condition. Power and preferments are to be had at one rate; pleasures at another; liberty and honesty at another. A good mind must be paid for, as other things.

But we had best beware, lest perhaps we pay too dear for it. Let us be assured we have a good bargain. Come on then. — Let us account.

— “What is a mind worth? What allowance may one handsomely make for it? or what may one well afford it for?” — If I part with it, or abate of it, it is not for nothing. Some value I must needs set upon my liberty, some upon my inward character. Something there is in what we call worth; something in sincerity and a sound heart. Orderly affections, generous thoughts, and a commanding reason, are fair possessions, not slightly to be given up. I am to consider first, “What may be their equivalent? whether I shall find my account in letting these inward concerns run as they please; or, whether I shall not be better secured against fortune, by adjusting matters at home; rather than by making interest abroad, and acquiring first one great friend, then another, to add still more and more to my estate or quality?” For where am I to take up? Begin, and set the bounds. Let me hear positively, “How far I am to go, and why no further?” What is a moderate fortune, a competency, and those other degrees commonly talked of? Where is my anger to stop? or how high may I suffer it to rise? How far may I engage in love? how far give way to ambition? how far to other appetites? Or am I to let all loose? Are the passions to take their swing: and no application to be given to them, but all to the outward things

they aim at? Or if any application be requisite, say plainly, "How much to one, and how much to the other?" How far are the appetites to be minded, and how far outward things? Give us the measure and rule. See whether this be not to philosophize? And, whatever willingly or unwillingly, knowingly or unknowingly, directly or indirectly, every one does not as much?

"Where then is the difference? Which manner is the best?" Here lies the question.

This is what I would have you weigh and examine.

"But the examination, say you, is troublesome; and I had better be without it."

"Who tells you thus? Your reason, you say, whose force, of necessity, you must yield to."

Tell me therefore, have you fitly cultivated that reason of yours, polished it, bestowed the necessary pains on it, and exercised it on this subject? Or is it like to determine full as well when unexercised, as when thoroughly exercised, or ever so expert? Consider, pray, in mathematics, whose is the better reason of the two, and fitter to be relied on? the practiser's? or his who is unpractised? whose in the way of war, of policy, or civil affairs? whose in merchandise, law, physic? — And in Morality and life, I ask still whose? May he not perhaps be allowed the best judge of living, who studies life, and endeavours to form it by some rule? Or is he indeed to be esteemed most knowing in the matter, who slightly examines it, and who accidentally and unknowingly philosophizes?

Thus, Philocles, said he, concluding his discourse, thus is philosophy established. For every, one, of necessity, must reason concerning his own happiness; "what his good is, and what "his ill." The question is only, "Who reasons "best?" For even he who rejects this reasoning or deliberating part, does it from a certain reason, and from a persuasion, "that this is best."

By this time we found ourselves insensibly got home. Our philosophy ended, and we returned to the common affairs of life.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.



Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper <<of>>,

Characteristics of men, manners, opinions, times, with a collection of
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